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Summary
The subject matter of this thesis is the analysis of implementation of three of the 
programmes of the National Solidarity Programme-PRONASOL. A study of the 
implementation of PRONASOL is essential because the relationship between 
policy success or failure and policy implementation has been poorly studied for the 
Mexican context
This thesis aims to provide a detailed analysis of the process of 
implementation of three of the programmes of the PRONASOL in the state of 
Campeche, Mexico, which will be used to test relevant theoretical assumptions 
about policy implementation.
In terms of policy implementation the dissertation explores empirically the 
link between individual behaviour and the political, economic and legal context in 
which the action takes place by considering contextual variables.
The thesis uses the case study method to test the adequacy of theory of 
policy implementation to explain the cases under analysis. This method was useful 
first, because it allowed to emphasise contextual conditions which may have 
significant influence on the phenomenon under study. Second, because the research 
aimed to describe cases in which the conclusions of national studies based on 
aggregated data were not helpful.
A contrasting strategy was used to extent the explanatory potential of the 
case study method which was achieved through the selection of programmes and 
also through the selection of municipalities and localities in which the study was 
carried out
The dissertation contributes to the understanding of the link between 
concrete and immediate day-to-day decisions by particular actors with the long­
term structural features of Mexican society and so, to shed light on the historical 
trends, institutional processes, and political decisions that are interwoven in the 
implementation of public policies.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The case for a study of implementation
The subject matter of this thesis is the analysis of implementation of three of the 
programmes of the National Solidarity Programme-PRONASOL. Analysis of 
implementation procedures and personnel adds to the information from previous 
studies which have adopted different perspectives. Formerly the emphasis has been 
placed on the political and economic implications in the national scene The 
majority of studies to date have made inferences from the analysis of aggregated 
data which frequently do not characterise particular cases and the conclusions of 
which are not useful in explaining regional or sectoral variations Furthermore, 
their level of generality does not allow, for example, an identification and 
understanding of the mechanisms through which a federal initiative like 
PRONASOL is implemented. Little is known about the actors involved in the 
implementation process or the changes which occurred in the programme from its 
original design to its final implementation Most importantly, although many of the 
studies offer an evaluation o f the programme, very little information has been 
provided about how actors and ongoing modifications influenced success or 
failure. Although these studies have provided valuable information for the 
understanding of one of the most important anti-poverty initiatives in the country, 
an analysis of implementation is still needed for the following reasons
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First, analyses of the implementation of projects are rather few in the 
Mexican context. In 19931 an anthology of key texts in the field was published. Up 
to then, two types o f study prevailed in the area of public policy. The first one, is 
an analysis that has tried to explain the process by which a social problem gets onto 
the political agenda. The second, is evaluation studies which have assessed the 
impact of governmental programmes, mainly by contrasting their intentions with 
final results. However, very few studies have focused on the process which lies 
between intentions and final outcomes. Whether programmes failed or succeeded 
because of their analytical framework or due to technical flaw or bureaucratic lag is 
something that has not received the necessary attention. It is not known for 
instance, whether a centralised or decentralised strategy helps to increase the 
effectiveness of a policy, or whether a smaller or larger number o f participant 
actors influences the achievement of the policy goals. The influence o f these factors 
in the success or failure of policy is examined. The analytical framework of a policy 
may be the proper one to effect change in a given area of policy, but if the 
implementation process is not structured adequately the policy will fail regardless 
of an adequate design. A study of the implementation of PRONASOL then is 
essential because the relationship between policy success or failure and policy 
implementation has been poorly studied for the Mexican context (see Valadez and 
Bamberger 1994). 1
1 See Aguilar Villanueva 1993.
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Second, studies of implementation are useful in identifying the political, 
economic and administrative perceptions and values of the actors during the 
implementation process which can hinder the objectives of governmental 
programmes (see Grindle 1991). It is commonly assumed that once the policy has 
been designed, it will be implemented by government agencies according to its 
guidelines Deviations from the original plan are considered then either as resulting 
from a lack o f control from a lack of foresight which can easily be corrected with 
proper supervision. The fact that implementing agencies are managed by political 
actors whose values, perceptions and orientations influence the decisions and 
actions which in the end affect the way a policy is implemented has been too often 
disregarded. Regulations and institutions certainly restrict discretion, but a study of 
the implementation process will show the extent to which the manoeuvring of 
bureaucrats at all levels may influence the final outcome of a policy.
Third, the implementation of PRONASOL represented a break with the 
established bureaucratic pattern of public policy implementation in Mexico. This 
had more than simple administrative implications The inclusion of actors who had 
traditionally been excluded from the decision-making and implementation of public 
policies gave the programme an important political and economic meaning. 
Economically, community mobilisation resulted in more cost effective 
implementation because participants had to contribute with work, materials and 
even money for the construction of public works. Politically, it was an effective 
way of bypassing the power of bureaucratic actors for whom the implementation of
Introduction 4
public policy was an occasion for advancing their interests and resorting to 
patronage, corruption and clientelism. It is argued here that by the creation of new 
rules and through the participation of new actors, not only was implementation 
made more cost-effective, but also the political legitimacy of the government was 
increased, reliance on discredited bureaucracy reduced, and a process of political 
and social learning was encouraged by the designers of the programme.
Finally, a study of implementation of PRONASOL is important because it is 
contended here that by analysing the implementation of a public policy empirical 
information can be obtained to document political processes which cannot be easily 
identified at higher levels of analysis. By examining the political and economic 
context in which the implementation process takes place, and by identifying the 
actors, their perspectives, values and orientations, our knowledge both in the field 
of policy implementation and in relation to the performance o f the Mexican 
political system can be extended.
But although studies of implementation are needed for these reasons, it is in 
the field of anti-poverty initiatives that they are even more important The thesis 
echoes the need for more research in the field of the implementation of anti­
poverty policies, where ‘more theory, conceptualisation and analysis of experience 
is required in the field’ (International Labour Organisation 1995, p. 100).
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The Focus on Implementation
An analysis of implementation rather than evaluation was chosen because a true 
evaluation of impact is only possible over the long term. For example, Children of 
Solidarity and FONAES were two programmes, the effect of which can only be 
assessed in the long term. Time must pass before it is possible to find out whether 
FONAES was capable of providing real jobs, or whether Children of Solidarity 
really changed family attitudes towards primary education On the other hand, 
streets, pavements, public lighting and other examples of public infrastructure, 
provided first hand data for the assessment of FOMUN
In sum, a study of implementation make possible the analysis of issues 
which are not explored by impact studies and provides important data for a future 
impact study.
Objectives of the Thesis
This thesis aims to achieve the following purposes. First, to provide a detailed 
analysis of the process of implementation of three of the programmes of the 
PRONASOL in the state of Campeche, Mexico, which will be used to test relevant 
theoretical assumptions about policy implementation.
Second, the thesis will try to fill a gap in the study of Mexican politics. 
Important processes of political negotiation take place between participating actors 
during the implementation process. Each group of actors uses formal and informal 
means so as to minimise the losses that the introduction of new policies or
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programmes may cause them. Such negotiations may affect the final outcome of 
the policy and the struggle between the modernisers and traditionalist factions 
which has become apparent in the governing coalition in Mexico in the last IS 
years. FOMUN in particular, exemplifies this situation and the clash between 
traditional bureaucratic actors and the new ‘socio-technocrats’ involved in the 
National Solidarity Program. ‘The bureaucracy is a basic scenario for the political 
struggle between different interest groups in society; it thus represents a possibility 
for political negotiation between the diverse, and occasionally contradictory, 
tendencies within the state apparatus’ (Aguilar Camin and Meyer 1993, pp. 255- 
256).
Third, the dissertation also addresses the ‘challenge of contextuality’ 
(O’Toole 1989, p. 202). This is a permanent concern in the thesis because quite 
frequently the conclusions or recommendations of studies based on aggregate data 
merely reflect political developments at the federal level, more particularly in 
Mexico city. They have a limited ability to explain regional or state variations.
Contributions of the Thesis
The dissertation aims to contribute to the understanding of the link between 
concrete and immediate day-to-day decisions by particular actors with the long­
term structural features of Mexican society and so, to shed light on the historical 
trends, institutional processes, and political decisions that are interwoven in the 
implementation of public policies. (Brachet Márquez, 1988, p. 228). In terms of
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policy implementation the dissertation explores empirically the link between 
individual behaviour and the political, economic and legal context in which the 
action takes place (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1981).
The literature in the field of public policy implementation is riddled with 
apparent contradictions. For example what seems to be a breakthrough, for those 
who adopt the “top-down” approach, is regarded as flawed by those who prefer 
the “bottom-up” approach. These controversies take insufficient account of 
contextual variables. This study aims to shed light on these apparent contradictions 
by considering contextual variables A principle that works in one of the 
programmes may not work in another. Decentralisation for example, might be 
useful in implementing a programme like FOMUN, but it may be inappropriate 
when implementing FONAES. In this respect, the research follows O’Toole’s 
recommendation in the sense that one of the issues of the implementation agenda is 
to ‘investigate systematically what patterns of implementation facilitate various 
types of problem-solving behaviour.’ (1989, p. 203).
In terms of the implementation theory, the cases under analysis show the 
sort of institutional reforms needed to accompany a successful implementation. 
FOMUN, Children of Solidarity and FONAES could be implemented because of 
the change to the rules that the programme introduced Such an institutional 
reform avoided the sort of problems that come with the high number of actors 
(FOMUN and Children of Solidarity) in the implementation of a policy. Contrary 
to what has been said in the field of policy implementation, it is demonstrated that
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the inclusion of actors does not necessarily prejudice success It is by reassigning 
responsibilities and giving access to actors who have a direct incentive in the 
effective functioning of the programme that implementation is improved
Important too for the success of the programme, as it will be demonstrated 
with FOMUN and Children of Solidarity, is the generation of incentives for gaining 
collaboration and securing the success o f the implementation process Incentives 
facilitate collaboration and reduce local resistance in the implementation of 
programmes.
The dissertation also shows that current models o f implementation, that is, 
“top-down” and “bottom-up”, are not useful in explaining particular cases and 
particular areas of policy as in the state o f Campeche These lessons are then put in 
the context of the new anti-poverty programme of the current administration. It is 
argued in the thesis that the Zedillo administration is empowering bureaucratic 
actors and it is actually depriving the community of the presidential support which 
proved to be influential in the implementation of the Solidarity programme
The dissertation also aims to clarify the debate regarding the purposes of 
the programme On the one hand, many of the studies o f the PRONASOL had 
privileged its political meaning, and therefore PRONASOL is either a merely 
electoral programme or a strategy to recover the political legitimacy of the 
government in times when it was badly needed. It must be remembered that the 
results o f the general elections of 1988 which brought Salinas to government, were
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seriously challenged by the main opposition parties and by the public opinion both 
national and international on the grounds of fraud. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that this interpretation had received much attention.
On the other hand, PRONASOL has also been studied from a policy 
perspective. This part of the debate claims that the communitarian approach in 
which Solidarity was based, had an important organisational and political meaning 
because of the social learning process which is implicit in the working of the 
programme. Its emphasis is not placed purely on the political implications of the 
programme, but on the organisational ones that may result in the future in terms of 
policy implementation As it will be discussed later in this research, such a process 
o f political and social learning has already shown some positive results for the 
implementation of anti poverty programmes in some regions of the country.
However, it is argued here that in reality, the debate is false. It is not a 
matter of this or that, but one of this and that. PRONASOL was both an innovative 
way of implementing public policies, particularly in the field of anti poverty 
programmes, but also an important political tool in recovering and fostering 
political legitimacy and gaining votes for the government It is precisely the 
political meaning which is embedded in the functioning of the programme and the 
purposes it served, the one that will be referred here as the hidden political agenda 
o f Solidarity and that will become apparent in the development of the chapters of 
this dissertation. In sum, it cannot be denied the political meaning of the 
programme, but is necessary to keep in mind that this is only one aspect of
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Solidarity and that a comprehensive evaluation of Solidarity must include a policy 
analysis as well.
Finally, the dissertation advances a point of view regarding the aims and 
successes of PRONASOL as a policy. Politically the hidden agenda of the 
programme was only partially achieved. During the implementation of the 
PRONASOL it was clear that many obstacles and vested interests effectively 
counteracted the attempt of reforming the bureaucratic way in which policies have 
been traditionally implemented. In this respect, political support from the 
presidential office was essential to surmount the many obstacles for the 
implementation of Solidarity. Despite this, the way the programme was designed 
and implemented could not counteract the strong corporatist tradition deeply 
rooted in the functioning of the Mexican political system. Politically too, the 
programme could test its usefulness in gaining votes for the government and 
increasing its legitimacy. It was clear that the programme played an important role 
in recovering votes in places where the PRI had lost its electoral control (e g., 
Chaleo).
In terms of the social and political learning process embedded in Solidarity, 
it is not possible to know whether the experience of Solidarity will have a long 
lasting effect in those communities where the programme was implemented and 
whether it really produced a social and political learning process as a result. 
However, it was evident during the field work, that the implementation of the 
programme was relatively more successful in those regions where previous
Introduction II
government initiatives had tested communitarian strategies for their implementation 
and where political support, mostly from the presidential office, was also available
In relation to the aims and successes of PRONASOL as a policy, the 
programme represented an effective way of building an impressive number of 
public works all over the country in a cost-effective manner It also introduced new 
actors into the decision making process which helped to shorten the distance 
between community needs and expectations and public officials’ perceptions. Most 
importantly, the social learning process implicit in the programme was reinforced 
by the institutional reform that the programme inaugurated.
Methodology
CASE STUDY
This research is based on a case study method. Although this method is limited in 
terms of generalisation and representativeness since it is not based on statistical 
inference, it was decided that it was the best method for achieving the objectives of 
this thesis. The case study method cannot produce generalisations in a statistical 
way but rather it tries to test the adequacy of any underlying theory to explain the 
case under analysis (Howard 1991).
The method was also useful for the following reasons First, when 
contextual conditions may have significant influence on the phenomenon under 
study it may use a variety of means for data collection and analysis (Yin 1994). 
Second, the case study method was also preferred because the research aimed to
\describe cases in which the conclusions of national studies based on aggregate data 
were not helpful. In this respect it helped to achieve two main research aims. First, 
the state of Campeche provided an opportunity to observe both political, 
economic, social and cultural interactions during the implementation process. 
Second, the causal links which appeared in real-life, too complex to explain by a 
survey or by experimental strategies, could be identified by the case study method.
Nevertheless to make the best of this study, a contrasting strategy was used 
to extent its explanatory potential. Contrast was achieved through the selection of 
programmes: Children of Solidarity, Solidarity Municipal Funds-FOMUN and the 
National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises-FONAES. Each represented a 
main area of action of Solidarity, Solidarity for social welfare, Solidarity for 
regional development and Solidarity for production, respectively The selection of 
the programmes was not random but aimed to cover different areas of policy each 
politically distinct.
Contrast also guided the selection of municipalities and localities in which 
the study was carried out. The state of Campeche shows different levels of poverty 
and marginality. Of its 9 municipalities, two show low levels of poverty, the City of 
Campeche (capital of the state) and Isla del Carmen. Five more, Hecelchakan, 
Tenabo, Calkini, Champoton and Escarcega, have a medium level of poverty. 
Finally, the municipalities of Hopelchen and Palizada show the highest level of 
poverty and marginality in the state. Two of them are mainly urban (Campeche and
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Isla del Cármen) and the remaining seven are mainly rural This introduced more 
contrast to the case study
But the selection of the state of Campeche is justified not only because this 
state remains largely unstudied, but also because of its peculiarity in the Mexican 
context. Economically poor despite its richness in natural resources and oil fields, 
politically, the state is still an undisputed electoral paradise for the PRI. It was not 
until the 1994 general elections that the PRI votes were less than the sum of the 
opposition parties. While the general political debate in Mexico is concerned with 
démocratisation, modernisation and political reform, in Campeche elements of 
patronage and clientelism remain strong. Campeche is the fourth least populated 
state in the country and it is geographically located between the wealth of Yucatán 
and the poverty of Chiapas and Oaxaca, the home of guerrilla movements and 
militant politics It also provides a refuge for those who wish to escape from 
problems over the border in Guatemala. It is a state where conservative values are 
deeply rooted but which is to trying to adjust to the process of modernisation All 
these features affected in a very particular way the implementation of the 
programmes. The research then attempts not only to increase the number of 
regional studies in Mexico, understood as a country and not as the capital city of 
the country, but also to test the validity and usefulness of current assumptions 
about Mexican politics and the field of policy implementation.
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Finally, by analysing the state of Campeche as a case study, it was possible 
to identify values, attitudes and perceptions that otherwise would have been more 
difficult to trace and which represent active elements of its political culture
The study provides empirical evidence and a basis for testing theoretical 
assumptions. However, the expense and time involved in interviewing and 
travelling in a state where some municipalities are 7 or 8 hours away from the 
capital city imposed important limitations on the research
TIME SPAN OF THE RESEARCH
The time span of this research was originally intended to cover the period of 
Solidarity only, that is, the Salinas administration. However, it was decided to add 
a chapter not only to up-date the latest developments regarding the anti-poverty 
strategy of the Zedillo administration, but also to introduce more contrast into the 
research. It was hypothesised that the Zedillo administration would introduce 
radical changes to the programme, that is from a less bureaucratic form of 
implementation, to another in which bureaucratic actors recovered their influence 
in the implementation of the policy. This analysis was carried out by reviewing the 
manuals and guidelines for the new strategy. It lacks empirical evidence and field 
work like that employed in the analysis of Solidarity. However, a limited number of 
interviews were carried out with public officials by the electronic mail in an attempt
to minimise this limitation.
\FIELD WORK
The field work for the research was carried out from July 1994 to January 1995 in 
Mexico city and in the nine municipalities of the state of Campeche. This included 
elite interviews with public officials at the federal, state and municipal levels and 
with members of the community and Solidarity Committees. During the field work, 
a review of the literature was made in the National Library of the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico-UNAM, the library of the El Colegio de 
Mexico and in the library of the Metropolitan Autonomous University-UAM 
campus Atzcapotzalco. The literature review included books, newspapers, 
journals, magazines, and films as well as the review o f television interviews given 
by officials of the programme It also included the review of 146 official 
documents; more than a hundred political speeches of the former president Salinas, 
and a significant number o f magazine and newspaper notes.
Another important source of information was two Courses of Basic 
Training for Mayors at the National Institute of Solidarity in August 1994, 5-8 and 
9-10 respectively Thirty eight municipalities of 23 states of the country 
participated in the first and forty five municipalities of 19 states in the second 
These courses provided an image of the problems o f the programme in other 
states than Campeche. But most importantly it was possible to observe the direct 
link that PRONASOL officials established with municipal authorities and 
community.
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During the field work it was also possible to participate in the many events 
of the 5th National Week of Solidarity in the state of Campeche, which was useful 
in understanding the context for implementation.
Interviews
This information was also complemented by 67 interviews. They were recorded 
when possible, and notes were taken when it was not possible to use the recorder. 
Interviews were carried out with officials of the agencies participating in the 
implementation of the programme as well as with members o f the communities 
under study They were conducted during the seven months of the field work. 
Although they were based on a basic set of questions, they were open ended so as 
to explore as many related issues as possible with individual interviewees. 
Interviews were used to clarify or exemplify certain points which had already 
emerged from published material about the topic and to assess its validity. The 
interviews are not representative in any statistical sense, nor were they even 
intended to be so. Each, however, reflects a personal view of some aspect of the 
implementation of the programme and their inclusion in the main body of the text is 
justified on that basis.
Main Problems Encountered During the Field Work
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Access to information was difficult because: first, the field work was carried out at 
the time o f the election. Because of this, many public officials, particularly at the
»federal level, were reluctant to make comments about the programme, more 
particularly because it was a presidential initiative. A second problem emerged with 
the ministerial changes that accompany all presidential transitions in Mexico. This 
made it particularly difficult to locate and interview officials of the programme.
Because the programme placed a lot of strain on many agencies and caused 
problems of jurisdiction and territory, public officials from other agencies different 
from SEDESOL, usually referred to the programme in ways that made it difficult 
to corroborate their information.
On the other hand, studies of the impact of the programme, some of them 
carried out by SEDESOL, were strictly limited and kept confidential. Nevertheless, 
some o f them were obtained at the state level.
Structure of the Thesis
After the introduction, chapter two is a discussion of the development o f  Mexican 
social policy. The chapter debates the different theoretical interpretations that 
explain the development of social policy in Mexico. Pluralist, corporatist and 
functionalist interpretations are reviewed, but it is argued that Mexican social 
policy can be better interpreted as following a ‘muddling through’ logic which is 
neither reactive nor preventive, as these theoretical approaches suggest. Emphasis 
is placed on the dynamic character of policy and how economic, political and 
institutional factors, orient values and perceptions of policy makers which shape 
policy development The chapter also discusses some of the most important earlier
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anti-poverty initiatives implemented in the country. Social policy and anti-poverty 
programmes are the two elements that constitute the background against which the 
implementation of PRONASOL is analysed
Chapter three, describes the process of implementation of the Solidarity 
Municipal Funds-FOMUN programme. Firstly, it describes the essential features of 
municipal government in Mexico, as the political, economic and administrative 
framework in which FOMUN was implemented. Secondly, it describes the 
immediate historical background to the programme in the context of the Salinas 
administration. Thirdly, the chapter describes the FOMUN structure, procedures 
and objectives and in general, the norms of the programme as it was expected to 
work around the country. These sections are followed by an evaluation of the 
programme in section four, and in section five the analysis of implementation is 
carried out, where a contrast is made between FOMUN stated objectives and how 
it was implemented in reality. Influential ideas in the field of policy implementation 
are discussed and evaluated in this section, before drawing some conclusions in 
section six.
In chapter four the implementation of the Children of Solidarity programme 
is discussed. The chapter identifies first the political and educational background in 
which the implementation process took place. This section is followed by a 
description of the main elements of the programme, its structure, objectives, and 
bureaucratic setting. The implementation process is discussed in a third section and
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finally, some conclusions are drawn concerning the degree of success of the 
programme
Chapter five analyses the process of implementation of the National Fund in 
Support of Solidarity Enterprises-FONAES programme. The chapter describes 
first the context of the programme, particularly the experiences and changes in the 
agricultural sector, and the context in which the programme was implemented 
Then the structure of the programme is discussed, followed by an analysis of its 
implementation. Finally, the effectiveness of the programme is discussed and some 
conclusions are drawn.
In chapter six, a comparative analysis o f the implementation o f the three 
programmes is undertaken so as to draw some lessons in the field of public policy 
implementation. The chapter integrates new findings and offers alternative 
explanations resulting from the comparative examination. The comparative 
exercise introduces the element o f contextuality as an indispensable element for the 
comparison. In the first part, the chapter presents the methodological approach 
used for the chapter. After that, it follows the comparison of the implementation of 
the three programmes. The comparison reviews the most important ideas in the 
field of policy implementation and assesses their usefulness in explaining the cases 
under study. Next, the chapter discusses the parameters for successful 
implementation and the resulting differences and similarities of the programmes 
Then, the chapter explores some alternative explanations and finally some
conclusions are drawn.
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Chapter seven discusses the new anti-poverty initiative of the Zedillo 
administration, and how the current political and economic context has affected its 
design and implementation. The main differences with Solidarity are highlighted 
less in terms of procedures than in terms of the politics involved in programme 
redefinition. Some comments are offered on NAW’s future.
Chapter eight summarises a set of propositions that have emerged from the 
analysis of the implementation of the three programmes and reflects on the kind of 
obstacles that future implementation will encounter and the changes required to 
improve the effectiveness of policy in the context of the Mexican polity. Emphasis 
is placed then on the political context and how it affects the implementation 
process.
Chapter nine, presents the conclusions of the thesis and integrates the 
findings both in the field of policy implementation and in relation to the 
performance of the Mexican political system.
Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6, the core chapters of the dissertation, can be read 
independently. However, the thematic structure is logically placed so as to support 
the conclusions. It is necessary to stress that the sections analysing the 
implementation of FOMUN, Children of Solidarity and FONAES in chapters 3, 4 
and 5, highlight the differences between the description of the programmes as they 
function from a bureaucratic perspective and their actual implementation as 
experienced by the author. It is in these sections where the different interpretations
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and assessments of the programmes as perceived by the policy-makers, 
implemented and clients are contrasted In a similar vein, a critical assessment of 
the programmes’ objectives and structures, which come from official sources, is 
made in such sections. It is precisely in the comparative chapter where the critical 
appraisal of the three programmes is carried out in depth.
Chapter 2
Social Policy and Anti-Poverty Programmes in Mexico
Introduction
The creation of the National Solidarity Programme-PRONASOL in December 
1988 inspired an intense debate regarding the rationale of Mexican anti-poverty 
programmes in particular and social policy in general.
Social policy is capable of several interpretations. For some, social policy 
merely performs certain legitimacy functions which are considered essential for the 
functioning of the political system. A second interpretation explains the 
development of social policy from a pluralist perspective and argues that it results 
from the pressure o f powerful social groups who have successfully taken their 
interests to the public agenda A third interpretation, the so-called corporatist one, 
gives the state and its institutions a preponderant role in the definition of policies. 
Policy-making then consists in a set of manoeuvres to hold power. Social policy in 
particular would merely serve the purposes of making more effective the means of 
control in a society.
Although the value of these interpretations may be useful in explaining 
social policy developments, at certain times, they are limited in explaining the 
evolution of social policy. It may be for example, that in the early stages of the 
development of any particular policy, specific groups are crucial in defining its 
content, e g., oil workers, civil servants, armed forces But later, those groups
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might not exert the same pressure on the development of that policy, as compared 
with economic, political or institutional situation obtaining at the time. It may be 
the case that the creation of the Mexican Social Security Institute-IMSS in 1943 
responded to pressure exerted by powerful groups whose role in the 
industrialisation o f the country was crucial. But at a certain point, the centre of 
power shifted and different elements might be more appropriate in explaining, for 
instance, the dismantling of the Mexican system of social security.
The development of Mexican social policy may however be interpreted as 
following a 'muddling through’ logic which is neither reactive nor preventive. The 
emphasis is placed on the dynamic character of policy and how economic, political 
and institutional factors, orient values and perceptions of policy makers which 
shape policy development. From this perspective, the origin of a policy could be 
explained by a group pressure; but the same policy could be explained later from a 
corporatist or functionalist point of view. This is so because the rationale of a 
policy changes with the passage of time and therefore its evolution cannot be 
explained using only one theoretical model.
Social policy will be seen to serve more than a single objective. Just as the 
education policy during the late 30s was useful in “building the nation” it was also 
a political tool used to undermine the power of the church. Such double purposes 
are precisely the source of the debate regarding the objectives and rationale of 
Mexican social policy.
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The rationale of Mexican social policy and the variations of the social 
agenda across post-revolutionary regimes will be identified. First, the different 
theoretical interpretations that explain the development o f social policy in Mexico, 
will be discussed and then some of the most important anti-poverty initiatives 
implemented in the country will be described. These two elements constitute the 
background against which the implementation of PRONASOL will be analysed.
The Rationale of Mexican Social Policy
THE FUNCTIONALIST INTERPRET A TION
The functionalist interpretation argues that social policy represents an attempt to 
‘keep the lid on’ and to contain the social problems that the economic process 
creates (Nord 1994). For Nord, the development of social policy in Mexico is 
primarily oriented to make the workforce efficient and to create political stability. 
Its main beneficiaries are those groups of the population who have performed vital 
functions for the nation in terms of economic infrastructure or political processes. 
In achieving this objective, social policy follows an affordability and conflict logic, 
namely that any social initiative depends on the availability o f resources and if they 
are available, their allocation is a function of conflict. But when conflict exceeds 
government possibilities, co-optation and coercion are exerted.
Following O’Connor’s (1973) main propositions, Ward (1993, p. 628) also 
holds that social policy in Mexico has been useful in palliating the worst effects of 
capital accumulation. For him, although the objectives o f social policy namely
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political mediation have not changed, the means for achieving these have changed 
For Ward, political mediation by means of social policy, can be divided in four 
main phases The first phase, political mediation through laissez-faire, is 
characterised by the primacy of the economic model based on a “grow now- 
distribute later” and “trickle-down” logic. Social provision was determined on “ad- 
hoc” basis and articulated through patron-clientelistic relations exchanging social 
benefits for political support for governmental initiatives
This was followed by a second phase in which political mediation was 
achieved through state intervention and populism. This was the case roughly from 
1976 to 1982. Although based on the same clientelistic and populist logic of the 
previous phase, the nature and extent of state intervention changed, embracing 
housing, land, sanitation and infrastructure, replacing the “ad-hoc” basis of the 
previous phase. There was a proliferation of social welfare agencies, which in turn, 
increased opportunities for patronage. The aim of this phase was not only to 
mobilise popular support for the government in a period characterised by the 
political activism of the left, but also to recover the legitimacy lost as a result of the 
students bloodshed of 1968
The third phase, the routinisation of social welfare, roughly from 1982 to 
1988, was characterised by a more administrative regime of management and 
efficiency and more decentralised basis of decision making. The rationale was to 
use scarce resources appropriately through more routinisation and less partisan 
delivery. Finally, Solidarity represents the fourth phase of welfare delivery in which
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social policy has returned to patronage and clientelism. Ward (1993, p. 628) 
suggests that either through clientelism or a more effective application of technical 
routines and procedures, Mexican social policy represents a ‘key element in 
statecraft and of papering over the cracks of social inequality. ’
There are some problems in explaining the development of Mexican social 
policy from this perspective. First, although social policy may be used to palliate 
the process of capital accumulation and to act as a cover-up to legitimise the 
government, such a characterisation should not be exaggerated. There are some 
other areas of government action, e g., electoral reform, which are also essential in 
improving the government’s legitimacy and sustaining the political system. 
According to this perspective, for instance, the political reform introduced in 1977 
which legally recognised the Communist party in Mexico, would merely 
represented a condescending concession of the state to legitimise the system. From 
this point of view, there seems to be no room for the influence and political 
pressure that certain social groups exerted, particularly during the late 60s, in 
shaping political reform. Actually, from this perspective all policies would serve to 
increase government’s legitimacy. Thus it is not clear what makes the social policy 
different from other policies which are also effective in improving the 
government’s legitimacy.
There is another problem related to this approach. It does not provide a 
satisfactory explanation of those periods in which legitimacy is achieved by other 
means. Following the logic of this approach, the development of compensatory
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programmes should appear in periods in which the state has privileged and 
supported an economic model prone to capital accumulation. However, some 
periods in Mexican history show that social programmes were relegated during 
administrations where capitalist development was privileged, for example during 
the Miguél Alemán administration (1947-1952) when social programmes were 
severely reduced (Nord 1994, p.6). A more dynamic argument has been offered to 
solve this inconsistency. It is argued that the capital bias shown by some Mexican 
governments is not necessarily accompanied by social programmes. It has been the 
case that other administrations have had to implement social programmes to 
compensate the class bias of the previous one. According to Nord, for example, the 
administrations of Cárdenas (1934-1940), López Mateos (1959-1964) and 
Echeverría (1970-1976) expanded the social commitment of the state to 
compensate for the capitalist excesses of previous administrations. The problem 
however, is that this argument assumes the existence of a homogeneous governing 
coalition with long term economic and political projects which is capable of 
adjusting itself to particular contingencies, which seems inconsistent with what we 
know of the Mexican political system. Furthermore, if the formula accumulation- 
legitimacy is correct, then it follows that social policy can be relegated in periods in 
which there is no threat to the stability of the system or when legitimacy can be 
achieved by other means.
Actually, social programmes have been at the margin of national priorities 
in times when legitimacy was badly needed For instance, during the period that
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followed the end of the Mexican revolution of 1910, very few social programmes 
were created. The period spanned nearly two decades in which political 
consolidation and stability were the priorities and during which the implementation 
of social programmes would have served the purpose of bringing political stability 
to the country. Nevertheless, scattered ‘social programmes’ were introduced in a 
rather irregular way For example, although during the administration of Plutarco 
Elias Calles (1928-1934) public works grew, a Federal Labour Law granted 
concessions with regard to hours and holidays and the 1933 Six Year Plan set up 
minimum wages and collective bargaining (Knight 1990), the state’s social 
commitment was rather slipshod. In terms of health, for example, up to the late 
30s, health services were not a responsibility of the state, but depended on public 
charities and private initiatives. When the state committed itself to national health 
programmes, they were either in the form of sanitary campaigns against yellow 
fever and malaria, or medical assistance (López Acuña 1982, p. 102). If there was 
a time to prove the popular character of the Revolution, but also to increase 
government legitimacy, it was then. A more recent example confirms this, the 
Zedillo administration could benefit enormously by implementing social 
programmes that could boost the legitimacy of his government. But the National 
Alliance for Welfare-NAW instead of serving this purpose, has been implemented 
in a rather humble way. His commitment is not as clear as that of Salinas to 
Solidarity.
VTHE PLURALIST INTERPRETATION
According to the pluralist interpretation, the development of the most important 
social institutions and policies in the country is the result of the pressure exerted by 
powerful social groups who have made their interests part of the public agenda. 
Mesa-Lago (1976, p. 228) has described the main groups in shaping social policy 
in the country. They are 1) all branches of the military and the police whose power 
is based on coercion and its access to arms; 2) the civil service at both the federal 
and state level (although the latter is less privileged than the former) whose power 
is exercised through political and administrative control; 3) the powerful economic 
groups in industry such as railroads, electricity, petroleum, sugar, metallurgy, 
mining, auto industry, telephone, and transportation and whose power is exercised 
through the market and, finally; 4) the bulk of the labour force composed mostly of 
urban blue and white-collar workers whose power is based upon and exercised 
through unionisation and the recourse to violence.
This model seems to provide an adequate explanation of the development 
of some welfare institutions related to important groups in Mexico, for example the 
creation of the Mexican Social Security Institute-IMSS in 1943 which covered in 
general the workforce during the years of industrialisation, or the creation of the 
Social Security Institute for State Workers-ISSSTE which covered the federal and 
state civil service in the 60s. But one must be cautious in adopting this 
interpretation because it leaves out the influence of economic factors in the shaping 
of policy and also because the development of certain social programmes can be
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»better explained by the action of the state and not by the pressure of certain 
groups. In the first case, for instance, it is difficult to say whether the boom in 
welfare programmes that came with the industrialisation process in the country 
resulted from the pressure of certain groups or rather from the need to integrate 
the bulk of the workforce in the industrialisation process. In fact, the so-called 
industrialisation convergence hypothesis (see Midgley 1984, p. 172) argues that it 
is precisely the process of industrialisation which determined the development of 
social programmes.
In the second case, important programmes for education and health were 
developed more in response to the initiative of the state than to the pressure of 
certain groups, reflecting the importance given to education and health by the 
Cárdenas administration. His commitment to education for instance, was reflected 
in the allocation of a one percent annual increase in the educational budget, which 
raised it from 15 percent to 20 percent of total spending between 1934 and 1940 
(Knight 1990, p. 27). Projects such as the programme for rural schools, the 
establishment of Teachers Rural School, Cultural Missions, Special Army Schools 
and special efforts to reach the Indigenous population proliferated during the 
Cárdenas administration.
In terms of health and social security, in 1931 the Cárdenas administration 
amended the Constitution to include a programme of professional risks that was 
oriented to all the worker population (Mesa-Lago 1976, p. 137). In 1937 Cárdenas 
created the Secretariat of Public Assistance to initiate formal intervention in
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matters related to social needs and the health of large groups of the population. In 
1939 a law was passed which made social security obligatory in the form of a 
workers’ compensation programme which protected the workers against disability, 
unemployment, sickness and accidents. This required the state along with large 
industries to make provision for housing, schools, infirmaries and public services. 
The same law established the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration that settled all 
disputes between labour and employers and which included representatives of 
workers, employers and the state, the latter having the greatest number of votes 
and reinforcing its regulating role It is clear then, that the role of the state in 
developing social initiatives is equally to, if not more important than that played by 
powerful groups in society as the pluralist interpretation would suggest
This approach has some other weaknesses First, it assumes that the state 
remains passive and neutral under the control of the most powerful groups in 
society (see Malloy 1979). But in the case of Mexico rather than a passive state we 
find a highly interventionist (activist) one. Second, in empirical terms, changes of 
policy over time can not be fully explained by reference to the activities of groups. 
According to this model, since social programmes respond to the pressure of 
certain groups, the modification of those programmes would be challenged by 
strong reactions from those groups who promoted them in the first place But as 
the privatisation of the system of social security in Mexico shows, this seems not to 
be the case. Third, when transformations in policies and institutions appear, it is 
difficult, in empirical terms, to identify the groups that are displacing or reshaping
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such institutions and policies. It is not possible to identify clearly for example, the 
groups that pressed the government to extend social security to rural areas during 
the 70s. Finally, because this approach puts the emphasis on groups, the analysis of 
the policy loses importance and therefore, the mechanisms through which it is 
designed and implemented seem to be less important.
In sum although the pluralist interpretation helps in understanding the 
influences affecting social policy, it fails to explain and describe the active role of 
the state in the process
THE CORPORATIST INTERPRETATION
This approach explains the development of social policy as a process by which 
social programmes are provided by a powerful state for certain groups in exchange 
for political support. This is done through a vertical system of affiliated 
organisations which are loyal to the state Particularly in the Mexican case, the 
corporatist approach assigns a central and authoritarian role to the state and the 
party, particularly the Institutional Revolutionary Party-PRI, in this process of 
political control (see Craske 1994). Due to the role of the PRI and its affiliated 
organisations (the Confederation of Mexican Workers-CTM, the National 
Peasants’ Confederation-CNC, and the National Confederation of Popular 
Organisations-CNOP) in structuring political power in the country, Mexican 
corporatism is based on a principle of clientelism by means of which favours are 
traded between the state and its affiliated organisations. Social programmes and 
material improvements then, result from this exchange, and they are primarily
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oriented to those groups who support state actions The development of the social 
policy then seems to depend on this system of favours and on the state’s 
willingness and ability to deliver social benefits.
Although the model is highly influential and useful in explaining some 
elements of the Mexican political system, it exaggerates the importance of the role 
of the state and minimises that of other elements in explaining social policy 
development Its first defect is that it assumes that social groups are weak and 
powerless in influencing policy shape. When social pressure is seriously considered, 
the state response to it appears as a ‘clever manoeuvre for manipulating basically 
weak and disorganized foci o f social dissent which can be controlled by repression 
and co-optation.’ (Brachet-Marquez 1992, pp. 98-99). It gives but marginal room 
for social groups or independent unions that have actually achieved benefits from 
the official corporatist channels by their independent action. As with the 
functionalist approach, the role of social groups and their importance in influencing 
the policy process is completely neglected in this kind o f explanation. Although the 
centrality of the government in the design and implementation of social policies 
cannot be overlooked it fails to explain the mechanisms through which social 
threats to the stability of the system translate into public policies.1
A second weakness o f this approach is that it does not explain why a 
presumably strong state has implemented reforms that have actually affected the
'For a critique of this approach see Dunlcavy and O’Leary 1987.
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interest of certain groups inside the governing coalition. It does not explain 
satisfactorily for instance, the short history of political reforms that have made 
room for the political participation of the Mexican left. As Brachet-Márquez 
(1992, p 99) points out, it fails to explain the pressures for change outside the 
corporatist channels, and the openness of a presumably ‘highly entrenched system’ 
which ultimately, is unlikely to be the architect of its own dissolution.’ In fact, as 
this study of implementation will show, the state and its institutions are weaker 
than the corporatist tradition assumes While it is true that this interpretation can 
explain some developments in terms of social policy, it is important not to ignore 
other factors.
SOCIAL POLICY IN  MEXICO: A MUDDLING THROUGH POLICY
The following analysis will attempt to show that the rationale of social policy in 
Mexico has been shaped by immediate and pragmatic political and economic 
considerations rather than by the compensatoria! activity of a ruling coalition or a 
powerful state or by the pressures exerted by powerful groups in society. This is 
not to say that keeping the peace or the search for consensus is not a consideration 
in the design and implementation of certain social initiatives of post-revolutionary 
governments in Mexico. It certainly is, but such a concern is limited to the 
immediate political and economic projects of each administration. Whether political 
unrest arises out six years later or not is not a concern for Mexican presidents. 
They are concerned with political stability during their administration. The 
objective of political stability is driven by a short-term oriented rationale rather
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than by a historical and institutionalised one as the functionalist or corporatist 
interpretations implicitly maintain. As Streeten notes, just because politicians live in 
the short term, it does not mean that their actions will have a limited impact on 
poverty alleviation. For Streeten (1994, p. 137), short term interventions on behalf 
of the poor have an important impact on poverty reduction, and therefore, a 
‘concern for the short term is not only politically but also intellectually 
respectable.’ Even in prospective terms, it is debatable whether social policy 
achievements would “keep the lid on” making the job of future administrations 
easier and maintaining political stability for the system as a whole or for a coherent 
and homogeneous governing coalition.
Social policy has a much more pragmatic meaning for Mexican politicians 
and particularly for Mexican presidents. It has been useful in balancing social 
inequalities in the country and at the same time, in advancing the political and 
economic projects of the administration. But it has been shaped in a ‘muddling 
through’ (Lindblom 1959) manner. Indeed, economic, political and institutional 
considerations are important constraints, but ideological perceptions, values and 
motivations of Mexican politicians have also played a significant role. It is true that 
many o f  the social actions during the Cárdenas administration resulted from 
coincident circumstances rather than autonomous decisions (see Knight 1990, p 
51). But it is also true that Cárdenas, as well as Calles or much later, other 
Mexican presidents, had values and perceptions of how the country should be and 
more importantly options through which to implement these options. While for
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Calles, for example, agrarian reform had been finished, for Cárdenas it was a means 
of transforming the nation (Knight 1990, p. 19). The point is that although 
circumstances are highly influential in deciding policies and government actions, 
decision-makers can also determine policy outcomes (see Grindle and Thomas 
1991). As Shapiro (1995, p. 5) notes, policy makers are not ‘the mere playthings of 
group pressures but are also purposive actors bent on achieving their own visions 
of public values. ’
Similarly, the implementation of the Social Security System during the 
Avila Camacho administration (1940-1946), was not merely an attempt to placate 
the labour force for the discipline imposed on it by the new administration, nor the 
result of the pressure exerted on the government to introduce the system. Instead, 
both processes contributed to its creation. The economic developments of the 
period provided the context but certain political issues influenced its particular 
shape. It was created because of the process of industrialisation but it also served 
the purposes of consensus building in dismantling the ‘red’ initiatives of the 
Cárdenas administration.
And it is precisely because of this influence of values and conditions that 
social policy has served more than a single objective. It is contended here that 
social policy serves the purposes of developing the nation, but also as a tool to 
balance the distribution of power in a given society, either by delivering welfare 
benefits to social groups or by counteracting political interest that may endanger 
the functioning of the system as a whole. Be it the land reform and education
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policies of the 30s, or the social security programme of the 40s, or even the rural 
development of the 70s and the Solidarity programmes of the early 90s, social 
programmes clearly represent this twofold use of social policy.
But the development of social policy is not only influenced by values and 
perceptions but also by institutional factors. The Constitution also has widened 
social rights and prerogatives that create legal channels to allow social demands to 
be transformed into specific programmes For example, the amendments to Article 
3, which made education socialist during the Cárdenas administration, were so 
entrenched, both politically and administratively that it took the whole 
administration of Avila Camacho to eradicate. Or again with the land reform policy 
which has been the classic example of social justice policy over several decades, 
the situation was the same
Finally, because social policy is tied to values and perceptions of Mexican 
presidents, the priority given to a particular area of the social agenda, varies from 
one administration to another, according to the political and economic project of 
the administration This has resulted in short-term and pragmatically oriented social 
programmes such as COPLAMAR, PIDER, SAM, and now Solidarity. But even 
normal long term oriented social policies such as education, health or housing, 
depend on the political perceptions and needs of the moment. For instance, while 
Cárdenas emphasised rural education, the Alemán administration was committed 
more to urban education because he promoted a more industrialised and urban
country.
\Although this short term oriented rationale has prevailed in shaping social 
policy, more recently economic constraints have diminished the room to 
accommodate social concerns in the public agenda. Nowadays, economic 
constraints coupled with the ascendancy of neo-liberal ideas are re-shaping 
Mexican social policy in the way o f a more residual model in which market 
oriented policies are displacing those which grew, first, under the import 
substitution model of the 40s, and later, under the so-called ‘stabilising 
development’ and ‘shared development’ strategies. While some areas of social 
policy are being privatised, namely pension funds, at the same time, new anti­
poverty programmes have been created, to fill gaps created by a former lack of 
coherence in social policy and which in the end increased social stratification and 
inequality.
Anti-Poverty Programmes in Mexico
The systematic subordination of social policy to other priorities, has increased 
social needs to a point where social policy as such is incapable of solving urgent 
needs. Anti-poverty programmes have played an important role in the Mexican 
public agenda of the last decades because of their effectiveness in improving 
targeting and meeting urgent social needs They have provided both political credit 
by ensuring that ‘government cares about poverty’ (see Harrop 1992), as well as 
targeting solutions to social groups which deserve urgent attention.
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*Four main anti-poverty initiatives deserve attention in the Mexican case. 
The Integrated Programme for Rural Development-PIDER, the Central Co­
ordination of the National Plan of Economically Depressed Regions and 
Marginalised Groups-COPLAMAR, the Mexican Food System-SAM and the 
PRONASOL.
THE INTEGRATED PROGRAMME FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT (P1DER)
One of the first anti-poverty programmes in Mexico was the Integrated Programme 
for Rural Development-PIDER. A World Bank funded programme, it was a 
multisectoral programme created in 1973 under the direct control of the 
Department of the Presidency. It aimed to co-ordinate the myriad national projects 
of rural development. Approximately US$ 2 billion was invested in 139 
microregions and about 9,000 thousand communities, considered the poorest in the 
country (Cemea 1992, pp 5 and 13) PIDER was made up of small projects aimed 
at benefiting small villages or subgroups within these communities by the 
construction of feeder roads, irrigation works, and fostering peasants 
organisations, training and welfare (Gates 1993, p. 37). According to Cemea 
(1992, p. 14), PIDER projects were grouped into three main types: productive 
projects (agroindustry units, small-scale irrigation schemes); economic support 
projects (construction of stores and warehouses in rural areas, rural electrification, 
development of local markets), and social infrastructure projects (construction of 
schools, health centres, water supply and sewage systems).
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According to Gates (1993, pp. 36-37), the programme was created in 
response to the food crisis that resulted from the importation o f large quantities of 
basic foods at the beginning of the 70s, and to calm the related rural discontent 
‘expressed in land invasions and violent conflicts between peasants and 
landowners’. Agricultural policies during the period 1970-1976, were oriented to 
the provision of high-yielding seeds, fertilisers and agrochemicals, equipment, 
credit, and technical assistance. All this was accompanied by the proliferation of 
governmental agencies. It was assumed that, in the long term, the programme 
would produce social and economic development and thus a more equitable 
distribution of social benefits.
A distinctive feature of the PIDER programme was that its implementation 
was based on a community approach. Previous development programmes were 
managed by local elites and bureaucratic agencies, but the PIDER programme 
bypassed them by directly targeting the rural population Consequently, PIDER 
had to introduce important adjustments in the way state agencies had traditionally 
implemented rural development programmes According to Cemea (1992, p. 14) 
PIDER practised an innovative bottom-up planning system which took into 
consideration local views and needs in deciding which projects to implement 
bypassing local bureaucracy.
For some (Fox 1994, p. 163), the community involvement was merely 
rhetoric because in the end the whole implementation of the programme remained 
under the control of reformists. Its effectiveness has also been questioned. Gates
(1993) notes that the level of production achieved under the programme did not 
match the debts that resulted from the peasants’ acquisition of capital goods. In the 
end, she argues, rural unemployment persisted and only those more enterprising 
ejidatarios became well-off The main beneficiaries were ‘the merchant middlemen, 
the distributors of fertiliser, farm machinery, and other new agricultural inputs, 
purchasing agencies and processing industries, together with the government 
officials, independent brokers, and large landowners, who are in a prime position to 
benefit in both the formal and underground economies from the numerous 
opportunities for personal enrichment offered by rural developments on this 
scale.’(Gates 1993, pp. 38-39).
Despite this, PIDER also produced positive outcomes. As Fox (1994, p. 
163) reports, PIDER not only offered sources of employment in regions where 
opportunities were few, but also diminished the power of regional bosses. Equally 
important is the fact that PIDER not only offered the opportunity to test a bottom- 
up planning system, but also increased the bargaining position of the target 
population with government agencies (Cemea 1992, pp. 15 and 22)
THE CENTRAL CO-ORDINATION OF THE NATIONAL PLAN OF ECONOMICALLY DEPRESSED 
REGIONS AND MARGINALISED GROUPS (COPLAMAR) AND THE MEXICAN FOOD SYSTEM 
(SAM)
During the administration of José Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) the Central Co­
ordination of the National Plan of Economically Depressed Regions and 
Marginalised Groups-COPLAMAR was created as a multisectoral agency that
Social Policy in Mexico________________________________________________________ 41
Social Policy in Mexico 42
worked by ‘subcontracting a number of welfare programmes to other agencies ’ 
(Brachet-Márquez 1988, p 228). Under the direct control of the office of the 
presidency, COPLAMAR established co-ordination agreements with other public 
agencies to deliver welfare benefits to marginalised groups. They in turn had to 
contribute to the construction of buildings or in the maintenance of finished 
premises as a condition of access to the services.
Rural roads, health centres, schools and food stores were some of the 
projects implemented by COPLAMAR In terms of rural roads, for example, an 
agreement was made between the Department of Human Settlements and Public 
Works-SAHOP and COPLAMAR to build rural roads and facilitate access to 
remote zones of the country. In terms of health, the IMSS-COPLAMAR 
agreement aimed to increase health coverage by the construction of health centres 
in which community participation played an important role. The programme 
constructed over three thousand primary health care units and dozens of rural 
hospitals (Brachet Márquez 1988, p. 228). In terms of education, an agreement 
between the Department of Public Education-SEP created the SEP-COPLAMAR 
agreement to tackle the problem of high school dropout rates. The aim was to 
construct more schools in isolated zones and by doing so facilitate access by 
isolated communities. In terms of food, the CONASUPO-COPLAMAR agreement 
implemented an ‘extensive network of village food stores designed to weaken local 
monopolies over staples in remote rural areas ’ (Fox 1994, p. 164).
VAlthough community involvement in the programmes varied, some of them 
successfully involved the community in the implementation of the policy. As Fox 
(1994, p. 164) points out, the CONASUPO-COPLAMAR programmes did not 
systematically make political support a condition of material benefits and even 
promoted the creation of democratic regional consumer organisations which 
challenged corrupt private and bureaucratic elites
The Mexican Food System-SAM was created by a presidential initiative 
almost at the end of the José Lôpez Portillo (1976-1982) administration. Redclift 
(1981, p 1) reports that the SAM represented the most important effort to deal 
with agricultural development and nutrition since the 40s The funds of the SAM 
came from the revenues of the boom in oil production during the late 70s. 
According to Gates (1993, p. 44), the programme represented a system which 
subsidised production, agribusiness, and consumption to expand rural employment 
and purchasing power through a concentrated attack on poverty.
Characterised as a subsidiary and populist programme, because of the 
partnership between the state and peasants in sharing production risks, it 
confronted many of the interorganisational problems common to the 
implementation of multi-agency programmes and in a sense, it was unrealistic 
because it was aimed at solving a structural problem by temporary means (Redclift 
1981, p. 5).
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THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME-PRONASOL
The latest effort in the field is PRONASOL Based in a philosophy of community 
participation and building on the experience of PIDER, COPLAMAR and SAM, it 
was an anti-poverty programme that encouraged local participation and leadership. 
With an impressive amount of resources it was the most ambitious programme of 
all. It was divided into three main areas: productive projects, social welfare actions 
and regional development programmes. As with PIDER, COPLAMAR and SAM, 
its actions were under the direct control of the presidency, this time, via the 
Department of Social Development-SEDESOL. What made PRONASOL different 
from its predecessors is its significant political role and the indisputable amount of 
public works implemented in the country
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PROGRAMMES
The programmes have some features in common. The most evident perhaps is the 
use of community participation for their implementation. As Midgley (1995, pp. 
114 and 115) notes, community approaches are based on the belief that by means 
of co-operation and shared purposes, people ensure that their basic needs are met, 
their problems are solved and opportunities for advancement are created. This type 
of community participation differs from other community approaches which either 
are more radical and challenge the government or those which are based on gender 
issues and women’s contribution to welfare
The community approach used in PIDER, COPLAMAR and PRONASOL 
resembles that used by the British in colonial times. As Midgley (1995, p. 116)
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notes, although many governments around the world used this approach during the 
60s as part of the conditionality of aid programmes introduced by the US Alliance 
for Progress, in essence the community approach is the same The main 
characteristics are: construction of community works with local participation in 
their implementation; enhancement of community identity; strengthening of 
democratic participation and fostering self-help and self-determination.
A second important feature shared by the programmes is that they have 
received strong political support for their implementation. They all have been 
presidential initiatives Redclift (1981, p 3) notes that in the case of the SAM, the 
programme’s final design was based on eight of twenty studies that the presidential 
office commissioned between 1976 and 1980. PIDER also received top level 
political support. As Cemea (1992, p. 19) notes, the implementation of a multi­
agency programme like PIDER required negotiation among the participating 
agencies, which could only be done with the help of top leaders COPLAMAR 
enjoyed direct presidential support as well. The programme co-ordinated the 
efforts of the participating agencies with the support of the presidential office. This 
gave the programme enough power to establish agreement between CONASUPO, 
IMSS, SEP and SAHOP. PRONASOL only overcame local vested interests and 
bureaucratic inertia with presidential support. The delivery of public works by the 
president himself all over the country, not only reinforced his personal image, but 
also sent the message that he would take care personally of any problem that
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would obstruct the implementation of the programme, thus reinforcing the personal 
link of the president with PRONASOL.
A third characteristic is that all of the programmes were given enough 
resources. Redclift (1981, p. 5) notes that the once prestigious PIDER, stood at 
only $ US 180, 000, 000 in 1980 compared with SAM which had $US 3 billion in 
1980 and another ‘$US 5 billion to be allocated to agricultural investment by both 
the public and private sector, and crop insurance ’ PRONASOL also stands out in 
this respect. Its budget allocation grew from 0.32 percent in 1988 to 0.74 percent 
of GDP in 1994. Similarly, Solidarity spending as a share of public spending on 
social development grew from 5.23 percent in 1989 to 7.32 percent in 1994. 
During the six years of operation of the Solidarity programme, 60 percent of its 
resources were allocated to rural areas (OECD 1996, p. 72 and 73).
The programmes were based on a ‘partnership’ between the government 
and the target population, particularly in the productive branch of the programmes 
The idea of shared risk (riesgo compartido) refers to the fact that the risks 
involved in the production of crops or goods by communities are shared by the 
government as well as the producer This was one of the main components of the 
SAM programme and the philosophy of the productive component of 
PRONASOL, namely the Credit on Word programme (crédito a la pala bra), the 
Solidarity Production Funds (Fondos de Solidaridad para la Producción- 
FOSOPRO), and the National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises (Empresas 
de Solidaridad-FONAES). The same applied to COPLAMAR in which, even
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though community participation in the construction of health centres was required, 
medical attention was given even if some community members were not willing to 
or could not contribute with their work.
In terms of policy implementation, the programmes also share important 
features. All o f them used incentives either to foster collaboration from 
participating agencies or from the community for effective implementation Redclift 
(1981, p. 9) notes that the SAM programme gave a ‘boost to some government 
agencies which were given priority under the programme [particularly to 
CONASUPO which]..assumed a much more central role under the SAM.’ As far 
as PIDER is concerned, Cemea (1992, p 9) notes that if PIDER achieved 
institutional collaboration it was because it was able to ‘take the necessary 
organisational steps to translate the desirable participation into practice, and to 
provide economic gains to the people expected to participate ’ In the case of 
PRONASOL, the lax interpretation of some o f the rules of the programme had 
effective results in accommodating a myriad of interests that in the end improved 
the implementation of the programme
Because all the programmes were multi-agency initiatives, they all 
encountered interorganisational problems. As Redclift (1981, p. 9) reports, the 
SAM showed serious difficulties in bringing together the many agencies involved in 
its implementation. Similarly, Cemea (1992, p. 17) reports how during its initial 
stages the PIDER programme, had to confront political opposition from vested 
interests, and the stifling routines of entrenched bureaucracies that used to be the
Social Policy in Mexico 48
only actors in the implementation process. The same problems were confronted by 
COPLAMAR and later by the PRONASOL. As described in the following chapters 
the National Solidarity Programme required a great deal of political leadership to 
co-ordinate its implementation. In many situations, such leadership could not cope 
with bureaucratic inertia at the federal, state and municipal level.
MEXICAN ANTI-POVERTY INITIATIVES COMPARED TO INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
There are also important similarities between Mexican anti-poverty programmes 
and international ones. Graham (1994) presents a comprehensive study of such 
efforts in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America. In reviewing anti-poverty 
programmes in other countries the most evident element is that they emerged 
during periods of economic adjustment. According to Graham (1994) and Van der 
Hoeven (1994), these programmes are aimed at palliating the social and economic 
costs o f  economic restructuring. PRONASOL appeared at the same time as the 
structural changes in the Mexican economy, namely privatisation, fiscal reform and 
the opening up of the economy.
Internationally too, community involvement is common to all programmes 
(see Jespersen 1994). As Graham (1994) notes, community participation not only 
enhance economic potential but gives political voice to groups who have 
traditionally been excluded from the planning process in the solution of their most 
immediate problems Furthermore, as the Micro Project Units in Zambia show, by 
including communities in the operation of the programme, political sustainability 
for economic reform is enhanced. Conversely, when community participation has
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been excluded from the implementation process, political sustainability has not 
been effective because of popular suspicion that the programme merely benefits the 
government clientele, as happened with the DIRE programme of Senegal (Graham 
1994, p. 313).
At this point, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of community 
participation for the purposes of this research It will be used not in a sociological 
way, but in a much more restricted sense, that is, at the level of neighbourhood, at 
the level of the people with particular needs and who can benefit from the 
implementation of the programme. Therefore a political interpretation of 
community participation as a politically proactive and dissenter “civil society” 
should be avoided Further reference to this topic will be made in the following 
chapter where the political use of the concept is briefly discussed.
Another common characteristic of international anti-poverty programmes, 
is that their success has been related to their ability to separate their image from the 
government. As Graham (1994, p. 313) reports, the AGETIP programme, a World 
Bank assisted programme implemented by the government of Senegal, succeeded 
because it was set up as an independent agency with a private sector director. On 
the contrary, the DIRE programme, also funded by the USIAD and the World 
Bank, worked with clientelistic criteria in the disbursement of loans, created an 
image of a programme dominated by the governing party and produced poor 
results with no impact on poverty alleviation Although a separation from the 
government seems to be essential in improving a programme’s image and
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effectiveness, it seems that PRONASOL has capitalised politically well as became 
clear after the 1991 elections (Molinar and Weldon 1994 and Bruhn 1996). This 
suggests that the link between the president and the programme influenced its 
success.
The success of PRONASOL despite its governmental sponsorship can be 
explained as follows: popular belief in Mexico in the genuine commitment of the 
state to this anti-poverty programme was sufficient, and in any case, no alternative 
and credible organiser was available. The Mexican state continues to enjoy a 
degree of popular legitimacy which many third world states lack.
Top level political commitment is another feature that emerges from the 
review of the programmes. As in the case of PRONASOL political commitment, in 
this case directly from the office of the presidency, guarantees not only the 
availability of resources but also the necessary administrative priority for their 
implementation. The role played by political leadership in the programmes is also 
essential in ‘fixing the game’ (Bardach 1977) as bureaucratic lag and vested 
interests appear during the implementation of the programmes. Political 
commitment in the case of PRONASOL also served the purpose of institution 
building. As Graham (1994) notes a significant element in the success of anti- 
poverty programmes is related to institutional autonomy, not only to separate these 
efforts from the governmental image, but also to increase their effectiveness by 
working with NGO’s or the community directly and to guarantee their continuation 
for more than a single administration. Although bureaucratic institutions in Mexico
\appear and disappear as administrations come and go, and the rule of law is in 
many cases empty talk, the institutionalisation process started by the Salinas 
administration in the case of PRONASOL, is noteworthy (Serrano 1996). This is 
not a guarantee that the process will be continued by the Zedillo Ponce de León 
administration, but an important element in advancing the political capacity and 
social learning processes of communities that should not be disregarded.
The Quest for Legitimacy and Pronasol
No other social policy or anti-poverty programme in Mexico has received so much 
attention as Solidarity. Although the debate surrounding the programme has taken 
different directions, it is a political interpretation the one which has attracted more 
supporters. Such an interpretation suggests that the programme merely responds to 
an electoral logic and that it has acted as a compensatory programme to palliate 
some of the costs of the economic reform of the Salinas administration. Although 
there is a tendency to conceive the programme from a merely political viewpoint 
and to overlook its policy implications, there are convincing reasons to favour this 
interpretation. Even before taking office, Salinas had to confront pressing 
economic, political and social challenges. Economically, he had to extend De la 
Madrid’s liberal reforms of the economic system which created a new economic 
environment and brought to the economic agenda a significant process of 
privatisation and the reduction of the role of the state in the economy. The problem 
was that the implementation of such an economic model, required strict austerity
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measures that would put a great deal of strain on the satisfaction of social needs, 
which had traditionally been solved by an irresponsible fiscal policy (see Craske 
1994, p. 4).
Politically and socially, Salinas faced equally complex problems. As 
Cornelius (1991, p. 1) notes, Salinas was the first president that had been elected 
with less than half of the votes cast in 1988 (48.7%), a situation that was further 
complicated by his pronouncement in the sense that the era of the virtual one-party 
system had ended. This created legitimacy and credibility problems not only among 
the leadership of the PRI who interpreted his message as a sign of an unfolding 
political liberalisation process in which the old structure and practices of the PRI 
could not fit, but also among public opinion, due to the “crash” of the computing 
system for counting the election votes. The political leadership of Salinas had to be 
reinforced too because the votes were not enough to keep the overwhelming PRI 
majority in the Congress, only 260 out of 500 seats (Cornelius 1991, p. 2). Finally, 
the political situation was further aggravated by the political ascendance of the 
opposition, mainly of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the Party 
of National Action (PAN). The “era of the virtual one-party system” was indeed 
something more than empty talk. The election results showed that a more 
demanding and politically active society was emerging, one that had already 
escaped from the traditional mechanisms of political control in which the PRI had 
based its political dominance in the country
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It is because of these reasons that the political interpretation of Solidarity 
has been favoured leaving its policy implications to one side. Form this point of 
view, Solidarity represents a clever manoeuvre to gain the legitimacy and 
credibility lost right after the elections and to palliate the effects of the neoliberal 
economic model initiated by De la Madrid, one that Salinas was committed to 
deepen. Therefore, following this line of argument, the communitarian approach in 
which Solidarity was based, its attempt to introduce new actors into the decision 
making and implementation processes and its strong popular appeal, fostered from 
the presidential office, were merely aimed at producing political legitimacy in times 
when it was badly needed. But this in only one aspect of Solidarity.
As it will become clear in the following chapters, both economic and post 
electoral problems, certainly demanded a legitimacy building exercise in which 
Solidarity would play an essential role. This legitimacy building exercise which 
included new actors, also helps to explain why PRONASOL encountered tensions 
between the policy makers and the different actors on the ground and why the 
government wanted to engage in a self-help community oriented programme as a 
means of counteracting the resistance and tensions of its implementation and how 
community acted as an essential ally in the process.
Conclusions
Social policy in Mexico is not merely a clever manoeuvre to legitimise the 
government or to keep the peace. It performs functions that are essential in the
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development of a given society and is useful in building the nation and delivering 
social justice, both through means of land reform, education, the development of 
social security systems and developing community attitudes that could increase 
their bargaining position with authorities. But because its development depends on 
a set of circumstances, as well as on values and perceptions of Mexican politicians, 
its political uses are many. It may bring legitimacy to the government or serve as a 
pork-barrel policy in gaining votes and demobilising opposition, but this could 
hardly be its only purpose.
It is precisely because of the different purposes social policy has served, 
that it is difficult to explain its development according to one single theoretical 
approach. It has been suggested that some of the models which offer sound 
interpretations of the development of social policy do so only at certain points in 
time. But they are limited in explaining its evolution because through time, the 
centre of power determining the evolution of social policy changes Therefore, the 
explanations given by these models are not always coincident with social policy 
developments in Mexico, which seem to be oriented by short-term and more 
immediate reasons. That is why, pluralist interpretations and long term 
conspiratorial theories are limited in explaining the development of social policies 
in Mexico.
It can be argued therefore, that in order to understand the dynamic 
character of Mexican social policy, a muddling-through model offers a better 
standpoint in explaining its development. It allows an examination of the origins of
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a social initiative, and explains its evolution without adhering to one single 
interpretation. It also allows an understanding of social policy as a political process 
by means of which it is possible to balance the distribution of power in a given 
society, either by delivering welfare benefits to social groups or by counteracting 
political interests that may endanger the functioning of the system as a whole.
This brief description of the main Mexican anti-poverty programmes 
stresses their differences and similarities and then compares them with international 
experiences. The review shows the importance acquired by communitarian 
approaches in their implementation; the need for incentives to increase their 
effectiveness, and possible obstacles and interorganisational problems that might 
appear as this proceeds. The rationale of social policy and the characteristics of 
anti-poverty initiatives in Mexico and abroad, constitute the framework within 
which the analysis of the implementation of the Solidarity programme will be
carried out.
Chapter 3
Solidarity Municipal Funds-FOMUN: An Analysis of 
Implementation
Introduction
Confronted with severe economic limitations, complex political scenarios and a 
large deficit in the provision of social services particularly those aimed at poor 
groups, the Salinas administration explored an innovative approach to the 
implementation of social policies. The National Solidarity Programme1- 
PRONASOL, the most important component of Salinas’ social policy, was aimed 
at reducing the gap between public demands and public provision. Created as an 
all-encompassing strategy to fight extreme poverty, it covered a wide range o f  
areas such as health, education, housing, productive activities, public works, and 
many others. Focusing mainly on the rural and urban poor, as well as Indigenous 
groups, the Solidarity strategy eventually developed into nearly 40 specific 
programmes, distributed in three main areas of action: a) solidarity for social 
welfare, b) solidarity for production, and c) solidarity for regional development. 
The latter includes Solidarity Municipal Funds (FOMUN), which was aimed at 
building up small basic public works all over the country by increasing the amount
'S in ce  the  b eg in n in g  o f  h is te rm  a t th e  head  o f  the  Federal E x ecu tiv e  B ran ch , C arlos S a lin as d e  
G ortari p resen ted  M ex ican s w ith  th ree  n a tio n a l reso lu tions to  p rom ote  d eve lopm en t w ith in  th e  
country  a im ed  at ex ten d in g  dem ocratic  ru le  an d  recu p era tin g  th e  su s ta in ed  g row th  o f  th e  
econom y th ro u g h  p rice  s tab ility  an d  p roductively  ra is in g  the  sta n d a rd  o f  liv in g  o f  th e  population .
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of finance available at the municipal level. Its actions covered public lighting, 
pavements, sewage systems, roads, drinking water systems, irrigation, 
infrastructure for agricultural and agribusiness activities, septic tanks, boring wells, 
hanging bridges, rural electrification, rural telephone lines, administration of solid 
waste, school rooms, some sporting facilities, health centre refurbishment, and 
others.
Fighting poverty is not new in Mexico, neither are the strategies used. In 
the past presidential initiatives had explored innovative ways to target poor groups 
The Integrated Programme for Rural Development-PIDER-a programme 
supported by the World Bank and the Central Co-ordination of the National Plan 
of Economically Depressed Regions and Marginalised Groups-COPLAMAR, for 
example, were some of the first anti-poverty efforts that included popular 
mobilisation for goal achievement. Nevertheless, the PRONASOL, differed from 
previous efforts because it emphasised community participation in the decision­
making process and aimed to fight poverty by redefining institutions, rules and the 
role of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic actors involved in the implementation 
process.
Because of its notoriety, PRONASOL originated an important debate in 
which political and economic issues were predominant. The comprehensive work 
of Cornelius, Craig and Fox (1994) for instance, covers a wide range of topics, 
from historical to ethnographic research, and quantitative analysis of aggregate 
data. Craske (1994) has also explored the political implications of Solidarity in
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redefining corporatist political arrangements in Mexico. Other works have stressed 
the economic angle of the programme and have analysed its usefulness in reducing 
poverty (Trejo and Jones 1993). Fewer works have studied the programme from a 
public policy perspective (Bertranou 1993). There are also innumerable articles in 
magazines and newspapers which had dealt with the programme. In general, all of 
them show a concern for the changing character of the Mexican political system 
and political developments on the national scene. Very few of them, have analysed 
the programme from a public policy implementation perspective While it is true 
that the importance of economic and macropolitical issues involved in the 
programme can hardly be exaggerated, it is also true that much less attention has 
been given to the cluster of dispositions and the limitations imposed by the 
bureaucratic and political activity that surrounds the implementation of a policy.
This is not a simplistic organisational study. As it will be shown in the 
chapter, the implementation of a policy is by its very nature a political process 
which affects political and economic interests and is therefore, subject to political 
negotiation. It is contended here that policies fail not only because of the gap 
between what is decided on the drawing board and what is actually implemented. 
They also fail because during their implementation process vested interests are 
affected. Public policies will achieve their goals in a more effective way if it is 
recognised, from the beginning, that due to its political nature the implementation 
process is subject to the balance of political power and negotiation. That is why the 
analysis stresses the identification of the main actors involved in the
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implementation process so as to distinguish their political orientations and what 
effect they produce on policy implementation. By means of this, it will be possible 
to describe the politics surrounding the implementation of the FOMUN programme 
in the state o f Campeche. It is contended here that this study of implementation 
offers a different perspective that other works have not stressed enough. It will 
also be useful in reviewing some of the most influential propositions both in the 
field of public policy implementation and the Mexican political system as well.
It will be shown that changes were made, both to the means and to the 
goals of the policy, during the implementation process because local actors have 
significant room for political and administrative manoeuvring. To some extent, this 
view dissents from that which suggests that overwhelming centralism in the 
country, mainly around the institution of the presidency and federal agencies under 
its control, has nullified state and local powers, transforming them into mere 
executors of federal policies (Needleman and Needleman 1969; Molinar Horcasitas 
1993).
Although it is undeniable that the Mexican political system has been built in 
an authoritarian, presidentialist and corporatist way (Cornelius and Craig 1991; 
Camp 1993) that has contradicted the federal spirit embedded in the Mexican 
Constitution, it is also true that state and local powers have developed strategies 
that bestow them with a margin of political and administrative manoeuvring. In 
practice this has altered not only the content of a policy, but also its 
implementation, and in particular cases it has even made it possible not to
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implement a policy at all Such autonomy does not result from a genuine federal 
system, but from the way political power and political recruitment are structured in 
Mexico. But Mexico can hardly be described as a weak presidential system. In 
general, what the chapter shows is that in the implementation of the FOMUN 
programme, presidential power has been relatively successful in imposing a 
reformist programme that by its very nature might otherwise have failed Important 
in this success was the fact that it had the proper political allies at the local level 
that helped to curb political resistance
The chapter also discusses some conditions which are indispensable for 
effective policy implementation In particular, it is argued that political and 
personal commitment to the programme, as well as the actors’ calculation of 
possible compensations, are determinants for effective policy implementation.
The chapter demonstrates too that the inclusion of additional actors does 
not necessarily result in a less effective implementation. This is so because the 
addition of actors during the implementation of FOMUN was accompanied by an 
institutional reform that changed the rules under which participants interact with 
each other. Therefore, it is not the addition or elimination of actors which is 
directly related to the effectiveness of policy, but rather who the actors are and the 
institutional frame which regulates their interactions.
Finally the chapter shows that the implementation of FOMUN was 
successful not only because of its procedural nature, but also because of the
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presidential support it enjoyed, the impressive amount of resources it was given 
and the community participation strategy on which it was based. Together, they 
provided FOMUN with enough power, adequate financial resources and the ability 
to produce allies during the process.
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first, describes the essential 
features of municipal government in Mexico, as the political, economic and 
administrative framework for what follows The second, describes the most recent 
historical background of the programme and the third, describes FOMUN 
structure, procedures and objectives. These sections are followed by an evaluation 
o f the programme and in section five the analysis of implementation is carried out. 
The main ideas in the field of policy implementation are discussed and evaluated in 
this section, before drawing some conclusions in section six.
B a c k g r o u n d  t o  FOMUN: M e x i c a n  M u n i c i p a l 2G o v e r n m e n t
In describing and explaining the programme and the way it was implemented, it is 
necessary to characterise Mexican municipal government and how it affected 
FOMUN’s implementation. This section also describes the main characteristics of 
Campeche, as the context in which the implementation process took place.
M u n ic ip a l i t ie s  a re  local ju r isd ic tio n s  w h ich  a re  o ften  a  m ix tu re  o f  ru ra l a n d  u rban  areas. T hey 
a re  s im ila r  to  “d is tr ic ts” o r  “co u n tie s” in  o th er coun tries.
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THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AND MUNICIPALITIES IN MEXICO
Mexico’s political system works according to written and unwritten rules. While 
the system of balance and checks among powers is granted by Article 49 of the 
Constitution, the decision-making process is highly centralised in presidential 
hands. Although there have been recent changes in the composition of both federal 
and state legislatures, the legislature, continues to rubber stamp the president’s 
will. The same is true of the judicial system because the designation of most 
important judges is actually a presidential privilege.
The federal structure of the Mexican government works too with formal 
and informal rules. Although its federal structure is granted by Article 40 of the 
Constitution, a genuine federalism is far from reality. Most states and 
municipalities are under strong control from the centre because of their 
dependency on federal funds.
Mexican federalism stresses the role of municipio as a level of government 
with the ability to control its own affairs, as described in Article 115 of the 
Mexican Constitution. In practice, this autonomy is merely formal because its 
competence in administrative, economic and political terms has been minimised by 
the overwhelming presence of the federation and state governments. Historically, 
municipalities have confronted direct intervention of federal and state agencies in 
municipal jurisdiction, presumably because they lack the economic, political and 
administrative abilities necessary to take care of their own affairs.
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Although several attempts have been made to reverse this situation and to 
reinforce their political, economic and administrative presence in their territories it 
was not until 1983 when an amendment to the Article 115 of the Constitution, 
introduced significant changes at this level of government. First, the Constitutional 
reform attempted to eradicate a common practice by which governors nullified 
municipal councils or removed any of their members in a discretionary way. With 
the reform, the dissolution of municipal powers became an exclusive prerogative of 
state legislatures and it can only be done after a highly complex procedure. This 
action gave more security to municipal authorities and protected them, to some 
extent, from discretionary decisions of state governors.
The Constitutional reform of 1983 also introduced new changes in the Law 
of Electoral Processes and Political Organisations-LOPPE that allowed municipal 
councils to be made up from representatives of more than one party elected both 
under the principle of proportional representation and relative majority. In essence, 
what the reform made possible was the participation of opposition parties in the 
composition of municipal councils.
Administratively the reform of 1983 allowed municipalities to formulate 
administrative and internal ordinances for municipal self-government. Before the 
reform, municipalities were dependent upon the approval of governors or state 
legislatures, for the formulation of internal manuals and ruling instruments. 
Furthermore, it was not until the Constitutional amendment of 1983 that municipal 
responsibility for the provision of drinking water, drainage systems, public lighting.
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collection and destination of solid waste, markets, cemeteries, slaughter houses, 
streets and pavements, parks and public gardens, public security, fire brigades, 
urban transport, etcetera was clearly established.
Economically, the constitutional amendment introduced two important 
changes The first, made council tax an exclusive municipal responsibility as well as 
the right to charge for the provision of certain public services The second, 
assigned municipal councils full legal power to approve annual budgets, a 
prerogative traditionally exerted by state legislatures.
However, the efficacy of the reform has been doubtful In administrative 
terms its impact has been sensibly diminished because many municipalities in the 
country lacked not only skilled personnel to implement the reforms, but also 
because in some of them there was no administrative structure. In these conditions 
it is not surprising to find that even today many municipalities in the country have 
not created internal regulations and administrative manuals to regulate their 
procedures.
Politically, the reforms have not been able to balance the distribution of 
competence and power in many municipalities in the country The introduction of 
the formula of proportional representation in the make up of municipal councils, 
where the PRI holds a majority, has not been able to counteract the political power 
of the mayor and PRI representatives who were elected by a relative majority and 
who hold a majority in many municipal councils. Decisions are still controlled by
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the use of a simple PRI majority (mayoriteo). The situation is different when the 
mayor and council posts are occupied by representatives of opposition parties. 
However, they represent a small proportion in comparison with those controlled by 
the PRI.
Economically, the changes introduced to the Fiscal Co-ordination Law of 
1980, have not increased municipal resources by the amount necessary to meet 
their obligations The federal sharing system formula implied in the Law still 
represents 80 percent of the total income of municipalities in the country. Only 20 
percent of their income results from municipal taxes, rights, and other products. 
Council tax is the most important source of income at this level of government. 
Nevertheless, the administration of this tax is not entirely managed by the 
municipalities. State governments retain on average 20 percent of such tax as a 
payment for printing its bills. In addition, the allocation of funds does not consider 
the increase in costs for maintenance and the natural depreciation o f equipment for 
the provision of public services which on the whole weaken the municipal finances 
and autonomy even more.
In sum, although constitutional changes have been introduced to strengthen 
municipal governments in administrative, economic and political terms, in practice 
severe constraints still exist that undermine the autonomy of the municipality 
compared with that of the state and federal governments
Solidarity Municipal Funds-FOMUN 66
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
Financial limitations are the most significant obstacle for municipal autonomy and 
the main reason behind the poor provision of public services. While the federal and 
state governments have increased their tax wealth, municipal governments have 
been losing theirs For instance, in 1982, municipal governments received the 
lowest percentage of public revenue in modem history, only 1.0 percent. In 1929 
they received 7.7 percent; in 1932, 8.9 percent (the highest in history); in 1940, 5.3 
percent; in 1950, 3.3 percent; in 1960, 2 8 percent, in 1970, 1.6 percent and in 
1980, 1.1 percent(Gutierrez Salazar 1993, pp. 85-86).
It was not until 1989 that the Fiscal Co-ordination Law was revised again 
to redistribute resources from richer to poorer states. According to the World 
Bank (1994, p 4), the changes to the Law benefited the four poorest states and 
altered the amount of federal transfers from 3:1 in 1989 to 2:1 in 1992. Despite 
this, federal superiority of resources is still an effective strategy to control and 
exert political power over the states (see Vicencio 1994, pp. 5-7). Not surprisingly, 
the same mechanism is used by some governors in relation to the municipalities 
under their jurisdiction. That is why, even if the federal government increases 
federal transfers to the poorer states, it is up to them to allocate these resources 
among their municipalities Although clear criteria should govern the allocation of 
resources (levels of poverty, population, and deficit of public services), 
discretionary decisions still play an important role in the process. Therefore, even if 
there is a redistribution of resources among states, this does not mean that they will
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reach municipalities because the state can still operate in ways that are not intended 
by federal authorities. This is one of the problems FOMUN was designed to deal 
with.
THE PLANNING SYSTEM AND MUNICIPALITIES
The enormous deficit in the provision of public services at the municipal level can 
also be explained by the minor role of this level of government in national planning 
activities. Planning in Mexico is a relatively new activity. The first attempts to 
structure what can be called an economic national plan emerged during the 30s 
with the so-called first plan sexenal (six year plan). As many other activities, 
planning in Mexico also reflects the rather centralist, short term and politically 
oriented characteristics of other elements of the Mexican political system. For a 
long time it has been considered as an exclusive federal prerogative and the 
inclusion of states and municipalities in the planning process has been merely 
formal. As a result, national plans rarely reflect the needs of communities. Many 
attempts have been made to reverse this situation (see Bailey 1994). Nevertheless, 
these attempts have been rather ineffective
On the whole, planning has been a clientele-based activity, short term 
oriented and defined according to the economic and political climate in turn. The 
first attempts to redistribute wealth during the period 1970-1982, were based on 
economic investments that could not steer private investment away from rich 
regions towards poor ones. In addition, planning is also characterised by a 
bureaucratic mechanism in which decision-making power remains in federal
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ministries in charge of budgeting and planning, and whose leaders are the principal 
negotiators in matters of federal spending. As a result, economic or technical 
decisions are bound to discretionary decisions, reinforcing a subtle clientelist 
structure. Finally, recent efforts to direct more resources to states and 
municipalities have been limited, mainly because funds for regional development 
represent a small proportion compared with those for normal federal programmes 
that still represent by and large, the main source of public investment in states and 
municipalities.
FOMUN also introduced important changes in this respect. Bailey (1994, 
p 110) notes that the most important changes are the PRONASOL legal 
mechanisms that were created to ‘permit the federal government to legally transfer 
funds through and around state governments to the municipalities’ For him, 
Solidarity differs from previous planning attempts in more than one respect. First, 
because its implementation bypasses state governors in the delivery of public 
services. Second, instead of national, state and municipal plans, the programme is 
based on a multiplicity of community projects, and because of this, Solidarity not 
only had more resources but these were also better targeted. This way of operation 
proved not only to be more effective in targeting poverty pockets in the country, 
but also in altering traditional channels for the transfer of resources.
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE AND MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL
Bureaucratic lag and personnel recruitment have also affected municipal 
governments. Mexican municipalities consist formally of the Municipal Council
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(Ayuntamiento), presided over by the Mayor (Presidente Municipal)', councillors 
(síndicos and regidores), who act as a local legislature, and the so-called auxiliary 
authorities (autoridades auxiliares), particularly in those cases where geographic 
isolation and population distribution are a major problem. With the exception of 
auxiliary authorities, all of these are elected for a period of three years.
But in addition to the popularly elected authorities, every municipal 
government has an administrative structure that varies from one municipality to 
another, depending on its size, needs and resources. On the whole, municipal 
governments of capital cities are better off and tend to have more resources not 
only because of their political importance, but also because the bulk of the 
population is concentrated there. Salaries of municipal officials tend also to be 
better and consequently the administrative structure of these municipalities is 
usually made up of more qualified personnel. In the poorest states of the federation 
however, some municipalities lack the minimal administrative structure to fulfil 
their responsibilities. There are some cases where although the Municipal Council 
is formally elected and installed, the mayor does not have a salary, something that 
has forced some mayors to leave the country during the United States’ harvest 
season to earn some money 3
In terv iew  w ith  Lie. D e  la  T orre , J. M ., D irec to r  o f  M un ic ipa l P ro g ram m es a t th e  F edera l 
D epartm en t o f  Social D cvelopm ent-S E D E S O L . A ugust 2, 1994 (S E D E S O L  C en tra l O ffices 
M exico, D .F .).
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These problems are aggravated by the fact that the recruitment of municipal 
staff is riddled with the same patronage pattern of recruitment that frequently takes 
place at the federal and state levels Patronage may take the form of personal links 
with the mayor, people who obtain a job as a suggestion from an influential person 
(<recomendados), nepotism and the camarilla (see Cornelius and Craig 1991; Camp 
1990) process of political recruitment, as well as the absence of a civil service, 
have riddled municipal administrative structure with poorly qualified personnel.
The absence of competence affects not only ordinary procedures but policy 
goals as well. Although the municipal staff is partially renewed each three years 
after the new mayor takes office together with his closest group of people, or 
camarilla, it is not possible to get rid of the employees at the lowest level of the 
bureaucratic structure, who in general, have been there for more than a single 
administration. This is for practical reasons. These public servants, know the 
procedures and community problems very well, but most importantly, they control 
information indispensable in solving every day questions and situations that new 
officials do not know. The mayor’s camarilla may or may not undertake new 
policies, but in any case they will have to rely on these bureaucrats whose only 
training comes from their administrative experience gathered over years. They are 
not concerned with new programmes or whether their goals are achieved, for them, 
new bosses merely mean a process of adjustment to new procedures and new ways 
o f interaction with citizens, but mainly with their new chiefs. They perceive their
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jobs only as a source of income and there is a real lack of commitment to what they 
do.
Generally, their working conditions are the worst inside the bureaucratic 
structure, and their salary scarcely reaches 50 pounds per month4. They are the 
operators of most of the procedures at the municipal level; their expectations for 
future promotions are rather few, not only because of their limited skills but also 
because, the better jobs are reserved for the mayor’s camarilla Therefore, they do 
not really care about new policies and goals; even more, new programmes simply 
mean a challenge to adjust the way they deal with the workload and a quite 
frequently bureaucratic delay is their response to the threat of change. These 
attitudes and perceptions are a decisive issue when analysing programme 
implementation. They not only affected programme success, but also they have 
created among the community an image of indolent of public authorities which any 
programme would have to surmount.
Community involvement in the programme was a response to this situation. 
The programme was not designed to work under the clientelist style that still 
prevails in the country and therefore, policy designers considered that by creating 
community participation in the implementation of the programme, the inertia and 
patron-oriented response to public demands, which on the whole characterises 
municipal bureaucracy, would be counteracted and the implementation of the
4
Som e v a ria tio n s  m ay  ex is t acco rd in g  to  each  s ta te 's  econom ic situation .
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programme would be more effective This was the hidden agenda of the 
programme. Formally, by including community participation, it would be possible 
to close the gap between what the people needed and what they received; to 
legitimate government actions; to encourage the efficiency of municipal authorities 
and staff; to produce an honest management of the resources of the programme 
and to increase the number of public works around the country. For former 
president Salinas, community involvement was the cornerstone of the programme 
and was aimed to guarantee that it would not fail. He did not make any attempt to 
conceal this. As he noted, ‘institutions and civil servants have to understand that 
this great popular mobilisation demands from them a new attitude. There are some 
who have already responded to this new logic of work; there are some others who 
have not; but I am sure that they will learn fast to adapt to those new 
circumstances, because if they do not, popular mobilisation itself soon will 
overtake them’ (Salinas de Gortari 1990a)
PUBUC PERFORMANCE AND POUT1CAL CULTURE
Far from a homogeneous national political culture differs from institution to 
institution, from region to region and it depends on socio-cultural conditions. In 
the same way, levels of education may alter the way Mexicans perceive their 
political institutions. Educated people tend to be more critical of current political 
institutions such as the PRI and its affiliated structures (CTM, CNOP, CNC) than 
people in the rural areas where these organisations still have an important political
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weight in creating and reproducing clientelist and patronage political structures and 
values.
However, there is something about which all Mexicans seem to agree, that 
is, their widespread popular distrust of almost every political institution in the 
country (see Camp 1993, pp. 56 and 71).
With the exception of the presidency, almost every political institution in 
the country lacks credibility. This differentiation between the presidency and the 
remaining political institutions in the country is interesting. The presidency is still 
viewed by many Mexicans as ‘the embodiment of paternalistic, [but] authoritarian 
rule in Mexico.’(Cornelius and Craig 1980, p. 353). Consequently, this has not 
only reinforced a centralised pattern of policy making in the country, by assigning 
huge, formal and informal, prerogatives to the executive branch, but also it has 
reinforced the belief that only by reaching the top levels of the public 
administration is it possible to obtain solutions for particular problems. 
Paradoxically, if solutions for a particular problem are not offered, the 
responsibility falls to other actors, in particular, those officials in lower levels of the 
bureaucratic structure As Cornelius and Craig note (1980, p. 353), even if 
‘government aid is not forthcoming, the citizen is likely to absolve the president of 
blame, attributing these failures of performance to corrupt, incompetent 
subordinate officials who thwart his will.’ (p. 353).
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Generalised corruption is one of the reasons for the widespread distrust of 
political institutions. People’s perceptions have been constantly confronted with 
the situation of municipal authorities deviating funds to other purposes than those 
of serving public needs Particularly in Mexico, and in the case of creating public 
works at the municipal level, the ‘project by contract’ scheme has been one of the 
most important ways for the deviation of funds and generation of corruption. In 
general, large-scale projects, as well as some others, where state or municipal 
government lacks the skill or technical resources to implement public works, have 
traditionally been put out to public tender. The idea behind the scheme is to give 
private firms the opportunity to compete among themselves, by offering a 
combination of a low price and good quality to be allocated the contract. However, 
the scheme is riddled with corruption. Generally, contracts are offered to those 
suppliers who collude with authorities and who are willing to ‘share’ the benefits of 
the contract. The problem is aggravated by the fact that ‘cheap’ is not necessarily 
‘better’ and quite frequently the favoured firm employs low quality materials to 
reduce costs and increase its profits.
It was only recently that an attempt to counteract such irregularities was 
established during the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988). With the 
creation of the General Comptrollership of the Federation-SECOGEF. Several 
measures to prevent and eradicate patrimonial attitudes in public institutions were 
then introduced but despite these efforts, there has been a more visible impact at 
the federal than at other levels.
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With this in mind, FOMUN designers developed the most important 
elements of the programme First, it was clear for them that one of the ways to 
counteract the corruption generated by the ‘project-by-contract’ scheme in the 
implementation of public works, was by assigning to the community a significant 
role in the decision as to what kind of works should be carried out in their 
communities. This was a significant step forward in comparison with normal 
programmes in which bureaucrats decide the needs of the community. In this 
situation, communities are generally provided with public works that are not 
coincident with community priorities. As noted by a member of a Solidarity 
Committee, ‘in the past you have chosen what is good for us and you have 
committed mistakes; now it is our turn to commit our own mistakes’.5 For a 
particular community, for instance, a basket-ball court is a priority, compared with 
the introduction of public lighting, because sport activities represent for this 
community a better option to redirect youngsters’ energies from drugs or 
alcoholism to other activities. One may not agree with their priorities but 
community satisfaction will be greater if they are adopted, than if officials decide 
what is beneficial for the community.
Second, by promoting community involvement in the implementation of 
such works, but most of all, by conferring on the community the management of 
the resources as well as vigilance and supervision activities, a positive impact on
in te r v ie w  w ith  Sr. C asanova , M ., N ovem ber 4 , 1994 (M u n ic ip a lity  o f  EscArccga, C am peche).
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community attitudes towards public institutions may be achieved, and in particular, 
a sensation that something is really changing may be generated. Therefore, for 
policy makers popular involvement in the implementation of FOMUN, would not 
only increase the effective use of public funds, by reducing to some extent the 
deviation of funds and by better allocating resources according to targeted public 
needs and priorities, but also would be helpful in recovering political legitimacy by 
allowing the community to handle and manage resources and influence policy.
There is evidence that the strategy worked. During the field work it was 
evident that people tended to identify the programme mainly with the president and 
not with any other political actor or political party. As noted by a resident in the 
municipality of Champotón, ‘since Lázaro Cárdenas I have not seen such as good 
president as this one (Carlos Salinas)’ 6
Nevertheless, it is also true that the way the programme was designed was 
also beneficial for other political actors, mainly state governors and mayors, who 
could have gained political credit by leading the implementation of the programme. 
For instance, according to a preliminary impact evaluation conducted by 
SEDESOL (1994, p. 8), more than two thirds of a sample of 8,652 Solidarity 
Committees, considered their mayors performance as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. Ten 
percent of the sample described this performance as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’, and nine 
to seventeen percent of the sample, according to the particular programme, said
6Idcm.
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that the mayors were the main obstacle to a proper performance of the programme. 
The learning process embedded in the programme however was not restricted to 
the community. Municipal public officials soon realised that a change in their 
performance was required. Some of them responded positively. As expressed by 
the Secretary of the municipal council of Hopelchen, ‘with Solidarity we had to 
change our procedures not only to meet programme requirements but also to 
match the increased community demands that came with the programme We have 
also learned something from this experience.’ 7
In sum, by allowing people involvement in the implementation of the 
programme, an important cognitive process took place.8 Just as cynicism was 
learned by Mexicans as a result of a constant and frustrating interaction with public 
institutions, new lessons can be learned from interacting with programmes like 
FOMUN, and eventually, this could lead to the transformation of perceptions and 
beliefs about public institutions.
ELECTORAL CYCLES AND POUT1CAL RECRUITMENT
Municipal elections take place every three years A new mayor and council are 
elected under the constitutional principle of ‘no re-election’. Therefore, during 
each six-year state term of office, there are two different municipal administrations.
i n t e r v ie w  w ith  L ie. C hâvez, J., S ecretary  G eneral o f  th e  M u n ic ip a l C ouncil o f  H opelchén , 
O c to b e r  17, 1994 (M u n ic ip a lity  o f  H opelchén , C am peche).
sF o r th e  pu rposes o f  th is  resea rch , p o litica l cu ltu re  is defin ed  a s  th e  ‘th e  set o f  co g n itio n s, 
p e rcep tio n s , eva lua tions , a ttitu d es, an d  behav iou ra l p red isp o s itio n s th ro u g h  w h ich  m em ber 
in d iv id u a ls  an d /o r subg roups o rd e r  an d  in te rp re t po litical in s titu tio n s  a n d  processes, a n d  th e ir  
ow n re la tio n sh ip s  w ith  such  in s titu tio n s  an d  p rocesses ' (C ra ig  a n d  C o rn e liu s  1980, p. 340).
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The formal procedure states that PRI ruling party candidates are selected from 
within the party, following democratic procedures and according to their militancy 
and representativeness in the community. However, the general rule is that each 
PRI candidate for the municipal government is hand-picked by a complex 
negotiating process between the governor, leading members of the party, local 
interests, federal government ‘sponsors’, and by the president himself who has the 
final word. The governor in turn, has the chance to “secure” political support from 
the candidates he selects. Nevertheless, some of the eventual mayors may not be 
directly supported by him, but by other powerful political actors. This particular 
selection process, may or may not increase the margin for political manoeuvre of 
mayors depending on the way they were chosen. When they are hand-picked and 
supported mainly by leading members of the PRI, or by national political figures, 
with the acceptance of the governor, their margin for political manoeuvre vis-à-vis 
the governor is wider. This gives them the chance to act more independently of 
state governments. In these circumstances, political confrontation between 
governors and this kind of mayor is limited mainly because it would erode 
governor’s political relationships with the mayor’s supporters. On the contrary, 
when candidates are designated mainly with the governor’s endorsement and 
through a local network of interests, the mayor’s political commitment is strongly 
tied up with his or her ‘sponsors’ and as a result, his/her margin of political 
manoeuvring decreases.
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The same situation arises when PRI governors are elected. They are 
nominated by a negotiating process between state interest, leading members of the 
PRI, top level federal officials and most importantly, by the direct decision of the 
president. Again, the governor’s margin of political manoeuvre, will depend on the 
way he or she was selected. As at the municipal level, the electoral cycle varies 
from state to state and there is the situation where a federal administration takes 
office when some state governments are in the middle o f  their legal period of 
administration. Therefore, the president has to deal with governors he did not 
choose and whose political convictions and commitment to presidential 
programmes and initiatives, will rely mainly on legal bases instead of a combination 
of the latter and political commitment and gratitude to the president who elected 
them In the end, both mayors’ and governors’ responsiveness to their electorate is 
more tied up with informal but highly effective political powers than with their 
citizenry. By supporting or vetoing elected politicians, regional political coalitions 
still exert significant influence in determining the result of national policies. It has 
been only by means of the development of institutions in the country that national 
policies have been implemented. As Knight (1993, p. 33) notes ‘state bosses and 
cliques still wield great influence in Mexican politics to the extent that incumbent 
governors are neither autonomous political actors nor the representatives of a party 
or a broad constituency but rather representatives of a tight clientelistic network, 
which links regional elites to the central government ’
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FOMUN was also confronted with this situation. The programme had to 
deal with governors sympathetic to the programme but also with those who 
perceived it as a threat to their interests. The situation differed depending on 
whether governors and mayors belonged to the same or opposing parties. While 
the programme received support from some PRD mayors in the state of Michoacan 
and PAN governors in the state of Guanajuato, in others particularly in Oaxaca, the 
programme was considered to reproduce patronage and clientelistic practices, 
common in Mexican politics.
MAIN FEA TURES OF CAMPECHE
Although the elements described in previous sections show the sort of problems 
the programme had to confront, there are still other issues that have to be taken 
into consideration to better understand the implementation of the programme. 
Regional differences are important because they represent political and social 
arrangements in which varying regional governing coalitions shape policies 
according to the balance of power in relation to the federation. This section deals 
with important elements of Campeche’s socio-political conditions that affected the 
implementation o f the programme.
Being one of the less populated states in the country, with 535,185 
inhabitants, the state of Campeche is made up of 9 municipalities (.37 percent out 
of 2,403 in the country), Campeche, Isla del Carmen, Calkini, Tenabo, 
Hecelchakan, Champoton, Palizada, Escarcega and Hopelchen. The state 
developed its main economic and socio-political profile during the 40s,
Solidarity Municipal F u n d s -F O M U N 81
characterised predominantly by agricultural activities with a limited range of 
products. Moreover, the late development of the infrastructure of communications 
and roads, during the 50s, had important consequences. It produced: a) a high 
dependency on the exploitation of very few products; b) the formation of a 
complementary export sector made up of primary products (honey, chewing gum, 
and wood) characterised by its immoderate exploitation as well as its low added 
value; c) a marked orientation to the satisfaction of the local market, and d) an 
inward oriented policy that in the end, reinforced the isolation of the local economy 
from the national context (Gobiemo del Estado de Campeche 1992, pp. 22-23).
From the 50s to 70s, growth of the shrimp industry gave a positive impulse 
to the local economy due to the high price of the product in the international 
market. But because of its unstable price, this impulse was ephemeral. During this 
time, large groups of the population moved from rural to urban areas, located on 
the coast (the most attractive being the municipalities of Campeche, capital of the 
state, and Isla del Carmen), generating the abandonment of vast areas of inner land. 
As a result, the main cities in the state developed important urban infrastructures 
leaving rural areas with a growing deficit of public services which accounts for the 
current regional disparities. By the end of the 70s, the state of Campeche actively 
participated in the oil boom, mainly through the exploitation of large oil fields in 
the Sound line of Campeche (Sonda de Campeche) which produces 70 percent of 
the total oil production of the country. This had a significant, but brief and limited, 
impact on the state’s economy that lasted until the oil crisis in 1982. The oil boom
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merely produced localised development in Isla del Carmen, with little impact in the 
rest of the state.
This situation has not dramatically changed. Nowadays, the economy 
depends on a group of disconnected activities that obstruct the creation of a 
multiplier effect on the employment and the living standards of the population A 
complementary export sector still remains, based on primary products with low 
added value and highly dependent on international prices. Agriculture tends to 
serve the local market and continues to use traditional methods. Most important 
perhaps is that economic isolation is reinforced by applying policies that discourage 
investment entrepreneurs from outside the state. This has exacerbated even more 
the state’s separation from the regional and national context.
Public investment has had a significant role in reversing this situation, by 
providing basic infrastructure to support private production. However the impact 
has been minimal, mainly because resources were merely used to cover 
bureaucratic expansion and therefore, the state government had to increase its 
participation in the local economy, mainly in the area of rural development. The 
growth of public expenditure, however, did not have a positive effect on income 
distribution, making deeper social inequalities, regional isolation, increasing 
poverty and accentuating even more the differences between the rural and urban 
areas. Nowadays, nearly 40 percent of all communities in the state remain entirely
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isolated for more than four or five months during the year9, because of floods and 
lack of roads and communications Therefore, many of the states inhabitants have 
been deprived of regular access to public services and other welfare benefits. For 
instance, health, education and employment indicators, although poor, are better in 
the main two cities of the state, Campeche and Isla del Carmen That is why they 
show a major demographic concentration, turning them into economic centres, and 
consequently putting stress on public efforts and resources and leaving the 
remaining municipalities in a difficult situation.
In terms of the composite index of socio-economic marginality, Campeche 
is considered as a state with a high level of social marginality and it is ranked tenth 
in the national context.
9Floods an d  storm s frequently  c o v e r  and  destroy  ro ad s in  severa l reg io n s  o f  th e  s ta te  d u rin g  the  
ra in in g  season w h ich  a lso  d a m a g e  co m m u n ica tio n s in fras tru c tu re . P a lizad a , o n e  o f  the  
m un icipalities o f  th e  sta te  w ith  th e  second h ig h es t level o f  m arg in a lity , every  year h a s  to  d rag  
d itches a long  the m ain  road o f  a cce ss  to th e  coun ty  due to  th e  h ig h  ra in fa ll w h ich  com pletely  
covers large sections o f  road.
Solidarity Municipal Funds-FOMUN 84
T a b ic  1.
C a m p e c h e 's  co m p o s ite  soc io -econom ic  
__________in d e s  o f  m a rg in a l i tà _________
Indicator
Population S3 5,185
%  o f  analphabet population
%  o f  the population who did not finish primary
15.40
school older than 15 years
%  o f  occupants per house without drainage and
44.82
toilet. 24.80
%  o f  occupants per house without electricity
15.02
%  o f  occupants per house without tubed water
29.52
%  o f  houses with m ultiple inhabitants
65.03
%  o f  occupants per houses with floor m ade o f  soil
24.16
%  o f  the population in localities with less than 
$000 inhabitants 36.21
%  o f  the population occupied with an income 
inferior to  the m inimum wage 68.07
Index o f  marginality 0.480 High
Source: Dirección General de Estudios de Población 1993
Two of its nine municipalities, Hopelchen and Palizada, have the highest 
levels of marginality. Five (Calkini, Tenabo, Escarcega, Champoton and 
Hecelchakan) are ranked as ‘medium’, and the remaining two, Campeche and Isla 
del Carmen, show the lowest index of marginality.
T a b le  2, C a m p e c h e ’s m u n ic ip a li t ie s  in d ex  o f  m a rg in a l i ty
Municipality and place in 
the state context
Index Uvei Place in the national
context.
1. Ilop elchén 0.603 High 682
2. Palizada 0.270 High 971
3. Cham  pot ón -0.071 Medium 1256
4. Calkini -0.230 Medium 1407
5. K scárcega -0.255 Medium 1423
6. II et c k haki n -0.284 Medium 1448
7. Tenabo -0.295 Medium 1462
8. Isla del (.'ármen -0.959 Low 1954
9. C am peche -1.413 Low 2211
Source: Dirección General de Estudios de Población 1993.
The latter, are mainly urban and contain 57.9 percent of the population. 
The capital city Campeche has 32.5 percent of it and Isla del Carmen 25.4 percent
The latter has received the economic benefits from the state-owned National Oil
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Company-PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos) generating an atypical economic 
situation there. The differences between the municipalities offer interesting 
contrasts that have proved relevant to the implementation of the programme
Politically too, Campeche is peculiar in the national context Up to the 
1994 elections, the state had never faced political opposition. Commonly known as 
a PRI paradise, the state has been an electoral stronghold for PRI politicians and 
because of this, it has significantly contributed to presidential victories. As in other 
states of the federation, it has been governed by a reduced government coalition 
which exercises political power frequently unresponsive to citizens’ needs. 
Politically conservative and rather reluctant to change, its political culture may be 
characterised by parochial values on the side of the civil society and authoritarian 
and paternalistic on the side of the state These values, political and historical as 
well as economic conditions, must be kept in mind in understanding local 
implementation.
Historical Background to FOMUN
This section deals with a group of conjunctural questions without which the 
implementation of the programme could not be understood They are related to the 
changes that the Salinas administration introduced. One of these topics refers to 
the power of the president in Mexican politics and his role in the success of the 
programme. Another deals with the intra PRI struggle which partially explains why 
a presidential initiative is threatening the traditional structures of the PRI. The so-
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called reform of the state is also reviewed as it provides the philosophy in which 
FOMUN is based, namely the establishment of new relationships between state and 
society, which also provided the framework for the community participation 
component. The institutional reorganisation induced by the programme, is also 
essential in understanding the implementation of FOMUN as well as the origin of 
the impressive amount of resources used by the programme.
THE PRESIDENCY
There are some features that are eloquent enough to illustrate the strong power of 
the presidency and that have generated the term presidencialismo, which refers to 
the overwhelming power of the executive branch of government in Mexican 
politics. A mix of legal, economic and political reasons are basic to such 
supremacy.
Constitutionally, the President has a legislative role. In fact, the most 
significant changes made to the constitution have been the result of presidential 
initiative. The legislative branch of government has played a secondary role in this 
respect, not only because its initiatives have been aimed to transform less important 
areas of public affairs, but also because its role has been that of approving 
executive initiatives with minimal opposition. The way the congress is constituted 
partially explains this situation. Of 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies, 
nearly three hundred belong to the PRI, who in turn have been hand-picked in the 
manner previously described. This has secured more than the minimal majority for 
the approval of presidential initiatives, or the rejection of any other party initiative.
\More recently, pressures from opposition parties and alliances among them, have 
decisively reduced the majority of PRI deputies in the chamber, making it more 
difficult for a presidential initiative to be approved. For instance, during the general 
elections of 1988, the PRI lost the majority and could not obtain the two thirds 
necessary for a constitutional reform. Nevertheless, this has not diminished the 
presidential power to make laws, which means that he can still act with very little 
constraint.
Likewise, the president in Mexico has also the ability to choose the most 
important members of the supreme court of justice as well as other judges in the 
country, who in addition, develop their careers in a highly corrupt environment. In 
addition, the Mexican President is also the supreme chief of the armed forces and 
most important, he controls public administration resources. The president is also 
the ‘natural’ leader of the PRI, and by expressing his “points of view”, he exerts 
decisive power to select candidates for popular election posts as well as the 
selection of leaders for the most important unions in the country.
Given that the centralisation of power is in the hands of the President, one 
may think that such power is reflected at all levels of government and in each 
sphere of public performance However, research findings suggest that this 
predominance of the executive, is to some extent, modified during the 
implementation of many policies. While the design of public policies still remains a 
federal initiative, the implementation process reflects a different balance of power.
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Despite this, the president’s support has been and still is, essential to 
determine the success of a policy. It is not strange, that PIDER, COPLAMAR and 
now PRONASOL-the most recent anti-poverty experience in the country-have 
been under the direct control of the presidency, something that proved to be 
essential in the case of FOMUN. It is contended here that without presidential 
support, the reform that FOMUN was trying to impose, would not have been 
possible.
Having this in mind, we may consider the origin of the reformist essence of 
a programme like FOMUN; how FOMUN differs from interesting experiences of 
the past, such as PIDER or COPLAMAR, and the relationship between FOMUN 
and the economic and political project to which Salinas was strongly committed.
THE "TECHNOCRAT" VS. "POLITICIANS" DEBATE
Recently, traditional and modem attitudes about the way politics and the economy 
must be conducted, have generated significant changes in the country and also have 
stressed the underlying changes in political recruitment in Mexico. The rise of a 
new economic and political project has been influenced by educated young 
politicians or technocrats whose credentials depend more on an advanced 
university degree, than on a long grass-roots political tradition of the older 
members or politicians. These politicians, have developed their political careers 
for many years inside the PRI structure and/or its affiliated sectoral organisations. 
Nowadays, they represent the hard-liners and are strongly identified with ‘dirty
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electoral activities’ (Cornelius and Craig 1991, p. 62). 10and with more traditional 
forms of political control. Compared with the technocrats, they lack not only the 
administrative ability to influence the direction o f public policies, but also the 
willingness to do so without resort to clientelist procedures. The rise o f the 
modernisers’ to the political elite, exhibits a common process through which, a 
renovation of cadres has taken place, replacing old politicians who had governed 
the country for several decades International and national economic and political 
conditions, created a positive atmosphere for the success of the modernisers. 
Former president Salinas de Gortari, is the most representative of the technocrats 
and his policies also reveal that there is a rupture with models from the past. For 
example, the most influential cabinet posts during the Salinas term of government, 
were occupied by specialists in areas of economics and public administration and 
who had postgraduate qualifications from Stanford, Harvard, MIT, Yale, 
Princeton, etcetera. It will be necessary to take account of this intra-elite struggle 
in order to understand some of the features of the National Solidarity Programme.
Despite its importance, such a distinction is not precise in reality. It is clear 
that not all Salinas’ members of cabinet in particular and federal authorities in
l0S om e o f  th ese  d ir ty  tech n iq u es  fo r electo ral success in  M exico. “ S tu ffin g  ba llo t boxes, 
in tim id a tin g  p o ten tia l opp o sitio n  supporte rs  by th re a te n in g  to  w ith d raw  g o v ern m en t b en efits , 
d isq u a lify in g  o p p o sitio n  party  po ll w atchers, re locating  p o l l in g  p laces a t  th e  last m in u te  to  sites 
k n o w n  on ly  to  PR1 sup p o rte r, m an ip u la tin g  vo ter re g is tra tio n  lists (p a d d in g  th em  w ith  n o n ­
e x is te n t o r  n o n -re s id e n t P R iis ta s  w h ile  “sh av in g ” those w h o  m ig h t vo te a g a in s t  the  ru lin g  party  
from  th e  ro lls ) , issu in g  m u ltip le  v o tin g  c reden tia ls  to PR I su p p o rte rs , o rg a n is in g  m u ltip le  v o tin g  
by  carruseles  (“ f ly in g  b rig ad es"  o f  PRI supporters tra n sp o r te d  from  o n e  p o llin g  p lace  to  the 
nex t), a n d  so  fo rth . See C o rn e liu s an d  C ra ig  1991. 62.
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general, share his rupture with models from the past Federal, state and municipal 
bureaucracies are far from homogeneous. There exist bureaucratic struggles 
between them (as it will become clear in the following chapter) and this influenced 
the way the Children of Solidarity was implemented Therefore, it is not argued 
here that federal authorities are in general a positive force for change and that local 
politicians are old-fashioned and against reform. As said before, there are some 
bureaucratic groups that are old-fashioned and other that are more prone to 
political reform It is this respect that the main and most influential SEDESOL 
officials have to be differentiated not only from other old-fashioned bureaucratic 
groups in the three levels of government, but also from other bureaucrats inside 
SEDESOL itself
The way SEDESOL integrated its cadres for the implementation of the 
programme helps to explain this. Julio Moguel (1994, p. 173) argues there are 
some similarities between certain ideas held by the social left and incorporated in 
PRONASOL which are not coincidental. Furthermore, he explains that ‘the 
ingredients that the social left has contributed to PRONASOL are as visible as are 
the members of the social left who now hold key posts in the Salinas team, 
beginning with Carlos Rojas, the individual directly responsible for PRONASOL’. 
It is clear then that some cadres that integrated the PRONASOL are sensibly 
different from other executive ministries It is not a matter of SEDESOL officials 
being more enlightened and progressive than their colleagues in other ministries, 
but one that emphasises how ‘their beliefs were expressed and translated into given
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political practices’ (Moguel 1994, p. 172), something that caused frequent 
disagreement with other bureaucratic groups at the three levels of government.
THE REFORM OF THE STATE
The so-called reform of the state was the main political discourse o f former 
president Salinas, which aimed to transform most of the economic and political 
institutions created after the revolution.
For Salinas, the reform of the state was the result of internal and external 
conditions First, due to a dynamic demographic evolution," a rapid urbanisation 
process and because of the limited possibilities of the economic model followed by 
the country in the past (known as the imports substitution model-ISI), the 
government had to confront a large and complex deficit in the attention to social 
demands which were aggravated by the economic crisis of the 80s and which 
mainly impacted on popular urban areas, the countryside and indigenous 
communities (Salinas de Gortari 1990c). For Salinas, constitutional power has 
given the Mexican state the responsibility for taking care of its inhabitants, but in 
the long run they have given the state the prominent role of supplier. In turn this 
has diminished society’s capacity for self government and self reliance. 
Economically, the expansion of the state’s responsibilities eventually pushed it to
A ccord ing  to  th e  la s t soc io -d cm o g rap h ic  cen su s in  th e  co u n try  in  1990, th e  to ta l p o p u la tio n  
doubled  d u r in g  th e  la s t 25 y ea rs  an d  show s an  an n u a l g row th  o f  2.1 percen t. Sec S a lin a s  dc 
G o rta ri 1990b, p. 38.
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increase the level of its foreign debt to obtain resources and meet its social 
responsibilities.
The external reasons came mainly from the need to cope with the 
globalisation and the interdependency of the economy For Salinas, finding a place 
in an ever changing world and avoiding isolation, was an economic imperative to 
prevent the kind of problems that grew up under the imports substitution model
According to Salinas (1990c, p. 30) the new role of the state based its 
actions on negotiation, democratic attitudes, a drive for participation and popular 
organisation of social programmes. Also the privatisation of non-strategic public 
enterprises to channel the funds to social programmes, transparency in its relation 
with all citizens, and the inclusion of society in the decision-making process, were 
other actions which were only possible if institutional changes took place.
In practical terms the reform of the state, opened the possibility for the 
exploration of a different modality for state intervention, in particular for the 
implementation of public policies. The comments of Salinas about the shared 
responsibility of the state and community in the solution of public problems, would 
eventually evolve in one of the most important characteristics of the National 
Solidarity Programme by including community participation in the decision making
process.
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ECONOMIC REFORM: ORIGIN AND USE OF THE FUNDS
For Salinas the reform o f the state implied a deep economic reform of three main 
areas: fiscal reform, privatisation of non-strategic public enterprises and the re­
negotiation of foreign debt They represented not only an economic imperative, but 
a necessary condition for the trickle down of some of the benefits of his economic 
project.
In fiscal terms, the reform not only generated an increase of 35 percent of 
tax collection in the country, but also generated a new revenue-sharing system that 
took into account the population of each state, its level o f development, and its 
efforts at collecting local taxes. Some states are changing their formulas of 
coefficients for distributing federal revenue-sharing to target a greater proportion 
of these resources to poor municipalities. These changes have increased revenue­
sharing with the nine least-developed states: between 1988 and 1994, their share 
rose by 55 percent in real terms, or 2.3 times the national average (Salinas de 
Gortari 1994).
In terms of the privatisation of public enterprises, the reform implied that 
strategic companies (defined as those that must remain under state control) were 
strengthened and most o f  the others were sold or liquidated, that is, 415 parastate 
enterprises, or 67 percent of the total.
Finally, the re-negotiation of foreign debt meant cutting the net transfer of 
resources abroad, reducing the amount of accrued outstanding debt, ensuring net 
positive resources over a long period, and reducing the real value of the debt and
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the share of gross domestic product that it represented. These three areas of the 
economic reform, provided the resources for the National Solidarity Programme.
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
Community participation was not just one of the four principles of all the National 
Solidarity Programme, but its backbone FOMUN in particular aimed to build a net 
of social organisation around the way public policies have traditionally been 
implemented in the country. The aim was to diminish the power that bureaucratic 
actors have created around the use of public funds, and also to bring democratic 
legitimacy to the government and to overcome the rivalry between institutionalised 
PRI interests on the one hand and the political project of the president on the 
other. Although unstated, this was the hidden agenda of the programme and its 
essential objective by means of which the programme’s designers aimed to effect 
change in the bureaucratic structures and practices at the local level.12 In order to 
hide this conflict the community participation element of the programme was 
eagerly presented as an extension of an historical tradition of community 
involvement in the country.
Popular mobilisation however was not restricted merely to the sphere of 
implementation, but also it was assigned a decisive role in the decision making 
process. In most modem democracies popular influence can be exercised at the
12F or an  illu s tra tiv e  exam ple  o f  how  som e po lic ies have tr ie d  to  m odify  a d m in is tra tiv e  and  
p o litica l b eh av io u r , sec Sabatier an d  M a /m a n ia n  1981.
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policy formulation stage on the assumption that policies thus created will be 
properly and officially implemented. By contrast, the Mexican approach to 
community participation implied in the programme, not only required the people to 
decide what ought to be done, but also to implement it by themselves.
Historically, the inclusion of the community in areas of public performance 
from which it has been traditionally excluded, is based on a tradition o f  self-help in 
certain regions of the country. The Mexican ‘tradition of community work’ 
involves a non monetary exchange of work and goods practised mainly by 
Indigenous communities, like the tequio, the mayordomias, the faena , and others.
The way that the community participates in all the programmes of 
Solidarity, is by the creation of Solidarity Committees which are elected at public 
assemblies and liase with the authorities and the social sectors to determine what 
work or project to carry out, how to put it into practice, how long it will take, at 
what cost, with what quality, an how the financial support provided will be 
recovered and reinvested.
Economically, community participation also had a significant impact in the 
implementation of public works mainly by decreasing their cost as well as the time 
during which they were implemented (Lustig 1994, pp 83 and 88). Finally, 
community participation was also aimed at making good bureaucratic failing and 
technical weaknesses at the municipal level of government.
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Politically, community involvement in the programme had a more important 
role. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, although community 
involvement in the programme should be understood in a rather restricted manner, 
that is, at the level of neighbourhood, it was useful too in displacing, though not 
without resistance, some of the traditional political organisations which grew up 
under the corporatist and clientelist structure of the Mexican political system. 
Despite this, its political implications must not be overlooked In many cases, 
community participation could not confront those corporatist and clientelistic 
structures creating Solidarity Committees which merely mirrored PRI 
neighbourhood committees and which privileged known priistas in decision­
making positions.
As a result, different interpretations have questioned the role of the 
community participation element of the programme It is argued here that such a 
component not only brought new voices to the policy process but it was also useful 
in pursuing the hidden agenda of the programme, as it has been referred before. 
But other interpretations have argued that community participation is only part of 
the government’s persistent strategy of cooptation and undermining of potential 
opposition mobilisation (see Dresser 1991 and Craske 1994). In reality, both things 
are true. As it will become clear further in this chapter, community participation 
was useful in curtailing the power of bureaucratic actors (the hidden agenda) and in 
bringing new voices to the decision-making and implementation processes as well. 
But it is also true, as it will be clear in chapter five, that the communitarian element
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of the programme was also useful in producing political demobilisation of potential 
opposition.
PRONASOL AND INSTITUTIONAL REORGANISATION
The implementation of the programme required an important institutional reform, 
the creation of a propitious institutional environment to promote its goals and 
generate adequate inter-bureaucratic collaboration.
On December sixth 1988, the Official Newspaper of the Federation (Diario 
Oficial de la Federación) published the agreement creating the Commission of the 
National Solidarity Programme. The commission was presided over by the heads of 
the federal executive branch and by most federal departments.
The under-secretary of Regional Development within the Department of 
Social Development, appointed by the President, is in charge of co-ordinating the 
functions of the PRONASOL. On May 25, 1992, the Department of Social 
Development-SEDESOL, was created by a decree published in the Official 
Newspaper of the Federation which reformed, added onto and superseded a group 
of stipulations within the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration. The 
Co-ordination of the National Solidarity Programme was integrated within this 
department, which formed part of the economic and social development, as well as 
the agricultural and livestock cabinets, in addition to participating in the Inter- 
Departmental Commission on Expenditure-Financing
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The institutional organisation introduced by the programme was aimed 
mainly at securing the adoption of the model which the president was eagerly 
trying to impose. Presidential support for the programme was not only expressed 
by a profuse amount of political discourse and by continuous promotional tours 
around the country to deliver public works personally Federal SEDESOL, as well 
as its state equivalents, the federal delegations in each state and finally, the “federal 
links” at the municipal level, worked as his emissaries and gave the president a 
permanent presence all over the country to secure the implementation of the 
process. This institutional reform gave rise to an overwhelming presence of 
PRONASOL officials all over the country. This triggered many conflicts between 
governors and mayors who perceived it as yet another federal incursion into their 
jurisdiction which prevented them from diverting public funds. PRONASOL 
sought to overcome the corruption which had bedevilled the system for a long 
time. Despite this, inter-bureaucratic collaboration was not only difficult to achieve 
but also proved to be ineffective in avoiding bureaucratic lag among many of the 
agencies involved in the implementation process. As Nelson (1989, p. 102) notes 
‘politicians may oppose channelling funds through local communities and non­
governmental organisation (NGOs), short-circuiting their allocation of patronage 
and developing alternative power centres. Government bureaucrats may also resent 
such channelling, since it implies doubts about their own capabilities and 
establishes rivals in their area of responsibility.’
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In 1989 President Salinas’ ‘masterpiece’, ‘programa de las pequeñas grandes 
obras', started to take shape, but it was not until March 1990 that FOMUN was 
formally launched. It was tested first in Chaleo one of the largest slums near 
Mexico city, where it showed both, it usefulness in addressing the huge gap in the 
provision of minimal social services and in producing political credit and 
recovering lost votes in areas where the opposition parties had been strong.13
The Salinas administration confronted an enormous deficit in the provision 
of public works at the municipal level. Geographical isolation, centralised planning, 
scarce resources and quite frequently, deviation of public funds, partially explain 
this situation. For Salinas it was no longer possible for federal agencies to offer 
solutions to local problems as had been the case traditionally For him, FOMUN’s 
formula was simple: implement small community works and do more with less by 
involving the community in the process (Salinas de Gortari 1991). 1
1 In te rv ie w  w ith  A n tropd logo  S a linas, A ., R epresen tative o f  the  S ta te  B ranch  o f  F ederal 
F O N A E S  in  C am peche, O ctober 10, 1994 (C am peche , C am peche). A lte r  S a lin as d es ig n a tio n  as 
P re s id en t, it w as dec id ed  th a t C haleo  (a re a  lo st by the  PR] d u rin g  the  g e n e ra l e lections o f  1988, 
due to  severa l co m m u n ity  o rg an isa tio n s le a d e d  by m em bers o f  opposition  p a rtie s  an d  re lig ious 
g ro u p s) , w ould  be th e  best place to  tes t th e  new  prog ram m e. A t the  b eg in n in g , com m unity  
re jec ted  so lidarity  o ffic ia ls  because, a rg u a b ly  they w ere m em bers o f  the  PR I. T o  cope w ith  th is, 
the  p ro m o te rs  o f  th e  p rog ram m e s ta rted  to  offer d rin k in g  w ater in ta n k s  w ith  the  logo  o f  
so lid a rity  to  ga in  th e  confidence an d  acc e p ta n c e  o f  the  com m unity , a c h iev in g  in  less th an  a  year, 
a  co n s id e rab le  in tro d u c tio n  o f  social se rv ices . D uring  the  1991 e lections fo r d ep u ties  an d  m ayors, 
th e  P R I recovered  C haleo .
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Solidarity Municipal Funds-FOMUN, one of the most important14 
components of PRONASOL within the area of regional development, was 
conceived as a “concerted” programme because it incorporates the community in 
the definition and implementation of its actions. Its objective was to transfer 
additional resources to the poorest municipalities in the country and strengthen 
their financial and administrative ability to care for their inhabitants. It is not by 
itself a comprehensive poverty alleviation programme, but it complements and 
strengthen normal sector investments without displacing or substituting 
conventional efforts.
OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAMME
FOMUN had two main objectives. The first is to promote public works and 
productive activities to benefit the communities with the lowest income in the 
country and, the second, is to promote social organisation and collaboration 
between local authorities and the community
FOMUN included the funding of a wide range of public works in three 
main areas:
•
1. Social Welfare Projects which aim to promote communities’ social 
development. They include construction or restoration of drinking 
water systems and sewage disposals; basic lighting in urban areas and 
poor neighbourhoods; parks and gardens; construction or restoration of
14T h e o th e r  m ost im p o rtan t is S o lidarity  F unds fo r P ro d u c tio n . In  th e  s ta te  o f  C am peche, 
how ever, F O M U N  absorbs th e  la rgest am o u n t o f  pub lic  in v estm en t ded ica ted  to  so lidarity  
p ro g ram m es in s id e  th e  S ocial D evelopm en t A greem en t (C D S ), th is  is, 32 .50  percen t.
classrooms for primary schools and annexes; sports facilities and health 
centres.
2. Productive Projects which are oriented to support the production of 
basic services and products such as irrigation projects; small agribusiness 
projects; fishing and aquiculture farms; warehouses and small markets.
3. Infrastructure Projects, which aim to provide public services to less 
developed communities. These include septic tanks, public cleaning 
projects, hanging bridges, rural electrification, rural telephony, toxic 
residues management projects, rural roads, slaughterhouses, residual 
water treatment projects, water wells, pavements and municipal 
transportation.
FOMUN funds could also be used for other public works as long as the 
objectives of the programme were met. In general, each project had to fulfil certain 
requisites: the total cost of the project ought not to exceed the 200,000 new pesos 
(roughly 20,000 pounds); where ‘agrarian problems’15 were likely to arise, these 
had to be settled before the implementation of the public work. The funds could 
only be used for new public works and the project had to be finished in less than a 
year, and not be divided in stages; in the case of health centres and school rooms, 
the equipment and personnel had to be available in advance.
These resources are allocated to either the public institution in charge of 
the projects, such as roads, drinking water system, sewage and electrification, or
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A g ra ria n  p ro b lem s “ is  ad m in is tra tiv e  sh o rth an d  for th e  v ir tu a lly  th o u sa n d s  o f  d ispu tes over 
bou n d arie s, w a te r  rig h ts , titles, a n d  th e  like, w h ich  can  se riously  co m p lica te  ro u tin e  pub lic  w o rk 's  
ac tiv itie s” (B a iley  1994, p. 116).
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directly to local governments where communities use the funds for particular 
projects they have decided to carry out. Communities must add their contribution, 
representing from 20 to 50 percent of the total cost of the project That percentage 
will change according to the nature of the public work. For example, for public 
works on education, health, and drinking water, which are considered as a priority, 
the financial scheme is 80 percent from government resources and 20 percent from 
community participation. The scheme changes to 50-50 percent, respectively, when 
those public works are streets, ejido housesl6or certain sport facilities, such as 
basketball courts.
By the standards of industrialised countries, the financial ceiling of each 
project might appear quite small. But it is necessary to keep in mind the enormous 
poverty of many Mexican communities Although these are very small projects 
they represent a real step forward for these people. As Streeten ( 1994, pp. 17-18) 
notes, the concept of poverty is relative because it varies between climates, 
cultures and social and economic environments. For instance, in many rural 
municipalities, FOMUN alone more than doubled the amount of investment 
resources available to the local jurisdiction (World Bank 1994, p. 8).
l6Ejido  houses a re  little  o ffices fo r ejido  au tho rities . T h e  e jid o  used  to  b e  o n e  o f  the  lan d  o w n in g  
schem es g ra n te d  in  th e  M ex ican  C onstitu tion  a fte r th e  1917 R evo lu tion . T h e  lan d  b e lo n g ed  to  the  
ejidatarios, w h o  p o ssessed  th e  land  on  co nd ition  th a t it w as  n o t so ld  o r  ren ted  fo r p r iv a te  u se  an d  
exp lo ita tion . D u r in g  C a rlo s  S a lin a s ' ad m in is tra tio n , th e  C o n s titu tio n  w as c h a n g e d  to  p r iv a tise  the 
ejido  schem e.
\FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OFFOMUN
The resources for the programme came mainly from fiscal reform, the privatisation 
of public enterprises and the re-negotiation of the national external debt FOMUN 
in particular obtained its funds from five basic sources: federal, state, municipal, 
and community contributions as well as additional resources granted by the World 
Bank (1994, p 16) as part of its Decentralisation and Regional Development 
Project (US $ 350 million loan financing) Although the ratio varied according to 
each state, in general, federal government made the largest allocations In the state 
of Campeche alone FOMUN has invested almost one hundred billion new pesos 
(roughly 10 million pounds) from 1991 to date. Federal contributions represents 
60.72 percent, state contributions 21.32 percent and the community 17.96 percent 
(Gobiemo del Estado de Campeche 1994).
The community’s contribution was surprisingly high compared to that in 
other communities. From a national sample of 10,526 Solidarity Committees, 48 
percent o f  them contributed with labour; 36 percent money; 6 percent materials of 
the region; 6 percent some other kind of contribution, and 4 percent made no 
contribution (SEDESOL 1994, p. 13). All contributions-excepting those of the 
community-are gathered each year in an instrument called Social Development 
Agreement (CDS), an annual treaty-like document, that establishes contributions to 
solidarity programmes.
Because of the wide range of projects which the programme supports, 
FOMUN has significantly improved public revenues at the municipal level. In some
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situations, the financial support coming from FOMUN has surpassed the total 
amount of traditional municipal and state incomes17 One of the reasons for this, is 
that in addition to the regular allocation which local governments receive from the 
state, municipalities may obtain supplementary funds according to their ability to 
promote and create Solidarity Committees
GENERAL STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES OF THE PROGRAMME
The allocation of funds to municipal governments follows a complex procedure 
and requires provision for community involvement within the structure of the 
municipal administration. Community involvement was achieved first, through the 
Solidarity Municipal Council-SMC, which was a collegiate group in charge of 
distributing among members of the community the resources allocated for 
solidarity programmes In addition, the SMC had to propose possible uses and 
procedures for such funds to analyse community proposals, making sure that the 
guidelines of the programme are met and to gain agreement and collaboration for 
the implementation of the projects. The Council comprises the mayor, a 
representative of the state government, the municipal treasurer, the appropriate 
municipal auxiliary authorities and a member of the community who acts as a 
spokesperson of Control and Vigilance. The mayor chairs the SMC and is 
responsible for the organisation of the Solidarity Committees in each community.
In te rv iew  w ith  Ing . V alle  C am b ran is , R ., D irecto r o f  P ro g ram m in g  o f  S ta te  S E D E S O L , 
N ovem ber 11, 1994 (C am p ech e , C am peche).
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The SMC is a new structure different from the Cabildo which is elected together 
with the mayor every three years and acts as a municipal legislature.
A second area of community involvement was the so-called Social 
Comptrollership which empowers members of the community to supervise and 
control the execution of public works, giving them the capability of denouncing the 
municipal authorities or any other member of the Solidarity Committee for the 
misappropriation of funds. Two legal figures carry out these activities. One is the 
so-called spokesperson of control and vigilance who is a member of the 
community in each Solidarity Committee and the second is a community 
representative who acts as spokesperson of control and vigilance inside the 
Solidarity Municipal Council-SMC.
The third significant area of community involvement in the programme was 
the Solidarity Committees. They were the basic structure of the Solidarity 
programmes, and were made up of a president, one secretary, a treasurer, one 
spokesperson of vigilance and control and two more spokespersons. They were 
democratically elected in a general and public assembly among members of a 
community, only after a project has been identified for implementation, and 
therefore they depend on specific community demand. 75 percent of the 
committees were created by neighbours looking forward to attending to a specific 
community need. The remaining 25 percent were created from existing 
organisations of a particular religious, political or other character (SEDESOL and
PRONASOL 1994, p. 6).
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Members of a Solidarity Committee must not hold a popular representation 
post, neither be public officials. They must live in the community where the 
committee is established and they must be recognised as honest and responsible 
members of the community. Whenever possible they must show leadership in their 
community. Solidarity Committees have certain prerogatives: they decide directly 
in general assemblies, the work or activities to be carried out; they receive and 
control government contributions as well as those from community members, to 
implement the project themselves, although they may decide to use the services of 
a private contractor to carry out the public work. They also approve the cost and 
budget of the work; watch over the use of resources, the progress made, and the 
quality of the work, and finally, they supervise the maintenance and operation of 
the completed work.
Although the committee proposes projects to the SMC, under certain 
circumstances the authorities will decide which projects to implement. One out of 
ten public works were decided by the authorities, something that decreased the 
level of participation of the community (SEDESOL 1994, p. 20). When they are 
received community initiatives are analysed by the auxiliary authorities within the 
SMC, where technical documentation defining the basic characteristics for 
investment are drawn up. Subsequently, proposals are channelled to the Planning 
Committee for State Development-COPLADE, as well as to the head of the state 
office of the Federal Department of Social Development-SEDESOL for evaluation 
as to their feasibility for support.
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In fact, no funds for the programme are received by municipal governments 
if there is not a formal Solidarity Committee behind each proposal for public work. 
Therefore, the creation o f Solidarity Committees turned out to be one of the 
priorities of municipal governments, mainly because the allocation of resources 
beyond those normally received by the federal and state sharing system, are 
dependent on them. In fact, community participation under FOMUN scheme, was 
transformed into a basic budgeting unit for the allocation of funds, with rigorous 
restrictions and guidelines for their use. Funds cannot be used for any purpose 
other than a particular project supported by the Solidarity Committee. This 
guaranteed that each project had been previously defined according to community 
needs and that funds were meticulously monitored by members of the community 
to avoid corrupt practices. This is an important element because it stresses the 
political nature of the programme by reinforcing community mobilisation around 
the implementation process. However, turning the Solidarity Committees into a 
sine qua non for the allocation of funds, has also brought some problems. 
Sometimes, Solidarity Committees only existed on paper. During field work 
situations were encountered where the Committee was invented by the municipal 
authorities in order to receive funds. In sum as Lustig (1994, pp. 83-84) points out, 
community participation produces a more effective targeting than when decisions 
are taken outside the community. It also increases government legitimacy by 
establishing a direct link between community requests and government responses.
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Additionally, it encourages the development of organisational and managerial skills 
and reduces corruption.
NEW SKILLS FOR PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION
The changes that the programme aimed to effect had to be accompanied by an 
institutional effort to support its implementation. In 1992 the government created 
the National Institute of Solidarity-NIS which aimed to offer the Solidarity 
Committees a forum to discuss recent experiences of implementing the programme 
in terms of their success within the solidarity philosophy. Eventually this became 
the most important training centre for Solidarity Committees, mayors, federal, state 
and municipal public officials, union leaders, peasants and those involved or 
interested in the implementation of the programme. Its main objective was to 
consolidate social organisation and community participation, mainly through 
workshops, conferences and seminars where participants learned about the 
principles of solidarity. The NIS received nearly 400 persons on a weekly basis for 
training so that they would go back to their communities and repeat the model they 
had learned. Despite the economic, political and institutional reform embedded in 
the programme, FOMUN still had to confront and surmount the old network of 
economic and political interests, as well as the traditional structures of patronage 
and clientelism that had been created around public policies and that were deeply 
rooted in the political culture of the country. This implied an enormous educational 
effort if the programme was to achieve its objectives. On more that one occasion, 
members of Solidarity Committees were encouraged by NIS members, to exert
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pressure on those mayors and state authorities whose co-operation with the 
programme was doubtful.
Preliminary Evaluation of Fomun
Evaluating the programme is a slippery business. It is difficult to resist the 
temptation to evaluate it according to its achievements because it was aimed at 
eradicating the causes of poverty This would require more than a single 
presidential administration, and monitoring systems not yet developed. The 
situation is further complicated by the need to distinguish the impact of the 
programme on poverty levels, from other variables that might affect poverty levels, 
for example, the general economic recovery that was going on alongside the 
Solidarity programmes.
Therefore, the evaluation of the programme has to adopt a different 
perspective. Brown and Wildavsky (1984) offer an approach for the evaluation of 
policies that fits the purposes of this research. They suggest that although 
quantitative measures of goal attainment and efficiency, are the most obvious 
criteria for successful implementation, there are other issues that have to be 
considered. For them a formal policy should be viewed in terms of ‘whether it 
possesses the ability to  structure the implementation process by means of clear 
objectives and priorities, a valid theory of causality connecting instruments of 
policy to desired objectives, adequate financial resources at the start, and sufficient
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power-co-operation among implementing organisations and the ability to get the 
clientele involved to do so as desired.’ (1983, p. 212).
This is the definition adopted here for evaluating the implementation of 
FOMUN. First, some data will be offered about goal attainment and efficiency 
relevant to the evaluation.
GOAL ATTAINMENT AND EFFICIENCY
In 1994 federal SEDESOL (SEDESOL 1994) carried out an evaluation study to 
measure the impact of the programme in the state of Campeche. The study is based 
on a sample of 140 Solidarity Committees during the period 1991 to 1993 selected 
randomly among the nine municipalities of the state.
The study reports that funds were used to build pavements and streets 
(29%); to restore and build markets, public squares, sports facilities, bridges, and 
other similar projects (15%); to establish drinking water systems (13%); public 
lighting (9%), and other public works (31%).
At the time of the evaluation, 87 percent of the projects were finished, 9 
percent suspended, and 3 percent were still in progress. The reasons for 
suspending or not finishing the work, were lack of resources, 35 percent; conflict 
with the mayor, 9 percent; and 35 percent for some other reason. In terms of 
efficiency the figures are on the whole positive, 77 percent of the projects were of 
an excellent or good quality; 20 percent satisfactory, and only 3 percent of the 
Solidarity Committees from the sample said the quality of the work was bad 73
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percent of the work was finished on time; 14 percent finished ahead of time and 8 
percent were late. In 76 percent of the cases, the cost was as expected; in 9 percent 
it was higher, and in 2 percent it was lower. Finally, the Solidarity Committees’ 
perceptions of the process were as follows 77 percent said the projects worked 
well; 13 percent said they worked satisfactorily and 5 percent reported poor 
projects (Missing percentages are not reported by the SEDESOL study).
In terms of goal attainment, in the state of Campeche, for the period 1991- 
1994, official figures report a total of 1,637 projects carried out with FOMUN, and 
the creation of 1,651 Solidarity Committees This represented a total investment of 
99,714 .19 billions of new pesos.
Although the allocation of resources to municipalities, is still inadequate, in 
Campeche, government contributions grew 132 percent in real terms. A better 
distribution of resources among municipalities was also achieved. More money was 
channelled to rural than to urban areas (Gobierno del Estado de Campeche 1994b, 
p. 15). Although encouraging, these figures do not allow any serious conclusion to 
be drawn about the impact of FOMUN in terms of poverty alleviation, mainly 
because the impact of the general economic recovery that took place during the 
period might also have had a positive impact on poverty levels.
QUALITATIVE EVALUATION
Perhaps the most important feature of the programme is that it provided an 
opportunity to change the way public policies are implemented. It also proved to
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be an important vehicle for greater citizen participation in government decision. 
The evaluation study prepared by SEDESOL, shows that the community 
participated in 69 percent of the cases in deciding the kind of work they wanted, 
and only 7 percent of the projects were proposed by solidarity officials. The 
community also participated in building their projects; 36 percent of the 
committees built the project directly; 32 percent used private contractors; 20 were 
built by municipal authorities and 12 percent by other means.
The ability of the programme to structure the implementation process by 
means of clear objectives and priorities, was facilitated by its “open-endedness” 
which gave it a great deal of flexibility, facilitating not only the definition of 
particular objectives, but also the definition of the means to accomplish them. 
Changing objectives and priorities was a community prerogative and the 
implementation of the programme was designed with this in mind. By this means 
FOMUN successfully increased the amount of financing available for infrastructure 
in poor rural communities.
Co-operation among implementing agencies varied according to the 
location. In the case of Campeche, as well as in other states, there was a network 
of economic and political interest around the process of implementation which 
affected the co-operation with the programme. Usually the degree of co-operation 
depended on the perceptions that bureaucratic actors had of the programme and 
how the implementation process would affect their interests. Finally, the level of 
community participation was high in 72 percent of the cases and in 28 percent it
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was low. Community participation contributed labour in 81 percent of the cases; 
15 percent money and 2 percent materials
The programme had an important effect on the communities’ attitude 
towards participation in the programme. It actually surmounted the lack of 
credibility that is usually associated with this kind of programme. For example, 85 
percent o f the Committees were created especially to built a project and only 12 
percent were pre-existing organisations. This is significant because it shows that if 
the participatory element is to continue, it will depend on the availability of 
resources. Some data confirm this argument. Only 47 percent of the Committees 
said they would continue participating if solidarity supports their efforts; 22 
percent will continue, even without the support of solidarity; 9 percent will create a 
new organisation; 9 percent will disappear, and 9 percent have no clear 
expectations about their future.
Despite this rather pessimistic scenario, the programme was an interesting 
learning process for the community. For example, 66 percent of the Committees 
took their main decisions in a general assembly; 17 percent of the decisions were 
taken by a selected board and only 11 percent of the Committees reported that 
their decisions were made because of suggestion of a solidarity official. In sum, the 
inclusion of the community as a major component of the programme; the creation 
of institutional and legal changes that allow community to participate in certain 
areas of policy design and implementation; the promotion of decentralisation, by 
including the community in the decision-making process of the programme, and the
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proof that the inclusion of community participation produces large numbers of 
public works in a cost effective manner, in a short period of time, represent 
significant achievements that should not be minimised Although there must be 
caution about effectiveness of the programme in reducing poverty, that is only one 
of its objectives. Popular mobilisation, the improvement of public services and the 
new links established between president and people represent political 
achievements that cannot be disregarded when evaluating the PRONASOL in 
general and FOMUN in particular.
The Theory and Process of Implementation
During the 60s in the United States, the “’Great Society” and “War on Poverty” 
initiatives inaugurated the debate about governments’ ability to cope with social 
problems in areas such as health, education and housing Confronted with 
continuous delays, lack of effectiveness, social resistance, and bureaucratic lag, it 
became clear that the most frequent problems of public policies occurred in 
implementation rather than in design or with the methodology used for programme 
evaluation As a result, many authors interested in government performance, 
started to develop ideas about policy implementation. The works of M. Derthick 
(1972), A. Wildavsky and J. Pressman (1973), E. Bardach (1977), M. Lipsky 
(1976), R. Elmore (1978 and 1979-1980), and others, proposed interesting 
interpretations that now prevail as indispensable references to the study of public 
policy implementation.
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The debate took two major directions: the first studies covered the analysis 
of implementation from a hierarchical point of view, or the so-called “top-down” 
approach. They stressed the importance of control and rigid administrative 
procedures to govern the conduct of operators at the lower levels of 
implementation, arguably because this was the only way to secure the achievement 
of policy objectives. The second direction, the “bottom-up” approach, came to the 
conclusion that policy implementation should not stress hierarchical and centralised 
procedures to secure policy success, but on the contrary, it should pay more 
attention to the setting where those polices are implemented and recommend an 
open attitude to discretionary decisions and actions during the implementation 
process so as to increase policy success This approach assumes that the ‘closer 
one is to the source of the problem, the greater is one’s ability to influence it; and 
the problem-solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control 
but on maximising discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate’ 
(Elmore 1979-1980).
This case study tests the ideas of selected authors representing both “top- 
down” and “bottom-up” approaches. The value of “top-down” and “bottom-up” 
approaches to the implementation of the programmes selected for this research, 
will be debated. Derthick (1972), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) can be roughly 
classified as representing the first tradition and Elmore (1978 and 1979-1980) as 
representative the second. Derthick was a pioneer in this field and her arguments 
proved to be useful in explaining the tension between centralisation and
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decentralisation, and the limited capacity of the federal government to impose rigid 
control over local actors which are embedded in the FOMUN programme. 
Likewise, Pressman’s and Wildavsky’s contributions are useful in identifying the 
actors involved in the implementation process and the importance they have as 
clearance points in the decision making process. Elmore’s (1979-1980), 
contribution will also be analysed and evaluated as well as its usefulness in 
explaining the implementation process for the Mexican case.
FOMUN AND THE TENSION BETWEEN CENTRALISATION VS. DECENTRALISATION 
One o f the first attempts to find out why federal programmes fail was made by 
Martha Derthick (1972). For her, federal governments are seriously limited in 
imposing inflexible control over state and local governments. Because of the 
limited power that the federation possesses to influence implementation actions at 
the state and local level, as well as its bias in favour of idealistic goals, federal 
programmes are doomed to failure. To accomplish its policies, the federal 
government must deal with state and local governments so as to generate political 
consensus as well as to negotiate policy implementation with local actors. In order 
to succeed, the federal government has to consider the resources necessary to 
generate three important conditions: firstly, it must have enough knowledge of 
local politics to know the resources needed to initiate action; secondly, it must 
possess adequate resources and third, the resources must be available at the time 
when they are needed to produce the desired effect on policy implementation. 
Although Derthick’s assumptions are based on American Federalism, are
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nevertheless useful in describing the Mexican case, not because of the existence of 
a genuine federal system in Mexico, but because of the way political power is 
structured in the country Political actors at the state and local level in Mexico have 
a margin of political manoeuvre that allows them to adapt and even oppose federal 
initiatives. The implementation methods of FOMUN, seek to achieve reform by 
applying some centralisation and some decentralisation. That is, the programme, 
mainly oriented to impose a decentralised model for public policy implementation, 
paradoxically included a degree of centralisation to counter the resistance of old 
interests who would not adopt the model willingly.
Before the discussion of FOMUN and the limits of centralisation it is 
necessary to clarify what is the meaning of centralisation. Bailey (1993, p.p. 102 
and 103) argues that according to Mexican terminology, decentralisation refers to 
“the devolution of decision-making authority to constitutionally authorized bodies 
separate from the central government line ministries that operate under presidential 
authority”. On the contrary, “déconcentration refers to delegating some degree of 
decision-making authority from the federal ministries to their own field offices 
operating in the states and municipalities, or to state and local bureaucracies 
themselves...the field offices operate under the authority and supervision of the 
central ministries; and powers that have been deconcentrated by executive order 
can be reconcentrated by a similar measure”. Because of this, Bailey concludes that 
“Solidarity acts to deconcentrate, not to decentralize, administration. Yet, while
Vthe short-term effect is to bolster presidentialism, the program may help create 
conditions to support decentralization over the longer term”.
Theoretically, such differentiation is useful but also a matter of degree. It is 
argued here that certain degree of déconcentration implies a degree of 
decentralisation. It seems that Bailey refuses to talk o f decentralisation in the case 
of Solidarity because the whole scheme of the programme was designed to bypass 
“constitutionally authorized bodies separate from the central government line 
ministries” that is state and local governments and congresses. Furthermore, Bailey 
(p. 104) argues that “PRONASOL deconcentrates program implementation to 
state governments and municipalities and to federal field offices through grant-in- 
aid mechanisms, but effective decision authority remains in México City”. 
However, while it is true that the whole command o f the programme remains a 
federal prerogative, it is also true that the implementation rests in constitutionally 
authorised bodies, that is, the Solidarity Committees which are institutions which 
have legal grounds on Articles 25 and 26 of the Mexican Constitution. Indeed, the 
financial structure of the programme facilitates federal control of the programme, 
but in a country saturated in caudillismo and clientelism relations, this acted as a 
safeguard against misappropriation of funds
In sum, while the theoretical differentiation may be useful, it does not help 
to explain the inclusion of non-bureaucratic actors in the decision-making process 
and how these new actors, constitutionally erected in the form of Solidarity 
Committees, had the chance to make decisions that had traditionally been a
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bureaucratic prerogative Although the way Solidarity operates looks more as an 
attempt to leapfrog obstructionists local politicians, the rationale o f the programme 
may help create conditions to support effective decentralization over the long term, 
as Bailey has suggested (1994, p. 101 ).18
FOMUN and the limits o f centralisation
It is generally accepted that the Mexican federal government, and most of all, the 
constitutional and meta-constitutional powers of the president are so strong that 
government actions, at the state and municipal level, have limited opportunity for 
autonomous performance. However, local actors have confronted to some extent 
the power o f the centre in two ways
First, different political objectives between federal and state executives and 
divisions not only inside the party but also in the governing coalition caused some 
resistance during the implementation process. In Chiapas, for instance, the 
introduction of the programme had to cope with strong resistance from the former 
governor (later Home Minister and dismissed after the Chiapas upheaval in January 
1994) Patrocinio González, and local politicians Local resistance may take the 
form of a bureaucratic lag or even subtle forms of violence and repression, as in the 
case of the imprisonment of Solidarity promoters during the introduction of the 
programme, presumably because they were creating political problems with some
F or a  d isc u ss io n  on  d e c e n tra lisa tio n  a n d  So lidarity , se e  R odrigue/. 1993.
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of the Indigenous groups in the state.19 Opposition to the programme was so 
strong, that during an evaluation workshop in the National Institute of Solidarity in 
August 1994, one of the Chiapas mayors attending the meeting, asked federal 
officials why the Children of Solidarity programme had not been introduced in her 
municipality. She was told that the governor Patrocinio González had not agreed 
to work with the programme and that instead, he had decided to channel the funds 
to provide daily breakfast for the children.
The second way by means of which local actors have confronted the centre 
is by the Constitutional changes that took place in 1983 (to strengthen municipal 
governments), as well as the amendments to articles 25 and 26, (that introduced 
the so-called National System fo r Democratic Planning, which included 
community, municipalities and states in the formulation of national plans), have 
created a legal framework that may facilitate processes of decentralisation of the 
Mexican political system but also could empower state and municipal actors to 
challenge federal initiatives.
However, local resistance on the one hand, and institutional modernisation 
on the other, have created tension between centralisation and decentralisation 
because, in order to encourage a programme aimed to increase decentralisation, 
such as FOMUN, it is important to inject important elements of centralisation in
19
In te rv iew  w ith  Lie. D e la  T o rre , J. M ., D irec to r o f  M unic ipa l P ro g ram m es a t th e  Federal 
D ep artm en t o f  Social D evelopm ent-S E D E S O L . A ugust 2 , 1994 (S E D E S O L  C e n tra l O ffices 
M exico , D .F .).
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those places where local resistance is strong. Such resistance is not directed at the 
introduction of public works and services but rather at the methods of the 
programme which aims to remove the power of vested interests which have grown 
up around the implementation of public works.20
The experience in Campeche is illustrative of the different forms that local 
resistance may take and how this is diminished when federal and state political 
projects converge. When the PRONASOL started its operations, the federal 
government had to deal with two different state governors. The first one, Abelardo 
Carrillo Zavala, who was already in his fourth of a six year period (1987-1992), 
was considered as a “politico” and came from the PRI traditional breed of 
politicians. His political career developed under the protection of Fidel Velazquez, 
leader of the most powerful union confederation in the country (Confederation of 
Mexican Workers-CTM) and one of the original affiliated organisations of the PRI. 
He developed his political career in the arena of electoral politics and in the 
corporatist organisations affiliated to the PRI. He had previously held positions as 
a federal MP, leader of the state CTM, local MP and president of the PRI at the 
state level. When FOMUN started the governor implemented the programme by 
creating some Solidarity Committees using neighbourhood cells of the PRI. 
Although some of their members had been leaders in their communities, they 
lacked the necessary credibility for the implementation of the programme. Even
20A lth o u g h  lim ite d  to  th e  te leco m m u n ica tio n s  sector, fo r an  in te restin g  s tu d y  o f  how  public 
in te res ts  a n d  p riv a te  o nes m eet in  M ex ican  po litics , see H eller 1993.
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worse, other Solidarity Committees existed only on paper and most of the formal 
procedures related to the programme were false. The assemblies in which 
communities discussed their needs and the organisation behind the strategy of 
Solidarity, were just a fiction. The reluctance to implement the programme as 
originally intended stemmed from the governor’s unwillingness to identify with the 
president and with the objectives of the programme. His support for the 
programme was merely formal, neo-liberal policies and political modernisation 
were not compatible with his political viewpoints and they were perceived as a 
threat to the political arrangements created and cultivated for a long time, namely 
the corporatist and clientelist system of political representation.
The second administration in Campeche, that of governor Jorge Salomon 
Azar Garcia (1992-1997), took office almost at the middle of the period of the 
federal administration (1988-1994). A university educated politician,21 Garcia 
counted on the support from the president to become governor and developed his 
political career working in the federal and state agencies of the public 
administration. He shared not only political convictions with the president about 
FOMUN, but also personal commitment as a show of gratitude for presidential 
support. He shared the values of political modernisation and neo-liberal economic 
policies. This political convergence had a different impact in the way the 
programme was managed. While in 1991, during the last year of Carrillo Zavala
21F or an  an a ly sis  o f  recen t p o litica l recru itm en t in  th e  co u n try , see C am p  1990.
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administration, 330 projects were carried out with FOMUN, in 1992, during the 
first year of the new state administration, this rose to 671 (Salinas de Gortari 1994, 
p. 648).
The comparison shows how political perceptions influence the 
implementation process. Although the design o f the programme aimed to 
decentralise decisions and to offer additional resources to local governments, in 
practice, such decentralisation depended on shared political values. The first state 
administration shaped the programme in the form of a patron-client oriented 
profile, producing a diversion of objectives and funds, and reducing the federal 
commitment for a major allocation of funds. As Knight (1994, p. 41) notes, 
governors’ collaboration with national policies depends on their perception of 
possible benefits or threats. For him this was particularly the case for labour 
organisation, agrarian reform, and Indigenismo during the 20s and 30s, and in spite 
of changes to programmes and initiatives, the rationale remains the same
In particular circumstances local actors show a significant margin of 
political and administrative manoeuvre that may affect policy effectiveness. While 
the appropriate allocation of resources is essential for an effective policy, this is not 
enough if local actors do not share the objectives and methods of the programme. 
Policy is tied to actors’ political perceptions. In the case of FOMUN in Campeche, 
the federal government showed a limited capacity to influence the first state 
administration, not because of a genuine federalism like the one Derthick has in
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mind, but because of a set of informal rules that characterise the Mexican political 
system.
The limitations o f the decentralisation o f FOMUN
It is precisely because local actors have a significant margin of political manoeuvre, 
that further decentralisation of programmes like FOMUN should be seriously 
considered. Derthick’s assumptions about the limited capacity of a federal 
programme to operate rigid control and influence state actions, seem to be correct 
in explaining the FOMUN experience. But whether a programme like FOMUN 
should be decentralised in conditions that do not guarantee the achievement of 
federal policies is debatable
For decentralisation, specific conditions are required. First, the network of 
economic and political interests that surround the implementation process must be 
curbed to guarantee the achievement of policy objectives. In a political context 
prone to politically motivated meddling, and in which the rule of law has given way 
to discretionary decisions and patronage, decentralisation may produce worse 
results than a policy centrally implemented FOMUN played an important role in 
this respect. The programme not only had the objective of building public works 
but also, o f generating a network of social organisation, the so-called popular 
mobilisation, around Solidarity Committees, that would replace traditional interests 
associated with public works The aim was to scale down the ‘project by contract’
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scheme that used to mean large revenues for contractors and for those public 
officials who assigned the contracts 22 However, despite public commitment, this is 
a practice which still remains The rules of the programme included the possibility 
of communities transferring power for the implementation of the project to 
municipal authorities (carta de desestirmento).
According to the General Manual of Operation, committees are allowed to 
cede their responsibility to undertake the work to municipal authorities when the 
committee is unwilling or unable to implement the public work. Although the 
community sometimes did not want to participate in the programme, in Campeche 
it was common to find that authorities discouraged Solidarity Committees from 
implementing the public work. Some municipal authorities in Isla del Carmen 
threatened Solidarity Committees that being involved in the execution of public 
work would cause trouble and that an improper use of funds would cause them 
legal problems. This was particularly so in the case of Candelaria, one of the 
municipal seats of Isla del Carmen
One of the main problems o f this village was the deplorable condition of 
some of its streets. In one of its neighbourhoods, a Solidarity Committee was 
created and funds were granted to solve the problem. However, the municipal 
authorities persuaded the committee to cede the project, presumably because if the
22In terv iew  w ith  Lie. D e la  T o rre , J. M ., D irec to r  o f  M un ic ipa l P ro g ram m es a t  th e  Federal 
D ep artm en t o f  Social D ev elo p m en t-S E D E S O L , A ugust 2, 1994 (S E D E S O L  C e n tra l O ffices 
M exico , D .F .).
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quality of the work was not good, that would cause them legal problems The 
project was finally ceded to the municipal authorities and later, it was allocated to a 
private contractor. At the end of the day, the work did not fulfil the technical 
requirements established in the Technical File, neither in the quality of the 
materials, nor in the extent of the work. 23 The Solidarity committee demanded that 
the street should be re-built according to the specifications. The municipal 
authorities had to pressure contractors and the Solidarity Committee received a 
positive answer only because one of the members of the committee was a member 
of the state legislature. Unfortunately, this situation was not an isolated one. 
Particularly evident in the municipality of Isla del Càrmen, this strategy allowed 
municipal authorities to transfer a large number of public works to private 
contractors. Although the community watched over the use of funds, as in 
Candelaria, this did not prevent the proliferation of such practices, particularly in 
Isla del Carmen and the city of Campeche. There are two reasons for this situation. 
The first is that these municipalities concentrate the economic activity of the state 
and therefore, they receive the major part of the state and federal funds. This has 
created a complex network of economic and political interests around public 
spending in which public officials and private actors collude producing a 
misappropriation of funds. The second reason is that in urban areas it is more 
difficult to reach agreement among the community about the nature o f the public
^ D u r in g  th e  fie ld  w ork  it w as p o ss ib le  to  co rrobo ra te  th e  lo w  q uality  o f  th e  w ork . I t  w as possib le  
to  m ake a  litt le  ho le  in  th e  lay er o f  pavem en t even w ith  a  key. O ctober 28 , 1994.
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work to be carried out As noted by a municipal official of the City of Campeche, 
‘we do not have the time to discuss every single project with the community. If we 
do that, we would never have time to finish in accordance with the regulations of 
the programme Besides, if we let the community discuss and decide the kind of 
public work they want, this results in conflicts and divisions inside the community 
Furthermore, because the programme gives the community a significant place in 
the implementation of the programme, sometimes the public works merely reflect 
the wishes of a strong leader in the community (usually recruited under PRI’s 
tutelage), but not necessarily those of the community in general That is why it is 
quicker and less complicated for us (municipal authorities) to decide where and 
what kind of public service to build in the community’.24
Cases like these, are useful in showing the limitations of other approaches, 
such as the one proposed by Richard Elmore (1979-1980). His suggestion that the 
key to successful implementation is to maximise discretion at the point of service 
delivery, is not appropriate here The programme was precisely designed to curb a 
trend in which public policies are characterised by patronage and clientelist 
practices. To expose the programme to that political environment, would have 
resulted not in the institutional change FOMUN was trying to achieve, but rather, 
in the reinforcement of patronage Therefore, if the federation still controls 
fundamental decisions, it is because a direct transfer to state and local actors.
24In terv iew  w ith  Lie. Sosa M ario , E ., M unic ipa l T reasu re r o f  th e  M unic ipa lity  o f  C am peche, 
A ugust 30 , 1996 (C am peche, C am peche).
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without certain federal control, would have exposed the programme to the 
influence of a network of political and economic interests at the local level
A second condition that has to be considered for a more decentralised 
implementation of the programme is the level of administrative skills in local 
government. There were cases such as the municipality of Hopelchén where 
several conditions converged and that created a propitious context for the 
programme to introduce decentralisation. Although this municipality enjoyed 
adequate resources, local political support and representation, as well as the 
promotion of mutual adjustments, political conditions were also a determinant of 
success. In the state of Campeche, Hopelchén shows the highest level of 
marginality. It is a predominantly rural municipality, with a population density of S 
inhabitants per square kilometre, the lowest in the state; it is ranked third in the 
state context in territorial area (7,927.95 km2), with a high dispersion of villages, 
generally isolated because of the lack of roads and communication infrastructure. 
Situated near the border with Guatemala, with a large Indigenous population, its 
economic growth is rather slow That is probably why the network of economic 
interest is not significant enough to alter the process of implementation as in the 
city of Campeche or Isla del Carmen Politically speaking, Hopelchén is 
exceptional for two reasons First, the mayor of this municipality had strong and 
long standing personal links with the governor, and second, Carlos Rojas, the 
current Head of the Federal Department o f Social Development-SEDESOL, 
worked in this municipality during the 70s in the National Indigenous Institute-
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INI, when he developed personal links with the region. The former mayor, was 
also respected as an honourable and responsible person in the community. He fully 
adopted the objectives of the programme and applied all its strategies. As a result, 
Hopelchen had the second highest per capita investment in the state and created 
the third largest number of Solidarity Committees; it is frequently mentioned as a 
model of implementation, not only at the state, but also at the federal level where it 
received a presidential award in recognition for its level of organisation and 
commitment to PRONASOL.
In administrative terms, Hopelchen was also unusual. The person in charge 
o f all the Solidarity programmes in the municipality, was a young university 
educated person, with previous experience in the private sector. He managed the 
programme rigorously, establishing monthly goals and objectives; he assigned clear 
tasks to his personnel, trained them in the philosophy of the programme, and 
imbued in them a team work spirit and a sense of professionalism. He also 
managed the programmes so as to maximise budget restrictions. When his 
personnel had developed the necessary abilities for the programmes, he promoted 
them, creating at the same time, positive expectations about future promotions 
even if they were not accompanied by an increase in their salaries. A secretary, for 
example, eventually was promoted to manage the Children of Solidarity 
programme. In addition, he also had the full support of the mayor and because of 
his administrative and political abilities soon developed strong relationships with 
state and federal SEDESOL officials. He carried out permanent supervision of the
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programmes and encouraged communities to participate fully in their 
implementation. Only in certain cases, such as the construction of water wells, 
which require machinery and a certain level of technical skill, were the works 
assigned by the community to people outside 25This in particular had a significant 
impact in reducing economic and political interest around public works.
On the whole, the example shows that community participation works 
when institutional support is provided and also when there is local and qualified 
leadership. It can be argued however, that the experience shows on the contrary, 
the importance of the control of the process residing in few trained hands and when 
possible without the interference of the community. Nevertheless, the programme 
genuinely stimulated community participation because both institutional and 
human support were provided.
FOMUN 's assets
The programme’s ability to adjust its procedures to local conditions is perhaps one 
of its most important assets. The programme’s flexibility was possible because of 
its open-ended structure and its procedural nature This demanded continuous 
change to the rules of the programme which facilitated the adaptation of its 
procedures to local conditions. For instance, the mechanisms for the creation of
2SM e n n o n ite s-m em b ers  o f  an  A n ab ap tis t sect founded in  th e  16th cen tu ry  a n d  still e x is tin g  in 
W est E u rope  a n d  N o rth  A m erica  a n d  th a t had  e m ig ra ted  to  d iffe ren t p laces  in  M exico-have 
d eveloped  th is  ab ility . T h e  quality , p rice  an d  speed to  b u ilt  w ells is qu ite  good. T h e  p ric e  fo r a 
w ell is  40  p e rcen t ch eap e r, in co m p ariso n  w ith  p riva te  firm s. T h e  qu a lity  is b e tte r  a n d  th ey  even 
b u ilt  a  m ach in ery  room , som eth ing  p riv a te  firm s ch a rg e  ap a rt.
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Solidarity Committees changed according to local needs and demand. Although 
FOMUN norms establish that municipal authorities must promote the creation of 
Solidarity Committees before the allocation of funds, some municipalities did the 
opposite. For local authorities to create Solidarity Committees and promote 
popular mobilisation without securing funds first, would only have caused false 
expectations and political problems with the community.
Some municipalities deliberately reversed the process to force the 
allocation of funds from the federation. In the municipality of Guasave, Sinaloa, 
local authorities set priorities in the community, organised people in Solidarity 
Committees, asked them for their contribution, and then asked for funds for the 
projects26. This was an effective mechanism for exerting pressure on state and 
federal officials for the allocation of funds. This way the process was shortened and 
there was plenty of time to implement the project. Flexibility also allowed the kind 
of projects that could be funded to be modified.
To accommodate a growing number of public works demanded by the 
community, federal officials created the possibility for municipal authorities to 
spend 15 percent of the total funds assigned to the municipality according to the 
particular needs and wishes of the community not necessarily included in the norms 
of the programme. In practice, this meant that from 200 million pesos, for instance, 
85 percent was spent according to the norms of FOMUN, while the rest was spent
26In te rv iew  w ith  D r. Pefla G astc lum , M . E ., S ecretary  o f  Social D ev e lo p m en t o f  th e  M unic ipa l 
C ounc il o f  G uasave, S inaloa, A ugust 10, 1994 (M exico , D .F .).
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at the community’s discretion.27 Such flexibility was possible because the 
programme assumed that popular mobilisation ought to be allowed to go beyond 
the approved list of eligible projects. Popular mobilisation was not overwhelming 
and cases like the one cited here are rather few. Nevertheless, is worth emphasising 
that the programme successfully modified itself to deal with more demanding 
communities.
Flexibility however had its limitations. In the political and administrative 
context in which FOMUN was implemented, laxity sometimes suggested the need 
for greater control. During the implementation of FOMUN there was tension 
between the need for control and the need for maximising discretion that ultimately 
did not obstruct the achievement of the programme’s objectives. The non-written 
rules in Mexico allowed the exercise of discretion but within the limits established 
by central power. When these rules were not enough, the central power exerted its 
authority to speed the programme using federal emissaries. The state branch of 
federal SEDESOL was effective precisely in counteracting the power of local 
actors enough to secure the adoption of the Solidarity model.
For instance, in Isla del Carmen both the federal delegate and the ‘link’ at 
the municipal level had confrontations with the mayor, because both officials 
supported the Solidarity Committees in carrying out public works themselves.
In terv iew  w ith  L ie . D c la T o rre , J. M „  D irec to r o f  M unic ipa l P ro g ram m es a t  th e  Federal 
D epartm en t o f  S o c ia l D cvclopm cn t-S E D E S O L , A ugust 2, 1994 (S E D E S O L  C e n tra l O ffices 
M exico, D .F.).
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whereas the municipal authorities preferred to use private contractors The 
confrontation gained momentum when the mayor expelled the federal SEDESOL 
link person from the Island These experiences suggest that although the federation 
still has effective means of control at the local level, powerful local actors can 
successfully confront the federal authority. These experiences particularly the one 
of Isla del Carmen also confirm Derthick’s assumptions in relation to the limited 
abilities of federal governments to implement policies if local collaboration is not 
be forthcoming. On the whole, however, her assumptions are not correct since 
FOMUN was able to be implemented on a national scale due to the influence that 
presidential power can exert in overriding local interest that might attempt 
obstruction. Nationally, cases like the one of Isla del Carmen were the exception 
rather than the rule. The difference between the Mexican situation and the 
American one (on which she based her ideas) seem to weaken her arguments 
because the difficulties that she envisaged do not actually arise in a damaging form 
in the Mexican case Contrary to what she argues, in a highly politicised context 
like the Mexican one, effective measures and rules to limit the weight of local 
economic and political interests can ensure success.
The FOMUN experience showed that three important conditions 
determined effective implementation: the first, was the popular mobilisation around 
the programme. The inclusion of community participation through the creation of 
Solidarity Committees noticeably diminished the discretion possessed by municipal 
and state authorities. However, research’s findings suggest that the stronger the
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network of economic and political interest at the local level, the more difficult it 
becomes to obtain good results, for example, in Candelaria. The success achieved 
by the programme in terms of community mobilisation can hardly be exaggerated. 
Popular involvement in Mexico apart from protest and crisis is rather unusual and 
even more unusual on a national scale Compared with other experiences of 
popular mobilisation, particularly in European countries, the experiment is an 
unusual achievement. Indeed, these countries have a representative system that 
works reasonable well and that makes community involvement unnecessary. But in 
the case of Solidarity, the large number of people involved was particularly 
successful because of the institutional opportunities available for participation, and 
also because of the lack of public services which acted as a catalyst for such 
participation.
Second, community participation was possible because significant funds 
were directed to the programme, more than US 12 billion dollars during the first 
five years of operation (Cornelius 1995a, p. 144). And third, the allocation o f funds 
and community participation were only possible because of the strong presidential 
support which the programme received, and by means of which significant changes 
in the implementation of public policies in the country were introduced. 
Presidential support, combined with community participation proved a perfect 
democratic means of altering the balance of power across the country. That is why 
the programme fluctuated between a centralised control and important degrees of 
flexibility and discretion. An important element for this support was the
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institutional changes introduced with the programme Particularly, the powerful 
role assigned to some federal agencies at the state level and federal representatives 
in municipalities in isolated communities Their role and presence guaranteed and 
reinforced presidential influence.
FOK1UN: THE COMPLEXITY OF JOINT ACTION
Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1984) introduced the idea, in the field of 
policy implementation, that the larger the number of actors and perspectives the 
more difficult it is to accomplish policy goals. Therefore, they suggested that the 
number of participants should be minimised to improve the policy’s chances of 
success. By identifying the actors involved in the implementation process, they 
pinpoint decision and clearance instances on which the process relies for its 
success. Table 3 lists the main actors involved in FOMUN’s implementation 
followed by a brief description o f their role in the decision-making process and 
their influence on the programme’s performance.
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T a b le  3 . P a r t ic ip a n ts  a n d  P e rsp e c tiv e s  o f  F O M U N  in  C a m p e c h e .
Participant and 
(Jurisdiction level)
Connection with 
Programme
Perspective and Major 
Objectives
Sense o f Urgency
Community 
(com m unity level) Propose a  public work. The program me represents a 
source o f  resources to  satisfy a 
comm unity need.
Very high.
Solidarity Committee 
(neighbourhood level)
Indispensable social organisation 
to  implement any public work in 
community.
The program m e represents an 
opportunity to  solve a public 
need. T o implement a public 
works according to  the 
procedures o f  the programme.
Very high.
Solidarity Municipal 
Council
(municipal level)
Collegiate mechanism inserted 
in the municipal administrative 
structure to  consider and 
approve all community 
proposals.
A program m e to satisfy 
comm unity demands o f  public 
works. Approve according to  
certain criteria, public works.
Varied according to the 
commitment and the 
way criteria are met by 
the president o f  such 
Council.
Solidarity M unicipal 
Officials 
(municipal level)
People in charge o f  the 
formulation o f  the T e ch n ica l  
F ile s  (Expedientes Técnicos).
Varied according to  their 
positions in the bureaucratic 
structure and to  then- 
identification with the 
programme.
Varied according to 
their positions in the 
bureaucratic structure 
and to  their 
identification with the 
programme.
M unicipal Council or
C a b ild o
(municipal level)
Exercises its authority for the 
approval o f  public works and 
verifies that process meet legal 
procedures.
Shares with m ost o f  the actors, 
the importance o f  the 
programme. Tries to  speed up 
and facilitate the implementation 
o f  the program me, in accordance 
within the legal responsibilities it 
possesses.
High.
State Department o f  
Social Development or 
State SEDESOL 
(state level)
Verifies that legal, 
organisational and general 
procedures are met.
A program m e to create public 
works. G enerate as many as 
possible public works for 
community.
Very High.
COPLADE. 
(state level)
Approves at the state level, all 
public works to be implemented 
under the scheme o f  Solidarity.
The program me is ju st one 
mechanism, am ong other, to 
foster development in the state. 
Verify that state needs in terms 
o f  the program me, are included 
in national plans for further 
support.
Varied according to the 
president o f  this 
collegiate actor.
State Branch o f  Federal 
SEDESOL 
(federal level)
Validates on behalf o f  Federal 
SEDESOL, proposals for public 
works.
The program m e would reverse a 
trend in the satisfaction o f  public 
services. Integrate all state 
proposals in a  coherent way.
Very High.
Federal Department o f  
Social Development 
(federal level)
Verifies state proposals and 
authorise funds for the projects.
Generate all over the country as 
many as possible public works 
for community.
Very High.
The process starts with the identification of a project needed by the 
community. A Solidarity Committee is then created for the implementation of the
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project in the community. Next, the committee submits its proposals for 
consideration of the Solidarity Municipal Council-SMC, a collegiate body which 
considers and approves all community proposals if all the requisites are met. Once 
the community projects have been submitted to the Council, the municipal 
solidarity officials transform community proposals into technical files which contain 
all the information necessary for the project to be implemented and which shall be 
submitted to state officials. Then the community proposals are submitted to the 
Cabildo for endorsement. Then the municipal proposal is submitted to the 
COPLADE a collegiate actor, which is made up of representatives of the state and 
municipal authorities, and that is chaired by the governor The state proposal is 
then submitted to the state branch of federal SEDESOL that verifies whether 
projects meet technical criteria before sending them to Mexico city for final 
approval. Finally, federal SEDESOL validates the proposals and authorises the 
funds for the projects.
The implementation of the programme however was a complex business 
and several setbacks appeared during its implementation. One of them was the 
population’s lack of faith in the programme. The emergence of a programme that 
offered full participation in decision making and implementation was viewed with 
reluctance. In many communities the government’s presence has frequently been 
associated with local bosses, the police or the armed forces. Despite this, the 
mobilisation created by the programme produced encouraging results. In 
Campeche, 87 percent of the projects were based on the community’s demands and
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only 7 percent were proposed by solidarity officials. This was possible because of 
the complex and costly propagandistic apparatus of the programme and the role of 
Solidarity promoters who acted as emissaries of the programme, and were 
frequently regarded as trouble shooters by local political coalitions. This proved to 
be an essential component in the implementation of the programme.
A second problem was that because the Solidarity Committees were 
essential for the allocation of resources, on some occasions they were created 
using the existing forms of political organisation, e.g., PRI cells in neighbourhoods. 
Although the programme was clear in this respect, it had to accept this situation so 
as to avoid open and direct confrontation with reluctant local political actors, as 
was the case with the first state administration in Campeche or in Chiapas where 
problems were more acute.
Once the community’s proposals had been submitted to the SMC for 
approval, implementation had to confront another obstacle. Although a member of 
the community was nominated to this body, the mayor who chairs the SMC, had 
significant power in analysing and selecting the projects to be carried out. 
Although FOMUN’s rules have effective means to counteract his influence, via the 
state branch of federal SEDESOL or the federal representative at the municipal 
level, the mayor can actually hinder some projects, either because he is not 
sympathetic to the programme or because the approval of certain projects would 
go to communities where he had suffered an electoral setback. In Isla del Carmen, 
for instance, the mayor did not direct funds to one of the Municipal Boards (Juntas
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Municipales )28 because electors in that particular locality did not favour him in the 
municipal elections, but most of all, because the president of that Municipal Seat, 
represented an opposition party (PRD).
The elaboration of the so-called technical files commonly delayed the 
implementation process because it required certain administrative and technical 
skills. This activity depended on a bureaucratic structure, the skills and sense of 
urgency of which did not match those of the programme’s vigour Two situations 
helped in solving this problem The first was the distinctive pattern of recruitment 
of Solidarity cadres and state and municipal operative personnel. Many of the 
Solidarity cadres had developed much of their experience working with 
communities and had even worked in previous governmental initiatives that 
explored the community involvement component for their implementation, namely 
PIDER and COPLAMAR. Some of them had even been involved in guerrilla 
movements in the country side during the 60s and 70s. This raised criticism from 
the Mexican left who interpreted this as yet another example o f how the Mexican 
political system co-opts political cadres from the opposition (see Moguel 1994).
When municipal proposals were submitted for analysis and approval at state 
level, some problems appeared because of the veto power of the governor. Again, 
as happened with the mayors, the governor’s political priorities and agenda were 
not always coincident with those reflected in municipal proposals. In some cases
28
Several M un ic ip a l Seats in teg ra te  th e  M unicipality .
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governors channelled funds to those projects which they deemed urgent and 
consequently funds were diverted from other needs or regions.
The way in which the programme countered this and secured the 
achievement of its objectives was by assigning a significant role to the state 
branches of federal SEDESOL and their representatives. They not only ensured 
that the rules of the programme were met, but also they had an important role in 
controlling the allocation of resources to the states. Very frequently governors had 
to negotiate with federal representatives, a process that caused political problems 
between the federation and the states (see Haber 1994).
This sort of conflict however was not confined to hard-line governors and 
the programme representatives. They also occurred where state and federal actors 
shared the objectives of the programme This was so because it was difficult to 
avoid using the programme with different purposes. It became evident during the 
field work that it was relatively easy to transform almost any community problem 
into a Solidarity proposal and by means of this, to channel resources which in the 
Mexican political context have effective healing properties in solving political 
problems. As mentioned by a state official, ‘in politics, money is the cheapest 
resource.’ 29
29
In te rv iew  w ith  Lie. A lca lá  F erráes, R ., U nder-secre ta ry  o f  S ocial D ev elo p m en t in  S tate 
S E D E S O L , S ep tem ber 21 , 1994 (C am p ech e , C am peche).
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From this review, it is clear that the implementation process was not only 
complex, but also had to confront issues, the importance of which was to some 
extent diminished by the rules of the programme In practice state and local actors, 
influenced the final result of the programme. In addition, the process was made 
more complex because an additional actor was introduced not only in the decision­
making process but also in the implementation of the programme. Despite this, the 
programme was quite successful in terms of implementation. Considering the 
complexity involved in its implementation it is surprising that it was implemented at 
all. Neither its complexity, nor the increased number of actors reduced the success 
of the programme because of the nature o f the actors, the ways the process was 
structured and the institutional reform that accompanied the implementation 
process. When a community becomes an actor within the administrative structure 
with decision making power, the results are more in accordance with the wishes of 
the recipients of a policy. Organisation played a significant role in this process, not 
only by giving an appropriate channel to such popular mobilisation, but also by re­
arranging bureaucratic structures and rules, creating an institutional framework 
that made possible the interaction of actors, new and traditional, in a programme 
that was more effective than in previous experience, namely PIDER and 
COPLAMAR
Compared with PIDER or COPLAMAR, for example, the inclusion of a 
new actor (community) in FOMUN was not new However, its participation was 
limited to the contribution of manpower for the construction of public works. The
\novelty is that FOMUN gave the community the status not only of an actor, but 
also one whose perspective and weight in the decision making process was 
essential for its implementation. Thus, it is not only their inclusion, but also the role 
played by these actors, old and new, which produced an institutional change that 
transformed the programme.
It is not contended here that each new actor will make the implementation 
process easier, but that the addition of certain actors, may be an advantage. This is 
so because the peculiar advantage of including the community as a new actor, is 
that the community has a direct interest and incentive in the efficient carrying out 
of the programme This is a very simple but useful principle that, in so far as new 
actors have a direct incentive towards programme performance, their inclusion 
does not produce the kind of complications that Pressman and Wildavsky would 
expect. In other words, if additional actors are introduced in the programme, who 
do not have that kind of direct incentive, the expectations of Pressman and 
Wildavsky would be correct.
Conclusions
The implementation of FOMUN showed tension between decentralisation and 
centralisation. On the one hand, the programme made an effort to decentralise 
substantial decisions which had traditionally been a bureaucratic prerogative at the 
federal, state and municipal level. This attempt introduced an institutional change 
that included the community in the decision-making process. The most important
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constitutional reforms were those of articles 25 and 26, which created the so-called 
National System for Democratic Planning the introduction of the Participative 
Planning method and the improvement of the Article 115, which redefined the 
responsibilities of municipal governments.
FOMUN structured its objectives and procedures around this institutional 
re-organisation and introduced the Solidarity Municipal Council and the Solidarity 
Committees as basic units for its implementation. From this moment, the 
community became a new actor with an important role in the decision-making 
process that diminished to some extent, the power of local actors who have 
traditionally been oriented by patrimonial political values. This, created anxiety and 
opposition to the programme. Delays in the allocation of funds, and discretionary 
decisions to select communities or projects to be funded, still exist in the process of 
implementation. This is so for two reasons. One is that certain actors counteract 
effectively federal initiatives, particularly those aimed at effective reform such as 
the Solidarity programme. The second is that the federal government has a limited 
capacity to impose rigid control on state and local actors. Because of this, tight 
control and increased centralisation was required to secure the introduction of the 
new model, which paradoxically was aimed at increased decentralisation. In this 
respect presidential support was essential. Federal delegates and representatives at 
the state and municipal level, played an essential role in this process. By means of 
them presidential control of the programme was achieved.
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Derthick’s arguments in relation to the limited possibilities of federal 
governments of controlling the implementation process were seen to apply to the 
Mexican situation only in certain respects. The findings of this research show that 
in programmes like FOMUN the centre can achieve major objectives with, as in 
this case, proper allies. These allies were the local communities and their new 
leadership. They helped to limit the power of the conventional, well organised 
elements in Mexican party politics The centre has been able to get a good deal of 
what it wants locally, because the opposition that could have been expected in a 
federal situation like the American one, where federal interests can be found on the 
one hand and local interests on the other does not exist.
The evidence of the research shows that the alliance between presidential 
power and the local community, was sufficient to produce a substantial shake up in 
the balance of power at local level. Derthick is right when she explains and 
describes the sort of limitations a central government faces in implementing public 
policies. But those limitations can be reduced and are reduced substantially in the 
Mexican situation when the federal actor, particularly the presidential actor, is able 
to find allies among the divided local actors. If local allies cannot be found, then 
the analysis of Derthick fits and all that can be done is to give weight to the local 
interest and allow it to adapt the policy to what they want. Considering all the 
adversities and the network of vested interest which grew up around public funds 
in Mexico, central power is achieving more than expected for a programme that
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aimed to introduce changes in the way public funds are managed and which has 
been one of the foundations of the Mexican political system.
The programme also showed the differences that may arise when 
implementing the programme in different economic contexts. The differences that 
appeared in the city of Campeche and Isla del Carmen vis-à-vis Hopelchén suggest 
that although presidential power has generally been able to find allies in certain 
situations, in others this has been particularly difficult. It can be argued that the 
programme performed less well in the urban more developed areas where the 
network of economic and political interest was stronger and in which the popular 
mobilisation component was more difficult to activate. This may be crucial in 
suggesting that the difficulties encountered in the capital city and Isla del Carmen 
might be representative of what might happen in the rest of the country.
In those cases FOMUN showed that local political actors have a significant 
margin of political and administrative manoeuvring, that may be used to introduce 
changes to the federal policy. These actors have originated a dynamic and complex 
network of political and economic relationships that confront and effectively 
counteract such centralised structure, not because of a constitutionally federal 
system, like the American one Derthick has in mind, but because of the way 
political power and recruitment are structured in Mexico.
The most important assumption of the bottom-up approach for policy 
implementation has been evaluated. It is clear that in a context such as the one in
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which FOMUN was being implemented, the maximisation of discretion would have 
resulted in a less effective implementation. In opposition to Richard Elmore’s 
suggestions, it has been shown here that the maximisation of discretion at the point 
of service delivery is not advisable in the Mexican context, because of the 
patrimonial and patronage attitudes which persist in many regions of the country.
This however did not prevent the programme from carrying out 
adjustments to each particular situation. One of the main assets of the programme 
was its flexibility or procedural nature, where the achievement of quantitative 
objectives, was not as important as the popular mobilisation around the process of 
implementation The range of projects was ample, from a hanging bridge, to 
pavements, public lighting, grave yards and even the refurbishment of a church. 
The means to achieve them could vary as long as the community were involved in 
the process. During the whole life of the programme, several changes were 
introduced in the General Manual of Operation to give a legal framework to 
different modalities of functioning around the country as well as to allow a 
redefinition of objectives at the local level as it was the case of Sinaloa The 
procedural nature of the programme helps to explain such flexibility. Although goal 
achievement is important, the success of FOMUN should be measured in terms of 
the process it implied, the way in which it altered the balance of power around the 
country and the social learning process that it produced Whether the programme 
produced enduring effects in these areas is debatable, but it succeeded in 
implementing both its formal and hidden agenda
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Contrary to what Pressman and Wildavsky argue, it has been demonstrated 
here that the inclusion of a new actor did not diminish FOMUN’s success This is 
so because the logic of the argument is different. FOMUN is not an old programme 
that included a new actor, but a new actor who defined a set of rules and 
institutions around it creating a completely different programme.30 The success of 
the programme is explained first, by its flexibility or its procedural nature, which 
facilitated mutual adjustments with the local setting. Second, by the political and 
personal commitment to the programme which was a decisive variable, as in the 
municipality of Hopelchén. Third, by the presidential support which was necessary 
to impose the model in the country, against patrimonial oriented actors and other 
interests. In this attempt the community mobilisation of FOMUN and the other 
Solidarity programmes worked to surmount the resistance that the programme 
would confront. Finally, by the resources available, mainly those produced by the 
economic recovery during the period.
30F rom  a  s ta tis tica l perspec tive , B ow en  co rro b o ra te s  th is  f ind ing . See B ow en 1982.
Chapter 4
The Children of Solidarity Programme: Lessons for Public Policy 
Implementation in the Education Sector in Mexico
Introduction
Academics and politicians share the belief that one of the most important areas of 
government performance is education. In Mexico education provides a terrain on 
which government success can produce significant political dividends. Since the 
revolution of 1910 the Mexican government has made it one of the pillars on which 
its legitimacy rests. Nevertheless, slow but significant changes inside and outside 
the education system, have affected this area of public policy. Over several 
administrations the efficient provision of education has been hampered by the rate 
of growth of the population. Also dispersion has created disparities between urban 
and rural schools. Furthermore, economic crises have resulted in the redirection of 
public expenditure away from education to other urgent government needs. As a 
result, education has suffered a chronic lack of resources which has affected 
teachers salaries, but also materials and buildings. This has affected standards and 
achievement.
The deterioration in training provision has also contributed to a poor image 
of the profession and a poor self image of the teachers themselves. In times past 
the rural teachers (maestros rurales) were sometimes considered as “martyrs” 
because of their devotion and commitment. Nowadays however it is difficult to
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recruit good people to the profession and teachers are often treated with contempt. 
Also the teachers’ performance is often influenced by the administrative 
atmosphere in which it takes place. This is authoritarian, centralised and patronage- 
oriented. It is fostered by the teachers’ union, the National Union of Educational 
Workers-SNTE (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación) and the 
educational authorities and militates against any attempt to develop a career based 
on merits or qualifications. Increasingly the population has become aware of 
external and internal influences on education and politicians have been forced to 
assign an exceptional place to education. The design and implementation of the 
Children of Solidarity programme is the result of this pressure.
Children of Solidarity (Niños de Solidaridad) was launched in 1991 and it 
aimed to fight the causes of early leaving among poor children in the country. Early 
leaving in the primary school was associated with the more general problem of 
poverty. For the designers of Children of Solidarity malnutrition, ill health and 
most important, the cost of sending children to school, are symptoms of a general 
problem of poverty which results in children having to repeat grades and in early 
leaving, mainly during the primary school years. The programme offered poor 
children a monthly scholarship, and package of supplies to secure minimal levels of 
nutrition as well as free medical care. This gained the government political credit 
through a more educated work force in a way cost effective to the family
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Although a preliminary study of the programme exists (Programa Nacional 
de Solidaridad-UNICEF 1994)', an analysis of the implementation o f the 
programme seeks to detect the “red lights” which militate against the final 
objective of the programme as well as those features which were useful in securing 
its achievements. A study like this also reveals some of the obstacles that Children 
of Solidarity had to confront, and their importance to the success o f the 
programme. The chapter balances the success of the programme against the large 
number of variables involved in implementation.
The objectives of this chapter are to document the process of 
implementation of the Children of Solidarity programme in the state of Campeche, 
Mexico. Some of the main theoretical ideas on policy implementation will be 
presented along with the effect on the implementation of the programme o f  the 
micro-political context in which education takes place in Mexico.
The programme was inserted in the larger framework of institutional 
change that aimed to transform the relationships between public institutions and the 
community. This new institutional framework not only affected these relationships, 
but also allowed a review of the theoretical assumptions in the area of public policy 
implementation, and those concerning the way the Mexican politics perform and 
change. 1
1 T h is  study  w ill be re fe rred  subsequen tly  a s  N SP-U N IC E F.
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This chapter starts by identifying the political and educational background 
in which the implementation process took place. This section is followed by a 
description of the main elements o f  the programme, its structure, objectives, and 
bureaucratic setting. The implementation process of the Children of Solidarity 
programme is discussed in a third section and finally, some conclusions are drawn 
concerning the degree of success o f  the programme.
B A C K G R O U N D
EDUCATIONAL IMBALANCES IN  MEXICO
Education in Mexico is one of the most significant areas of government action. 
This is so for three reasons. First, it is an essential means of increasing the quality 
of the labour force of a country. Second, it is generally accepted that education is a 
means of achieving social prestige, economic success, and greater self-confidence 
(see Camp 1993, pp. 56-57). Finally, education has an important place in the 
political agenda because it is a valuable source of political credit for the 
government Nevertheless, despite the priority assigned to education its guidelines, 
contents and means have varied according either to the economic imperatives of 
each period, or to the priority assigned to education by each administration. This 
has created a lack of continuity in perspective and content generating disparities 
not only in terms of quality, but also in terms of the groups availing themselves of 
the provision.
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Because of this lack of continuity, disparities between rural versus urban 
schools, poor schooling infrastructure, teacher quality and working conditions are 
the most evident. First, disparities between rural versus urban have been 
exacerbated by the political commitment of each administration For example, 
while Cárdenas strongly supported rural schools because they were part of his 
political agenda, Ávila Camacho relegated them not only because they represented 
an unsettling influence, but also because his priorities were different As a result, 
economic resources were redirected and the support given to rural schools during 
the Cárdenas administration was translated to Avila Camacho’s preferred schools 
leaving the former almost unaided.
Second, emigration from rural to urban areas also contributed to the 
existing disparities in education. Attracted by the promise of better opportunities, 
the rural population emigrated to the main cities of the country increasing the 
demand for education in urban areas. Many more resources were needed to satisfy 
this demand, and in the long run, this situation created disparities which provided 
urban schools with more resources than rural schools Even so , broken windows, 
old and insanitary toilets, classrooms without doors, broken chairs, old 
blackboards, roof leaks and faulty electrical installations, are common in urban and 
rural primary schools.
The disparities between rural and urban schools are also reflected in the 
quality of teachers. Better conditions of work, other forms of income, such as 
‘non-monetary remunerations of the social wage’ (Martin 1994, p. 100), and
Children of Solidarity 153
facilities which a city may provide, encourage teachers to look for urban rather 
than rural posts. A rural post is still considered by many teachers as their last 
option and even in these circumstances, they prefer to travel every day from the 
city to the village. These imbalances erected some obstacles for the implementation 
of Children of Solidarity.
POVERTY AND SCHOOLING IN  MEXICO
One of the main assumptions of the programme was that poor academic 
performance as well as high rates of early leaving in primary education, are 
strongly related to the more general problem of poverty. Consequently, its actions 
were oriented both to overcome the economic limitations which prevent children 
from finishing primary school, and to minimise the effect of the other variables on 
early leaving and poor academic performance. Children of Solidarity was 
structured around four main components: a monthly economic stimulus, a 
complement of basic family supplies, medical care and nutritional supervision and 
the promotion of recreational workshops and activities to benefit the community.
Although free education is granted by the Mexican Constitution, the 
indirect costs have frequently been underestimated. Notebooks, pencils, books, 
uniforms, clothing, transportation, and from time to time, extra expenses for civic 
activities, represent a burden which the average family income cannot bear It may
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take fifty to a hundred new pesos per annum (roughly five/ten pounds)2 for each 
child to attend school (NSP-UNICEF 1994, p. 31). Considering that the total 
annual income of these families is about three thousand new pesos per year 
(roughly three hundred pounds) and that the family is generally large, the sum must 
not be underestimated. Also low income families need their children to supplement 
their income.
The level of education completed is dependent on family income. Early 
leaving is frequent not only during primary school, but through all the cycles of 
formal education. Nevertheless, it is at the level of primary school and particularly 
during its first three years that the problem is more persistent since it is also at this 
stage that the greatest incidence of poverty is found. Dropping-out from school 
markedly diminishes the possibilities for employment and the less educated a 
person is, the poorer s/he remains.
Although economic considerations are important (Martin 1994, pp. 6-8), he 
is sceptical about the common assumption that early leaving results from the need 
for children to take a job to supplement family income. He argues that this 
presupposes the existence of a dynamic labour market and a dynamic economy, 
something that seems improbable in the Mexican case His views are reinforced by 
the NSP-UNICEF study (1994, p. 33) which found that 94 percent of the sample 
under study said that their children did not work.
2 T h ese  am o u n ts  a re  g iven  in  new  pesos and  before  th e  d ev a lu a tio n  o f  nearly  45  p ercen t in  
D ecem ber 1994.
VMartin (1994) believes that the lack of support and supervision of children 
by their parents whose attention is directed to survival is most important. While 
this approach might be quite useful in interpreting, for instance, the important role 
assigned by Children of Solidarity designers to community participation in the 
programme, it remains true that even if a child receives full attention from his or 
her parents but poor nutrition or health problems are persistent, the child will not 
perform well in school.
The decision about dropping-out might also be influenced by the family’s 
perception of the quality and usefulness of education. For many parents school 
does not offer “value for money” because what children learn at school seems 
inappropriate for obtaining a job.
Early leaving is not explained solely by economic reasons. Circumstances 
such as the social conditions in which children and their families live, migration, the 
parent’s educational background, the children nutritional situation and health, are 
also at the root of the problem. Parents’ migration influences the decision to finish 
primary school. The reasons for migration are varied, but most of the time parents 
believe that cities will offer opportunities they do not have in rural areas (see 
Cornelius 1975). Parents move with their children to the cities, particularly Mexico 
city, and also to the United States in search of a better income. As a result, children 
are rooted neither to their communities nor in their school.
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In relation to parent’s educational background, Trejo and Jones (1992, p. 
101) show that children from illiterate parents only attended the first three years of 
primary school; those children whose parents finished primary school, have 7.49 
years of education, this means that they have finished primary and secondary 
school at least; and those children whose parents finished secondary school 
complete on average 10.41 years of study, which roughly means that they have 
completed primary, secondary and college These data show that there is a better 
chance for children to study more if they belong to a family where parents are 
educated.
Malnutrition is another factor that prevents children from finishing their 
primary school. Trejo and Jones (1993, p 90) show that 20 percent of all children 
annually suffer malnutrition; 51 percent of children in rural areas are poorly 
nourished and 2.6 million children under five years old do not have a balanced diet. 
In rural areas malnutrition is twice as bad as in urban areas showing thus a 
geographical concentration in the Centre, South and Southeast of the country. In 
rural areas, 90 percent of children under six years old presented a malnutrition 
problem and of the remaining 10 percent, nine out of ten children did not consume 
milk, meat, eggs or fish for a period of four or seven days. Although other 
circumstances may be significant in preventing children from finishing primary 
school, these were the most significant for the Children of Solidarity programme.
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EDUCATIONAL STRUCTURE AND SECTORAL POUTICS
The educational system in Mexico is structured in five main cycles, all of them 
offered by public and private institutions. The first cycle, pre-primary education, is 
designed to teach children how to read and write before starting primary school. 
The second cycle, primary school, lasts for 6 years and the curriculum includes 
reading, writing, history, geography, mathematics, Spanish grammar, and social 
and natural science The third cycle, secondary school, consists of another three 
years. It increases the knowledge of the previous cycle and includes other fields of 
study such as technical workshops to prepare some students for technological 
careers. The fourth cycle, another three years directs students towards a degree 
course at the university. University or polytechnic institutions require another four 
or five years, depending on the course selected by students.
Educational policy is the responsibility of the Department of Public 
Education-SEP {Secretaría de Educación Pública). Created in 1921, it has grown 
to be one of the most important departments in the Mexican public administration, 
not only because of its legal responsibilities, but also because of the political 
significance which education provision has acquired in the country. Only the 
church has questioned the government’s dominance in educational matters. In the 
past, the church-state tension has been a matter of some importance. Although at 
certain times, particularly in the 30s, the tension has increased, the church has 
preserved its educational role mainly by reinforcing its presence in private
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education at all levels. It is surprising that the church did not criticise openly the 
Children of Solidarity programme, or demand its extension to private schools
Educational policy in both design and implementation has been a federal 
prerogative. The states of the federation have only recently acted as simple 
operators of the policy which, often, was not coincident with the needs, 
expectations and cultural characteristics of each state. Efforts have been made to 
decentralise the functions of SEP, however it was not until the Salinas 
administration that more visible changes were made, in particular with the National 
Agreement for the Modernisation of Basic Education-ANMEB (Acuerdo Nacional 
para la Modernización de la Educación Básica) in 1992. In general, the ANMEB 
encourages more community involvement, greater teacher commitment in 
community matters and shared responsibilities with state authorities, in order to 
overcome bureaucratic top-heaviness and improve the quality of education (see 
Martin 1994, pp. 20-23).
Both internal and external factors have influenced educational provision 
Internally the role o f the teachers has been most important. In the 1930s, when 
education became one of the axes of government action with the so-called socialist 
education, teachers had an influential role in urban and rural areas
Despite the fact that this role has gradually diminished, teachers remain 
influential not only in educational but in many community matters, particularly in 
rural and isolated areas where they are still regarded as a link between the
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community and the outside world. Mexican families also believe that schools and 
teachers have an authority similar to their own. School is a second home for 
children where discipline, rules and other values are learned and teachers are 
regarded as being in loco parentis. Even today, many parents allow teachers to use 
corporal punishment as a painful but effective means of learning: ‘7a letra con 
sangre entra” (letters are learnt with blood).
Teachers have also developed authority with government support, both by 
preventing parents from intervening in school matters (something that was 
amended by the ANMEB) and by creating programmes such as SEP’s scholarships 
scheme for children whose academic performance is outstanding. In this way, 
politics and the educational system have been closely linked since the 30s when the 
institutional period in Mexico reinforced the bonds between teachers and the 
government.
In sum, with the popular belief that “school is like a second home”, and 
with the representative role that teachers have assumed in the community, and their 
legal and political status, the authority of teachers is still considerable. However, in 
order to secure a proper allocation of funds, Children of Solidarity had to curb 
teachers’ authority by allowing the community to take decisions that had 
traditionally been the teachers’ prerogative. Although community participation 
helped the implementation of the programme, the limiting of the teachers’ role 
discouraged their collaboration.
\COMMUNITY INVOL VEMENT IN SCHOOLING
Community participation acquired significance in the educational policy of the 
Salinas government. In 1988 when Salinas took office, one of his aims was to 
achieve community participation in education. For him, education as well as many 
other areas of public action should be considered as a joint responsibility between 
society and government. Previous to the ANMEB of 1992, when the system 
opened itself to more participation and criticism, educational policy had been 
controlled by bureaucratic actors.
Before the changes made to the General Law of Education, parents’ 
intervention in educational matters other than through the official channels, such as 
the Parents Association (Sociedad de Padres de Familia) was considered as an 
administrative offence. The educational system worked as a closed system where, 
teachers and authorities, not only made decisions in a highly discretionary way but 
also reproduced patronage-oriented relationships inside this sector.
The lack of community involvement is relevant to previous educational 
developments and explains early leaving in primary education. According to Martin 
(1994, p. 5-6) by excluding parents from educational activities, a substantial means 
of preventing children from leaving primary school or improving their academic 
performance was being unused. This author argues that relationships, are the most 
important influence on academic performance in school.
This chapter follows Martin’s (1994, p. 6) argument which considers that 
‘the immediate cause of school failure in primary school is the corrosion of the
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relation between teachers and parents; thus the final expression of such failure, 
drop-out, occurs when all relations between parents and teachers over the child 
have collapsed-when negotiations have broken down.’ That is why community 
participation became an important element for the achievement of the objectives of 
the programme For the designers of Children of Solidarity, community 
participation was a means through which the quality of education could be 
improved. According to officials of the programme, the main objective of Children 
of Solidarity was to raise the consciousness of the community of educational 
matters, and the only way to do this was by opening up opportunities for 
community participation in the system. ‘This is not a programme of coverage, we 
are not trying to deliver as many scholarships as possible, but on the contrary, this 
is a programme of impact. We believe that only by involving community in every 
day problems of schools, not only an improvement in the quality of education will 
be achieved, but also this will help to retain children at school.’3
It is true that poverty is a determining factor in a family’s decision to take 
their children out of school, but the most important effect of poverty is that it 
consumes all the family’s energies in an attempt to secure a minimum standard of 
living Consequently, the whole responsibility of children’s learning is left to the 
teachers.
in te r v ie w  w ith  Lie. B cccrra, S ., F o rm e r  D irecto r o f  R eg ional O p era tio n s. C h ild ren  o f  S o lidarity  
P rog ram m e, A ugust 3, 1994 (S E D E S O L  C en tra l O ffices, M exico , D .F.).
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The Children of Solidarity Programme
OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES OF THE PROGRAMME
The declared objectives of the programme were: to increase the degree of 
certification at primary school, mainly by attacking the main causes of early 
leaving, and to improve living conditions for children with the provision of medical 
care and nutritional support.
The rationale behind the programme was that by redirecting families' 
attention away from everyday concerns, they could spend more time supporting 
their children and helping them to succeed in school, and consequently, decreasing 
the rate of early leaving. Although the economic incentive was effective in keeping 
children in school, the extra parental attention rarely occurred. Not only were many 
children left alone but also they were burdened with the need to achieve well 
enough to maintain the income from the programme.
For selected children the programme offered four family benefits: a monthly 
grant for a period of 12 months or for as long as the scholarship is in effect, equal 
to approximately US $16.00. The NSP-UNICEF (1994, p. 11) study has calculated 
that this represented an average increase of 45 percent in the family income. The 
children also receive a package delivered monthly by CONASUPO-DICONSA4. 
This package is made up of cooking oil, pasta soup, sugar, com flour, sardines.
D IC O N S A  is  a  d istribu tion  agency o f  th e  N ationa l Subsid ised  S taple P roduc ts C om pany 
(C O N A S U P O  ) w hich  subsid ises w ith p u b lic  funds som e products co n sid ered  to  be basic  for 
fam ily consum ption .
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powdered milk, rice, beans and gelatine The children were provided with monthly 
medical care and nutritional supervision, and finally, the programme included the 
promotion of recreational activities for the benefit of the community.
The programme was offered only in public primary schools which offer the 
six grades5 and which were located in highly marginalised zones. They must 
already have formed a Solidarity Committee, and or have participated earlier in the 
Solidarity Programme for an Adequate School (Escuela Digna) 6
In each state, the participating schools are jointly selected by the state 
branch of federal SEDESOL, SEP and state officials according to the level of 
marginality and poverty, geographical isolation and where early leaving has been 
identified as a major problem. In some states informal procedures give municipal 
authorities the prerogative to submit to the state officials a list of schools that they 
consider to be eligible for the programme. Children of Solidarity worked as a cash- 
limited programme rather than an entitlement programme. The rationale then 
allows only a limited number of schools in each state to participate rather than all 
who meet given criteria or need. Because of budget restrictions, the selection 
process is important.
sT h is  is  su rp ris in g  since m an y  ru ra l schoo ls o ffer less th an  6  g rades a n d  a re  po o re r th a n  the 
o thers. T h e  p rog ram m e d ec la red  itse lf  in  sup p o rt o f  th e  poorest!
6lts  ob jective  is to  support th e  renovation  a n d  m a in ten an ce  o f  th e  educa tiona l cam puses. T he 
p ro g ram m e include the  p a rtic ip a tio n  o f  teach ers , paren ts , studen ts , school au th o ritie s  an d  civil 
assoc ia tions , aim ed  a t p re se rv in g  the  ed uca tiona l real state.
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The programme is jointly financed with federal and state funds. The 
formula varies according to the economic situation of each state, but generally 75 
percent is federal and 25 percent is state funds. Originally, the programme 
allocated a maximum of 24 and a minimum of 12 scholarships to each selected 
school, equally distributed among the first three levels, with only one per family 
However, the rule was changed during the implementation of the programme and 
the scholarships were granted up to the sixth grade of primary school and in some 
schools the number of scholarships was also increased.
OPERATION OF THE PROGRAMME 
Jurisdiction
Children of Solidarity is under the direct control of federal SEDESOL. The 
Children of Solidarity programme co-ordinates, supports and liaises with federal 
institutions involved in the programme, such as the National Subsidised Staple 
Products Company-CONASUPO and its distribution agency DICONSA, which 
provides and distributes the complement of basic family supplies. The programme 
also co-ordinates with health sector agencies such as the Mexican Social Security 
Institute-IMSS, the Department of Health-SSA, the Social Security Institute for 
State Workers-ISSSTE, the National System for the Integral Development of the 
Family-DIF, and with medical state agencies. Their role is to take care of the 
nutritional-health area of the programme. SEDESOL and SEP jointly implement 
the civic ceremonials which are intended to reinforce the programme in schools. 
Finally, control and vigilance over the use of funds is secured by the General
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Comptrollership of the Federation-SECOGEF which provides the training for the 
Solidarity Committees
The programme was completely managed by federal SEDESOL and not by 
SEP, something that caused jurisdictional and territorial problems with local 
bureaucrats and which affected the implementation of the programme
Actors in the programme
Children of Solidarity includes a large number of actors in its implementation 
Firstly, federal SEDESOL, its state branches at the state level and solidarity 
promoters. SEDESOL and its state branches have significant influence in the 
selection of schools, in conjunction with state governments. Jointly they manage 
the whole programme and make sure that the rules are followed at the municipal 
level. Solidarity promoters, acted at the community level and had the responsibility 
of introducing the programme in each school and verifying that it worked 
according to the rules Solidarity promoters were mainly selected from university 
students who must do community work as part of their degrees or social service 
(servicio social). They received payment from SEDESOL and had to introduce 
and assist the Solidarity Committees with the operation and follow-up of the 
programme. Solidarity promoters were trained by SEDESOL and SECOGEF in 
the activities of the programme They were expected to know the objectives, 
strategies, policies and procedures of the programme. Their responsibility was to 
keep the Solidarity Committees informed of every major topic related to the
programme.
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The programme also required the collaboration of federal, health and 
distribution agencies to give medical attention to the children selected as well as to 
prepare and distribute the family package supplies. SEP promoted the civic 
activities related to the programme, and SECOGEF monitored the efficient and 
honest use of resources.
The State Department of Social Development or State SEDESOL, the 
Planning Committee for State Development-COPLADE and a sub-committee 
especially constituted to deal with the programme at the state level, were the main 
agencies involved in the implementation of the programme at the state level. 
Although the COPLADE decided which schools participated in the programme, its 
decisions were sometimes influenced by the state branches of federal SEDESOL if 
the selection was not made following the criteria set down by the programme.
At the municipal level the main actors of the programme were mayors, 
municipal treasurers and the municipal authorities directly related to solidarity 
actions. They could sometimes propose the participating schools, they 
administered the scholarships and collaborated in the delivery of the family package 
supplies. Finally, at the community level head teachers, teachers. Solidarity 
Committees, parents, and children were the main actors in the programme. Their 
role was essential because the most important part of the decision-making process 
took place at this level
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The perspectives of these actors and the complications which those 
conflicting perspectives brought to the programme are an important part of the 
discussion of the implementation process.
Allocation o f funds
In Campeche the allocation of federal funds for the programme was made in two 
instalments (Jan/Aug. and Sept./Dec.) through a bank deposit into an account on 
behalf of the governor who is the general co-ordinator of COPLADE. The account 
was jointly managed with the representative of federal SEDESOL, who endorsed 
cheques to the mayors for the equivalent of four months of scholarships to allow 
them to pay the scholarships on time. Although this never caused open 
confrontation between the governor and the representative of federal SEDESOL, it 
was certainly a source of tension because the governor’s priorities were not always 
the same as those of the programme.
The mayors and municipal treasurers opened a joint bank account to 
manage the funds received, which could not be used for any other purpose than 
the scholarships. According to the programme’s regulations, mayors had to pay the 
scholarships during the first ten days of each month and ensure that the supplies 
package was delivered on time
Selection process
There were four criteria: firstly, the child had to be enrolled in and to regularly 
attend a public primary school; secondly, s/he had to be selected from the children
of the first three grades; thirdly, children had to belong to a poor family, and 
finally, s/he should be willing to collaborate and participate at school. In order to 
keep a scholarship children had to reach and sustain a general academic average of 
eight out of ten and they had to participate in school and community activities.
Children decided who of their classmates will receive a scholarship. 
Although this aimed to secure a more accurate selection of children, it also caused 
a negative disposition among teachers who have traditionally exercised this 
privilege and who treated the programme with contempt. This has diminished their 
willingness to co-operate in its implementation. ‘The selection made by the children 
is not always the proper one. In the first selection the children were wrong and 
now the teacher, the head master and the members of the community make the 
selection. That is why I think that the teachers should participate more in the 
selection process’ .7
The process followed three main stages: first, solidarity promoters arranged 
a visit to the selected primary school and called for a general meeting of parents to 
introduce the programme, its objectives, rules, procedures, and the duties they 
would accomplish under the programme. Required community responsibilities 
included those of verifying that payments and the package of family supplies were 
delivered on time; ensuring that the selected children regularly attended school; 
follow up jointly with doctors the nutritional status of the children, and in general,
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7 In terv iew  w ith  te a c h e r  o f  P rim ary  S chool, N ovem ber 7, 1994 (V illa  M adero , M un ic ip a lity  o f  
C ham potdn , C a m p e ch e).
»confirm that the scholarship was spent properly. Nevertheless, according to a 
public official of the programme, there are certain communities that consider that 
the introduction of the programme would cause divisions among them and they 
may decide not to participate in the programme. In this case, solidarity officials 
must minute this and explain the reasons for community rejection. The minutes 
should be signed by members of this community .8
Second, the selection process started with the so-called “special day”. By 
using pedagogical tools, the solidarity promoters tried to gain the children’s 
confidence, by playing a game with them. Once they had captured the children’s 
attention and confidence, the second stage prepared children to make a selection 
from their classmates. During this stage solidarity promoters tried to familiarise 
children with the values of solidarity by using fairy tales with a topic strongly 
related to the main purpose of the programme. Once the children’s confidence was 
gained, they moved to the third stage. During this phase children were told about 
the scholarship and its purpose and asked to choose some of their classmates who 
they considered needed help. This phase ended with a preliminary list of candidates 
for the scholarship.
After the preliminary selection had taken place, the next step was the 
validation process where parents, teachers and members of the Solidarity 
Committee, agreed the selection or discussed changes One of the main problems
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In terv iew  w ith  Lie. B ecerra , S ., F orm er D irecto r o f  R egional O perations. C h ild ren  o f  S o lidarity  
P rogram m e, A ugust 3, 1994 (SE D E SO L  C en tra l O ffices, M exico , D .F.).
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when children decide who is to receive the scholarship, is that their decisions are 
not necessarily accurate enough to guarantee a proper allocation of funds. Their 
idea of poverty is not necessarily coincident with that of the programme, teachers 
or families in the community. Very frequently ethical or moral considerations were 
used by the community to deny a scholarship to a child. There have been cases 
where a scholarship has been denied on the grounds that the mother of a selected 
child is a prostitute or a single mother. However according to a public official of 
the programme, children are accurate in ninety percent of the cases. 9
After the validation, the Solidarity Committee made a formal proposal, 
certified by the head teacher. This was submitted to the Mayor who in turn 
submitted it to the state branch of federal SEDESOL. From here final validation 
was sought from COPLADE.
Each year, the re-allocation of scholarships followed the same guidelines 
used in the selection process. However, additional factors were taken into account, 
including the child’s performance. These criteria were quite flexible and the 
community could decide that despite a poor academic performance, the scholarship 
should remain with the child However, in highly isolated areas where poverty is a 
generalised problem, there may be no second chance.
9 Idem .
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Family's basic supply package
The basic supply package was provided by the CONASUPO-DICONSA system 
and it had to be delivered together with the payment. According to the rules of the 
programme, the state branch of federal SEDESOL gave to the representatives of 
DICONSA the list of selected schools in each municipality and locality to facilitate 
the delivery o f the family supplies each month (SEDESOL 1993b, p. 13). Their 
distribution was limited to the existing routes of this agency. However, in order to 
offer a better coverage in isolated communities DICONSA instructed its regional 
offices that the distribution route could be altered by up to 50 kilometres from the 
main route.
Medical attention
Medical care was delivered by the Department of Health-SSA, the IMSS, the 
ISSSTE, and the DIF, through their medical services in the clinics and hospitals 
closest to each school. This care consisted of a three monthly check to chart 
growth and development; an updating of the vaccination record; regular eye tests; 
dental examination; posture checks and specialised medical attention when needed. 
The clinic also had to offer practical help with nutrition and hygiene (SEDESOL 
1993a, p. 55).
The benefits of the programme came as a package and therefore 
scholarship holders got health care even though they had no health problems. 
However, the programme aimed to help those children whose conditions were 
extremely serious and for whom even the constitutional entitlement to health is not
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enough, either because of problems of accessibility or because a curative rather 
than preventative approach was adopted. The health component of Children of 
Solidarity aimed to force parents to take their children to the doctor on a regular 
basis and not only if a child is ill. Children who are not sponsored by the 
programme are entitled to medical attention in any of the institutions of the health 
sector. The problem is that they never attend because of economic, geographical 
and even cultural problems of accessibility For example, for many indigenous and 
rural communities a healer (curandero) frequently enjoys more credibility than 
general practitioners.
Reciprocal community activities
The Department of Public Education-SEP supports the work of the Children of 
Solidarity committees and promotes activities that reinforce the programme at the 
community level. However the field work revealed that such activities were more 
fictitious than real. In fact they played only a formal role in the whole process and 
merely served to compensate for the exclusion of SEP from the main decision­
making process of the programme. In fact, by allowing the community to take the 
core decisions of the programme, the strategy accomplished two objectives. Firstly, 
since the demand was greater than the resources, by letting the community allocate 
the scholarships the government transferred its responsibility to the community. 
Secondly, community decision making curbed the power formerly exercised by the 
teachers and the authorities and ensured that the resources were managed 
according to the programme criteria. In sum, the minor role assigned to the SEP
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was not accidental but a means of bypassing the bureaucratic structures that have 
permeated public service in the country and which had made it increasingly difficult 
to reach target populations.
Securing programme implementation
The last component of Children of Solidarity was the activities of control involved 
in the programme. According to Children of Solidarity’s officials, the organised 
participation of the community was important in keeping the bureaucracy in check. 
The skills required to promote the operation of the school committee to support 
and respect community decisions; to make sure that the assigned resources are 
provided promptly, with clarity, honesty and efficiency, and to perform the services 
effectively (SEDESOL 1993a, p. 55), were provided by the SECOGEF which 
trained the members of the Solidarity Committees and helped them to fulfil their 
role.
The analysis of the process of implementation will reveal the extent to 
which the intentions of the programme were achieved.
Programme Implementation and Theory
CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION
One of the central topics on the agenda of the PRONASOL was the moving of 
decisions and actions away from federal government. In practice, the programme 
did not transfer important decisions to the state or local government A complex 
distribution of roles and decisions generated a rather contradictory mix of trends
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between centralisation and decentralisation Examples of remaining centralisation 
can be seen in the funding and selection process for the programme
The role of the municipalities was limited to administering scholarships and 
co-ordinating and verifying that the family package supplies were delivered on 
time, though some municipalities submitted a preliminary list of schools for 
selection
After the selection of children, mayors only acted as the official messenger 
between the community and the state branch of federal SEDESOL which received 
community proposals. Once the funds were approved, the representative of federal 
SEDESOL transferred them to the local governments through a bank account. 
Each federal disbursement aimed to cover four months, so as to allow mayors 
access to the resources and so as to deliver the monthly payment on time. This 
allowed governments to gain some credit during the implementation of the 
programme. Nevertheless, because of the systematic delays in the allocation of 
funds (mainly because the 25 percent from the state, was not available on time), 
potential political credit was transformed into a widespread popular belief that the 
funds were used for different purposes.
Important decisions about funding and selection were taken away from the 
state and municipal levels of government and became the direct responsibility of 
the federation. This generated jurisdictional and political conflicts between the 
federation and the states and reflected a more politicised style of decision-making
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of state officials on the one hand, and a firm interpretation of the principles of the 
programme by the state branches of federal SEDESOL on the other.
Another element that highlighted the centralised character of the 
programme was the way in which the funds were managed. Although federal funds 
could be jointly managed by the state governor and the representative of federal 
SEDESOL, it was the latter who actually exerted more control over the process. 
He had the prerogative to receive proposals directly from the community and 
simply submit them for formal validation to COPLADE. Most importantly, he 
could endorse cheques to municipal governments. This was possible because of the 
funding formula of the programme, that is, 75 percent of federal funds and 25 
percent of state funds. This gave the federation effective control over its resources.
The lack of availability of resources on time, is the third element that 
reflects the centralised structure of the programme. Delays in the allocation of 
resources at the municipal level were common because the state contribution to the 
funds o f the programme was not always available. Communities and mayors 
argued that the delay in the delivery of the scholarships was due to the state’s 
delay in the allocation of funds and at the state level, they argued that such delay 
was a result of federal delay. ‘Sometimes the state and the federation face financial 
problems and they cannot always secure the allocation of funds when necessary. 
Therefore, mayors depend entirely on state and federal resources which transform
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municipal governments into mere official intermediaries between the federal agency 
and the community
Conversely, when the resources arrived on time mayors could reinforce 
their position in the community. Some of them visited their communities and 
schools, delivering the benefits and transforming the process into a political 
opportunity. Others, set a delivery point where certain communities could receive 
the funds every four months, since geographical isolation made it very difficult for 
them to travel to the main cities of the county. However, delays turned these 
possibilities into pressures.
But delays may also have introduced important distortions to the goals o f 
the programme. Three months was the average delay in paying for the 
scholarships. By the end of November 1994, most of the Solidarity Committees in 
the state of Campeche had not received funds since September. Because of this, 
one of the main criticisms of the programme is that it has reinforced certain 
behaviours that reproduce poverty. It was argued that subsidising family income 
through the scholarship would not necessarily improve the economic situation of 
children or even the family, mainly because once the money is added to family 
income, consumption preferences and cultural patterns will determine its use. Some 
families used the money to buy radios, television sets, to pay debts or even to buy 
alcohol. In some cases when the delay was at the beginning of the school term, the 0
I0In terv iew  w ith  Lie. Costilla , I., F o rm er H ead o f  the  S tate  D epartm ent o f  Social Developm ent- 
SE D E S O L , S ep tem ber 14, 1994 (C am peche, C am peche).
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acquisition of uniforms, shoes and materials was not possible. Therefore, 
sometimes the funds neither reached the target group nor solved problems of early 
leaving. The situation was aggravated when families suffered a delay of three or 
more months. This reinforced the tendency to use the funds for other purposes 
other than those intended by the programme.
In sum, the subordinate role o f states and municipalities in the decision 
making process, the way funds were managed and their composition (75 percent 
federal and 25 percent from the state) as well as the federal control of those 
resources which usually translated in continuous delays in their allocation, all 
reinforced the idea of a centralised programme
But while it may seem that the decentralised ethos of PRONASOL was 
more formal than real, there is still the other core decision to be considered, that is, 
the selection of children. This was a community prerogative. While it may appear 
that the goals of decentralisation are merely discursive because of the role the 
federation has assigned to states and municipalities in the programme, a significant 
degree of decentralisation was nevertheless achieved by allowing the community to 
participate in the decision-making process at the expense of bureaucratic actors. It 
can be argued that the possibilities for more decentralisation depend on the states’ 
capacity to implement federal programmes in the way intended. Children of 
Solidarity has also given states and municipalities a role in the decision-making 
process by inviting them to select the schools which will benefit from the 
programme. Although such selection is supervised by the delegates of SEDESOL,
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this is only the case when the selection of schools has been made using other 
criteria than the ones established by the programme. In other words, the 
possibilities of a greater decentralisation depend on the state’s ability to follow the 
guidelines of the programme and reduce the amount of discretion in the selection 
of schools.
Whether the programme reinforced centralisation or it represented an effort 
towards decentralisation is debatable. On the one hand, by displacing states and 
municipalities from the fundamental decisions of the programme and by 
centralising them in the federation, not only is a centralised structure reinforced, 
but also this clearly militates against the supposedly federalist structure on which 
the Mexican political system is based. On the other hand, defenders of the 
programme, would argue that in the short term this certainly results in the 
reinforcement of the centralist structure of the Mexican political system, but they 
would also argue that this strategy was essential because the aims of the 
programme were the reinforcement of community participation in the provision of 
certain services. Furthermore, the design of the PRONASOL was based on the 
assumption that by following the traditional channels for the provision of services, 
many deviations would occur on the way from the federal to the community level. 
The federal intention was jaded when it reached the community and as a result, the 
effectiveness of the policy was diminished. Therefore, although it would be 
reasonable to object to the exclusion of state governments, because it undermines 
the principles of a federal structure, it is also true that to stimulate community
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involvement in public actions, some of the state and local interests had to be cut 
out This was only be possible by a combination of federal action at the top and 
community action at the bottom
The centralisation used by Children of Solidarity seems to be the only 
viable pattern in the short term. The de facto power that the representatives of 
federal SEDESOL had in the whole process, was not intended to alter the federal 
system in the country, but instead to ensure that the objectives of the programme 
were met and to eliminate possible deviations that could arise during the 
implementation process The programme was designed to eliminate discretionary 
decisions that have permeated the implementation of public policies in the past. 
Therefore, the representatives of SEDESOL frequently acted as a counterbalance 
to mitigate the possibility of discretionary decisions o f the governor or state 
bureaucracy.
However, the power of SEDESOL’s federal representatives varies 
according to the particular sub-programme of PRONASOL. According to an 
official of state SEDESOL, there were some programmes whose budgetary 
composition made them more politically sensitive than others. ‘When federal 
funding is comparatively larger than the participation of the state, the programmes 
are managed more under federal than state terms. Children of Solidarity is such a
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case. The state branch of federal SEDESOL manages and controls the programme 
here in Campeche because it participates with 75 percent of programme’s funds
In sum, the programme was administered in a way in which objectives were 
set centrally although community participation of a subordinate sort was developed 
at the grassroots level Although Children of Solidarity had some features of 
centralisation, local participation and genuine popular support and involvement 
were obtained.
INTERORGANISA TIONAL PROBLEMS
One of the most notorious problems during the implementation of the programme 
was the lack o f collaboration of some of the federal agencies which participated in 
Children of Solidarity. Considering their number (four from the health sector, one 
in charge of the family package supplies, the Department of Public Education, one 
in charge of all the Comptrollership activities and finally SEDESOL) it is tempting 
to say that this was almost predictable. It was difficult enough to co-ordinate the 
implementation of the programme in the 31 states of the federation with more than 
two thousand municipalities The addition of eight federal agencies (DIF, ISSSTE, 
IMSS, SSA, CONASUPO, DICONSA, SEDESOL, SEP)complicated the 
programme, particularly because their collaboration with the programme varied.
" in te rv ie w  w ith  L ie . E squivel C am pos, A ., D irecto r o f  Social O rg a n isa tio n  in the  S tate  
D epartm en t o f  S o cia l D evelopm ent, S eptem ber 26, 1994 (C am p ech e . Cam peche).
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To a large extent the federal agencies of the health sector were those which 
showed least collaboration with the programme Three reasons help to explain this 
First, they did not have adequate information about the programme. Second, there 
were recurrent problems of jurisdiction and territory, and third, these agencies did 
not perceive any positive incentive in participating in the programme.
Lack of information, was perhaps the most important factor affecting the 
implementation of the programme. According to the NSP-UNICEF (1994, p. 25) 
study, only 41 percent of the medical personnel of the sample on which the study 
was based, understood their responsibilities. Practitioners at the community level, 
did not know for example, that a dossier should be opened on each child; that 
medical attention, preventative, curative or rehabilitative, should be provided free 
of charge; nor that children should attend the clinic monthly. Only 25 percent of 
the sample knew that they should refer the child for specialist attention if 
necessary.
Problems of jurisdiction in medical attention can be explained partly by the 
structure o f the health service. The Mexican health service is made up of several 
agencies each one covering particular social groups, e g., the armed forces, civil 
servants, and blue collar workers (see Mesa-Lago 1991). Because of this, it was 
common for some doctors to deny medical attention, arguing that a child was not 
entitled to  receive it since the child was not under the coverage group of that 
particular institution (ISSSTE or IMSS).
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The rules of the programme were intended to assist any of the Children of 
Solidarity in the nearest health centre, independently of whether s/he was entitled 
to receive medical attention in one of the agencies of the health system, but doctors 
did not know this. When medical attention was provided it was limited to a 
superficial examination of the child.
Since the programme did not offer any kind of incentive to health workers 
but only more work, it was difficult to gain their co-operation. The political credit 
of the programme went to the federation or to the states and municipalities.12
Because of a lack of information and the exclusion of the Department of 
Public Education-SEP and associated agencies from the core of the programme, 
these organisations collaborated with the programme to very different degrees. 56 
percent of the teachers did not inform the Solidarity Committee about the progress 
made by the selected children either through ignorance of the requirement or 
because they were not asked. Some did not consider it their responsibility and 
some did not know how to contact the Solidarity Committee. (National Solidarity 
Programme-UNICEF 1994, p. 16). The exclusion of teachers from the 
implementation process was responsible for the lack of knowledge of the
12O nly  D IC O N S A  o ffic ia ls a rgued  th a t th e ir  p a rtic ip a tio n  in  th e  p ro g ram m e w as n o t only 
g ro u n d ed  on  th e  fac t th a t its  objectives w ere re la ted  w ith  th e  objectives o f  the  p ro g ram m e , bu t 
a lso  th a t by  p a rtic ip a tin g  th is  w ould g ive the  ch an g e  to  b e  in se rted  in  w h a t they  co n s id e red  the  
m ost im p o rtan t p ro g ram m e in  term s o f  social po licy  o f  th e  regim e. D r. C ano , S. (19 9 4 , 
S ep tem ber 1) M a n ag e r  o f  O p era tio n s an d  Special P ro g ram m es o f  D IC O N S A , G . Mixcôatl, Ed. 
(M exico , D .F .).
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programme. For example, in the municipality of Campeche,13 the process of 
scholarships distribution was handled wholly by solidarity officials, the Solidarity 
Committee and parents without teacher participation. The solidarity team carried 
out their meeting at the school without even asking for the permission of the head 
master.
The teachers’ lack of information also distorted the objectives of the 
programme. The NSP-UNICEF study reports that some teachers believed that high 
grades were necessary to keep the scholarship and some of them increased the 
children’s grades accordingly. Furthermore, some teachers believed that parents of 
sponsored children should carry out special activities in the school and forced them 
to do so. This was particularly the case in the school Lázaro Cárdenas in the 
municipality of Hopelchén. The head teacher of the school argued that when the 
school required improvements or collaboration from parents to carry out civic 
ceremonials, not only were the sponsored children the first to be called, but also 
their parents. ‘Before, they had an excuse not to participate; now because the child 
is sponsored they do not have any pretext and that is good for the school’.14
The absence of pay-offs also discouraged teacher collaboration. Teachers 
were only given an operational role whereas the old SEP scheme of scholarships 
had relied upon their “natural” leadership as representatives in many community
13Im pressions tak en  du ring  a reass ignm en t o f  scho larsh ips in the  m u n ic ip a lity  o f  C am peche, in 
th e  school L ázaro  Cárdenas. N ovem ber 15 1994.
'in te r v ie w  w ith  S r Rosado, R ., H ead  m aster o f  E scuela L ázaro  C á rd en as , O c to b er 18, 1994 
(M un ic ipa lity  o f  H opelchén, C am peche).
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matters. Children of Solidarity significantly diminished their importance by 
bestowing on the community the decisions teachers used to make. In the end, this 
discouraged them from participating in the programme.
By removing the programme from its ‘natural administrative environment’ 
(SEP), the possibilities of gaining collaboration from this agency were diminished. 
‘While we [the education sector] receive the problems, Solidarity receives the 
credit’.15 For educational bureaucrats the operation of Children of Solidarity was 
imposed on them and yet it was under the control of SEDESOL. This was 
perceived as an intrusion into their natural jurisdiction and territory.
Solidarity officials however believed that the displacement of teachers, 
education authorities and local authorities from the selection process, would not 
only improve its targeting, but would also open opportunities for community 
mobilisation in the sector which at the same time would curb the professional 
power that education bureaucrats exerted. The officials believed that the targeting 
of the selection process could be improved if children and parents were involved in 
it. Therefore, in order to remove patronage-oriented allocation and to adhere to the 
criteria of the programme, the teachers’ displacement seemed necessary But by 
excluding the teachers from the selection process, the programme lost not only an 
important source of experience, but also support for the many activities that 
accompanied the implementation of Children of Solidarity
^ In te rv ie w  w ith  O je d a  M acossay, M . C ., C h ie f  o f  the  S tate D ep artm en t o f  E du ca tio n , C u ltu re  
and  Sports o f  C a m p e ch e . S ep tem ber 1994 (C am peche. C am peche).
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Of all the federal agencies involved in the implementation of the 
programme, one stands out because of it collaboration. DICONSA, the agency in 
charge of the preparation and delivery of the family supplies package, performed 
relatively well. Proper information and pay-offs were essential. According to the 
NSP-UNICEF study (1994, p. 24), the information received by the operators of 
DICONSA was sufficient and precise. They received booklets and verbal 
instructions and even promotional videos of the programme in some of the regional 
offices in the states ensuring that all the operators of the programme knew the 
content of the package. DICONSA operated under commercial principles since the 
family supplies package represented not only more work for the agency but also 
more income from increased sales. DICONSA needed prompt payment for sales in 
order to maintain its stock of products. Initially there were problems because 
DICONSA acquired large stocks of products for the programme by redirecting 
resources from its working capital. SEDESOL reimbursed the agency in a matter 
of days. DICONSA wished to collaborate because Children of Solidarity was one 
of the most important of the social policy programmes. It may also be relevant that 
for a period of time, the head of this agency was the president’s brother.16
The problems DICONSA encountered were with communications, 
infrastructure and the existing distribution network of the company. Most of the 
time the distribution of supplies used existing routes for the normal distribution of
16In terv iew  w ith  D r. C ano, S., M an ag er o f  O p era tio n s and  Spécial P ro g ram m es o f  D IC O N SA , 
S ep tem ber 1, 1994 (M exico , D .F .).
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goods. On occasions, this lent itself to corrupt practices from intermediaries who 
offered their services to transport supplies beyond the existing routes to the 
localities The Manager of Operations and Special programmes argued that if 
corrupt practices existed during the distribution of the packages, DICONSA ought 
not to be blamed, but rather, the community. ‘Most of the lorry drivers of 
DICONSA are members of the community who receive a salary from the profits of 
the community stores which are also managed by members of the community’.17 It 
was also a common practice for the parents of sponsored children to be asked to 
contribute to the cost of transporting the packages For example, in the community 
of Dzacabchen in the municipality of Hopelchen, the Solidarity Committee charged 
each sponsored child ten or fifteen new pesos for collecting a package from the 
nearest distribution centre
DICONSA modified its normal operations for the delivery o f the family 
packages because these required individual packaging rather than the bulk 
packaging which DICONSA normally used. It took sometime to perfect the new 
packaging so that the goods arrived in good condition
In sum, the federal agencies involved in the implementation of Children of 
Solidarity showed different degrees of commitment and effectiveness. While the 
health and educational sector were rather ineffective and less committed to 
collaboration with the programme, DICONSA performed better. This contrast is
l7Idem
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interesting because more conflict from state and municipal governments might have 
been expected since this federal programme represented a direct intrusion into the 
state jurisdiction and territory. The minor role allocated to states and municipalities 
might have caused difficulty but there was the opportunity for them to gain 
politically while, some of the federal agencies perceived no positive pay-off for 
their collaboration For some of them, the programme meant the invasion of 
jealously preserved territory and jurisdiction.
The predominant role of SEDESOL in the design and implementation of 
Children of Solidarity, also implied hierarchical relationships that militated against 
the collaboration required by the programme. Conversely, the relationship between 
SEDESOL and DICONSA was peculiar because their co-ordination was not based 
on a hierarchical relationship, but on co-operation and made possible because of 
the mutual benefit both agencies gained by participating in the programme; 
SEDESOL achieving their objectives and DICONSA increasing their sales. 
‘DICONSA is a system of distributing companies made up of sixteen subsidiary 
firms and all of them have been benefited in terms of sales of the family supplies 
packages of the Children of Solidarity programme. We are talking about 500,000 
packages per month, something that has given DICONSA not only the image of a 
profitable trade company, but also one with social commitment because through its 
distribution mechanisms it is helping the people of the programme’ .18
l8Idem.
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The failure of the programme to generate a pay-off for health and education 
reduced the collaboration of these agencies and hence the effectiveness of the 
programme to some extent. However the programme succeeded in its main 
objective-the involvement of the community and a change in the balance of power. 
The shortcomings of the health and education agencies and the civic activities 
programme did not detract from the impact of the programme and its 
transformation of popular attitudes of public services as a whole. In so far as 
individual component fell short of requirements this reflected a failure of the 
federal agencies to adjust procedures to the requirements of the programme.
THE COMPLEXITY OF JOINT ACTION AND CLEARANCE POINTS
In comparison with FOMUN or FONAES, Children of Solidarity involved a large 
number of participants and more complex implementation (see Table 4).
The leading actors (defined either in terms of their contribution to the 
design of the programme; their influence in the decision making process or by their 
role in the implementation of the programme) of the programme were, federal 
SEDESOL and its state branches in each state, and the Solidarity Committees 
along with the children in primary schools. These exerted the most influence in 
decision making and implementation. The auxiliary actors (defined as such because 
their contribution to the design of the programme, their role in decision making and 
in the implementation process was less important) were the other federal agencies 
involved in the process of implementation (SSA, IMSS, ISSSTE, DIF, DICONSA
and SEP).
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The obstacles to effective collaboration resulted from the different 
perspectives of the agencies, both vertically from federal to municipal and 
horizontally between agencies at the same level. Each varied in their sense of 
urgency, degree of scepticism, and wish to preserve their own benefits.
The lack of effective collaboration resulted in the delay in the allocation or 
the availability of economic resources, on average for three months. This was true 
in all the schools visited during the field work. For example, at Villa Madero in the 
municipality of Champoton, it was not until mid November that the scholarships 
due in August were paid and again the last four months of 1993 were not paid for 
until January 1994.19 Most of the time the delays were related to the procedure 
through which the funds were allocated to each state on a twice yearly basis, Sept - 
Dec. and Jan-Apr.20 Payment depended on the approval by the Chamber of 
Deputies, who generally meet during the last two weeks of December. Therefore, 
the delays are not related to the number of actors and the way they perform in the 
programme but rather to the budgetary structure of the country.
The inclusion of the community also increased implementation complexity. 
In some communities, popular participation proved to be more of a problem that a 
solution. Cultural and ethnic issues were at the root of this. In one of the localities 
of the municipality at Hopelchen, most of their inhabitants came from twenty three
^ In te rv ie w  w ith  teach er o f  P rim ary  School, N ovem ber 7, 1994 (V illa  M adero , M un ic ipa lity  o f  
C ham po tôn , C am peche).
20 In te rv iew  w ith  Lie. A rân , G ., F o rm er S tate C o -o rd in a to r o f  th e  C h ild ren  o f  S olidarity  
P ro g ram m e o f  the  S tate B ran ch  o f  F ederal S E D E SO L , O c to b er  13, 1994 (C am peche , C am peche).
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states of the country. This heterogeneity made it difficult to generate popular 
mobilisation because some of the groups had previous experience of participation 
while others had not, and therefore it was hard to generate agreements between 
them.21
Implementation however, did not fail because of the clearance points that 
the programme set down. By including the community in the implementation of the 
programme, new actors and clearance points were created, giving the community a 
significant role in the implementation process. Children of Solidarity’s most 
significant attribute was that the children and the community made fundamental 
decisions in its implementation. The community also participated in the monitoring 
and managing of the programme’s resources. There were cases for example, where 
a sponsored child did not receive the scholarship because his father was an 
alcoholic or the money was for the wrong purpose. Although this was rare, the 
Solidarity Committee was able to manage the scholarship directly without 
reference to the child’s parents. However, most of the time, the members of the 
Solidarity Committees did not want to interfere in what they considered to be a 
private matter or they did not know how to cancel a scholarship without creating 
problems inside the community.22 Nevertheless, the range of decisions which the
2 ,In terv iew  w ith  Lie. C hávez, J., Secretary G eneral o f  th e  M unic ipa l C ouncil o f  H opelchén , 
O ctober 17, 1994 (M unicipality  o f  H opelchén, C am p ech e).
22 In terv iew  w ith  Sr. C anul Cobo, E., M em ber o f  th e  C h ild ren  o f  S o lidarity  C om m ittee , 
N ovem ber 4, 1994 (Ejido K ilóm etro  36, M un ic ipa lity  o f  E scárcega, C am peche).
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community could make was extensive and this gave it a significant authority and 
influence in the programme.
According to the NSP-UNICEF study (1994, p. 16), in 90 percent of the 
schools where the programme was implemented, the selection process was carried 
out according to programme’s regulation. Although politically productive, ethical 
considerations sometimes interfered with the original criteria. For example, 
children’s decisions were always endorsed by their parents and the Solidarity 
Committee. In some cases, a child whose mother was a prostitute or a single 
mother was awarded a scholarship but then the community reversed the children’s’ 
decision to grant the scholarship. In these cases Solidarity officials tried to 
convince the community that the children’s proposal for the allocation of a 
scholarship should be accepted. However, if the community persisted with the idea 
then the decision was respected, on the grounds that the programme must respect 
community values and forms of organisation. Despite this, the programme was 
generally successful in introducing this procedure and in transferring key decisions 
to the children and the community
Another two major clearance points were COPLADE and the delegate of 
SEDESOL. Once the selection and validation processes were over, COPLADE 
had to validate the scholarship proposals. There was no significant evidence that 
community proposals were rejected by this agency. Before the community proposal 
is submitted to COPLADE, it had already been validated by the representative of
federal SEDESOL in the state.
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In sum, the complexity of programme’s implementation was increased not 
only because of its inability to solve problems either of territory and jurisdiction, or 
because it could not offer the sufficient incentives to gain collaboration as 
discussed earlier, but also because the programme was tied to the budgetary 
structure of the country, and as a result, delays generally affected the payment of 
the scholarships.
Despite this, the implementation of the programme showed that when the 
leading actors influence the design, the decision-making process and the 
implementation of the programme, it is more likely to succeed. Children of 
Solidarity, shows that by combining federal and community actors as leaders, it 
was possible to produce effective implementation. Successful implementation was 
also achieved because of the clearance points defined by the programme. It is clear 
that despite the large number of actors and the complexity of programme’s 
implementation, it was successfully implemented.
_______________ T a b le  4. P a r tic ip a n t»  a n d  P e rsp e c tiv e s  o f  C h ild re n  o f  S o lid a rity _________
Participant Connection with Perspective and M qjor Sense o f Urgency
________________Programme___________ Objectives__________________
Federal Department o f 
Social Development 
(SEDESOL)
Designed the programme in 
accordance with a Presidential 
Mandate.
The programme will support 
children at primary school o f  
low income families to prevent 
them from leaving school.
State Branch o f
SEDESOL.
Promotes the programme all 
over the country in primary 
schools and select a group of 
schools to  be benefited by the 
programme.
The programme is o f the greatest 
importance in producing a better 
quality o f education by means o f  
community involvement in
education matters. The
programme is not a c o v e r a g e  
one, but primarily oriented to 
produce an im p a c t on the quality  
o f education by means o f  
community participation.
State Department o f  
Social Development 
(State SEDESOL)
Collaborate jointly with the Share in full the objectives and 
Federal Delegation o f  perspective o f  federal
SEDESOL, for the funding and SEDESOL. 
implementation o f  the
Very High.
Very High.
High.
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Participant Connection with 
Programme
Perspective and M ajor 
Objectives
Sense o f Urgency
programme.
Mayors and municipal 
authorities.
Propose a primary group of 
schools to benefit from the 
programme and to pay on a 
m onthly basis the scholarships, 
as well as to follow up the 
implementation o f the 
programme.
Regard the programme as an 
additional source o f  economic 
resources a s  well as a possibility 
for political credit among their 
constituencies, but they share the 
objectives o f  the  programme.
High.
Federal Agencies o f  the 
National Health System 
(IMSS, SSA, ISSSTE, 
DIF)
T o  provide medical care when 
needed and offer monthly clinic 
examinations to the children 
selected by the programme.
The program m e was ju st a 
presidential initiative to be 
supported, an d  that would only 
increase their load o f  work.
M oderate (some 
problems regarding 
territory and 
jurisdiction as well as 
lack o f  identification 
with the programme).
Department o f  Public 
Education-SEP.
Collaborate in the promotion o f 
civic activities among the 
schools selected to reinforce 
positive attitudes towards the 
programme and produce a better 
impact.
An additional programme o f 
scholarships similar to that 
managed fo r this Department for 
a long time. T he  objective was to 
support a  Presidential Initiative.
Moderate (some 
problems regarding 
territory and 
jurisdiction).
National Subsidised 
Staple Products 
Company-
CONASUPO, mainly 
through its Distribution 
Agency-DICONSA.
Provision o f  the family supplies 
package.
An opportunity to  be engaged 
directly w ith  a presidential 
initiative as w ell as an additional 
source o f  sales for their products.
High (both because it is 
a  presidential initiative, 
but also because it is 
part o f  their rationale to 
w ork with high 
standards o f 
performance).
Solidarity promoters. T o  introduce the programme in 
the selected schools and to give 
all sort o f  information about the 
programme to educational 
authorities and the community.
Varied according to each 
promoter.
Varied according to 
each promoter.
Children o f  the first 
three grades o f  primary 
schools.
To m ake a primary election o f 
their classmates to be benefited 
w ith the programme.
To help som e o f  their classmates 
that they consider to be poor.
None.
Teachers and head 
masters.
Validate children’s ’ primary 
selection o f classmates and 
follow up and report 
performance o f  those selected.
Confused image o f  the 
programme an d  to  sustain their 
leadership position in 
community.
Moderate in general, 
but it varied according 
to  each teacher.
Solidarity Committee 
and Parents.
Definitive validation o f  the 
selection o f children, jointly 
m ade with Teachers, Deans and 
Solidarity Promoters.
The program m e supports poor 
children so  they can finish 
primary school. The objective 
for them is to  allocate these 
scholarships to  those children 
who are m ore vulnerable in 
economic term s.
Very High.
Children o f Solidarity 
Sub-Committee inside 
the COPLADE
Operative group which includes 
all the state and federal agencies 
involved in the implementation 
o f  the programme.
To facilitate the  implementation 
o f  the program m e by means o f 
periodical m eetings to solve 
“bottle-necks” .
Varied, according to 
the problems the 
programme face.
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STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
It is evident that the programme was effectively able to sideline teachers’ influence 
in the implementation process. Considering the authority and powerful position 
teachers still have at the base of the pyramid, it is surprising that a programme like 
this openly ignored them during the selection of children. Following Lipsky’s 
(1976) arguments, it is rather surprising that the programme did not cause more 
problems. Such displacement may however cause serious problems in the long term 
because teachers’ participation is as important as that of parents.
The teachers did not behave passively. During the first stages of the 
programme, they tried to have their stake in it.23 Teachers criticised the programme 
on the grounds that the children would not be able to make a proper selection of 
their classmates. When the solidarity promoters introduced the programme in the 
schools it was not surprising to find that the teacher already had a list of the 
children who should benefit from the scholarships. At the beginning of the 
programme in Campeche, the former Secretary of the Department of Public 
Education in the state objected to the programme because it was not under his 
jurisdiction. Some other teachers complained that they were merely used to sign 
the reports that had to be submitted to the SEDESOL field offices.24 Furthermore, 
teachers’ reaction to the role they had in the programme was even more adverse in
23 In te rv iew  w ith  L ie . A rân , G ., F o rm er S tate C o-o rd in a to r o f  th e  C h ild ren  o f  S o lidarity  
P ro g ra m m e  o f  th e  S ta te  B ran ch  o f  F ederal SE D E S O L , O ctober 13, 1994 (C am peche, C am peche).
24Id em .
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rural areas. In rural schools teachers reacted with anger to the fact that they could 
not decide who would receive the scholarship.25
Following Martin’s (1994) arguments, both displacement of teachers and 
parents have a strong impact on the drop-out rates at primary school. In the short 
term the programme was surprisingly successful in spite of the teachers having 
been ignored. Therefore, it seems that Lipsky’s arguments might be right in the 
long term, but for the moment, he seems to be wrong, because the programme 
performed well without taking into account the attitudes of these “street level 
bureaucrats”.
FLEXIBILITY IN IMPLEMENT A TION
The programme had to work with a great deal of flexibility to adjust its procedures 
to different scenarios, for example, in areas with difficult access, where it takes 
days to reach a major town or city. People from these villages only come down 
from the mountains a few times a year to obtain supplies and exchange goods or as 
with the programme, to receive every three months a scholarship payment. One of 
the most significant elements of the programme was its flexibility in adapting to 
local conditions
One of the guidelines of the programme is that the payment of the 
scholarship must be on a monthly basis. However, for some municipalities in the
25In terv iew  w ith B a làn  C han , E. d e  la  C ru z , C o-o rd in a to r o f  th e  C h ild ren  o f  S o lidarity  
P ro g ram m e in  the  M un ic ip a lity  o f  H opelchén , C am peche, O ctober 17, 1994 (H opelchén , 
C am peche).
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country, geographical conditions make it extremely difficult to pay according to 
the norm. Some communities are isolated areas where communications are not 
good and where travelling from their homes to the city council may take three 
days. Under these circumstances, some Solidarity Committees and mayors decided 
to change the norm and make three monthly payments. It also happened that in 
some regions money does not have much value since barter is still the traditional 
practice. In some regions the procedures of Solidarity were adjusted to the 
particular situation. Additionally, where the levels of poverty were generalised, the 
scholarships and the supply package were shared among the children in that school
In urban areas the situation is more complex because here it is still possible 
to find poor children and very poor children. The community cannot validate the 
selection of children because, in this large population they do not know each other. 
Under these circumstances, the validation process was carried by visits from 
members of the Solidarity Committee to decide if the children’s proposal could be 
endorsed. On the other hand, in isolated or indigenous areas, everybody knows one 
another and there are no such differences between poor and very poor. In such 
cases, Children of Solidarity distributed the total of resources among all the 
children and the payment is rotated each month so that every family could benefit 
from the programme
In some other situations where community participation did not facilitate 
the selection process strange methods were adopted For example, in the locality of 
Santa Rita Bacabchén it was very difficult to organise a general assembly among
\parents for the introduction of the programme and the selection of children. The 
two scholarships that had to be assigned in this group were assigned through a 
raffle. As a result, one of the scholarships was assigned to a teacher’s child and the 
second one to a family who had an average income.26 In the primary school of 
Villa Madero in the municipality of Champoton the selection process was changed 
in an effort to adapt the programme to local conditions. In this school the 
Solidarity Committee, teachers and the head-teacher made the selection of 
children, arguably because everybody involved believed that teachers should 
participate more in this stage of the implementation process27
LOCAL POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTATION
Community participation was one of the main objectives of Children of Solidarity, 
but it underestimated the influence of traditional political structures at the local 
level. This became clear at an evaluation workshop with mayors at the National 
Institute of Solidarity-NIS. One of the participants explained that in his 
municipality the former mayor had delivered nearly two thousand scholarships 
using different criteria from those established by the programme. The scholarships 
had been granted to friends or for political benefit In addition, the inadequacy of 
the health component and the complete lack of information about the programme 
brought a huge number of complaints When a different municipal administration
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26 Idem.
27Interview  w ith  teach er o f  P rim ary  School, N ovem ber 7, 1994 (V illa  M adcro , M un ic ipa lity  o f  
C ham potdn, C am peche).
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took office (the one he represented), 1,409 scholarships were reallocated, 
information was delivered to all the agencies involved in the programme and 
effective co-ordination with the health agencies was achieved. Since then there 
have been few complaints.28
The workshop showed that the implementation of the programme at the 
municipal level is largely dependent on the political discretion of the mayor. 
Solidarity promoters and members of the Solidarity Committee have a 
responsibility to report anomalies to the state branch of federal SEDESOL and to 
act as allies of the federal programme. Nevertheless, for the community and 
solidarity promoters confronting the mayor has a high cost. If, in addition, no 
resources are allocated for supervision activities, the detection of these situations is 
even more difficult.
Local politics also influenced the implementation of the programme 
through the creation of the Solidarity Committees. The guidelines required that 
they should be created democratically. However, some were created using the 
traditional structures of the PRI, mainly in the people’s neighbourhoods (barrios or 
colonias populares) in urban zones. Political mobilisation for the PRI in urban 
areas rests significantly on neighbourhood leaders (lideres de colonias) many of 
whom are women and who are sponsored and supported by the PRI. When 
committees were formed using these leaders the entire process of reallocation of
28
In te rv iew  w ith  D r. Pefia G a s td u m , M. E ., S ecretary  o f  Social D evelopm en t o f  th e  M unic ipa l 
C ouncil o fG u a sa v e , S inaloa, A ugust 10, 1994 (M ex ico , D.F.).
*scholarships was corrupt. During the field work it was possible to observe during a 
re-allocation of scholarships in the primary school Lázaro Cárdenas in the city of 
Campeche,29 how these leaders, acting as presidents of the Solidarity Committee, 
managed the whole process, controlling the access to information, intimidating 
adversaries and even establishing personal links with top officials of the programme 
at the municipal level. These people know most of the parents in the community 
and control the flow of information before the general meeting occurs. By then, 
they have already discussed and made a decision about who the recipients of the 
funds would be, most of the time for their supporters. The voting is then rigged to 
secure the desired result. The idealistic organisation of the programme did not 
anticipate circumstances like these thus revealing the limited capabilities of a 
centrally designed programme.
However, these political considerations are not under the control of the 
programme. This was another variable that affected the implementation process. 
Even if the president of the Solidarity Committee was not a member of the PRI or 
was democratically elected and even if s/he has the support of the programme, it 
was still very difficult to confront a leadership supported by the traditional political 
structures of the PRI and the state and municipal government itself. ‘Solidarity 
leadership is constrained by the traditional one previously created’.30 The situation
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29 T h e  re -a llo ca tio n  o f  sc h o la rsh ip s  w as ca rr ie d  o u t in  N ovem ber 15, 1994.
30
In te rv iew  w ith  L ie . E squ ive l C am pos, A ., D irec to r  o f  Social O rg an isa tio n  in  the  S tate  
D ep a rtm en t o f  S ocial D evelopm en t, S ep tem ber 26 , 1994 (C am peche, C am peche).
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was aggravated by the fact that most of the traditional leaders are still financed by 
the PRI One leader stated: ‘The people always look to her in all the aspects 
related to the Solidarity Committee and not to the committee itself.31 Indeed, in 
this respect Children of Solidarity had an idealistic design. Even the political 
support that enjoyed the programme was not enough to counteract the deeply 
rooted structures of caudillismo and clientelism which have characterised the 
political culture of the country. This is something that the programme could not 
confront.
Indeed, in this respect Children of Solidarity had an idealistic design. 
Despite the political support that enjoyed the programme, it was not enough to 
counteract the deeply rooted structures of caudillismo and clientelism which have 
characterised the political culture of the country. The political problems 
confronting the programme were not confined to the municipal level. At the state 
level there were situations were the whole programme could not operate as 
originally intended. In the state o f Chiapas, during the governorship of Patrocinio 
González Garrido, the programme had to modify its structure and channel its 
resources in the form of “school breakfasts” because of the governor’s refusal to 
accept the programme as it was structured 32 3
3 ,In te rv iew  w ith  M rs. D e G uilldn  M o ren o , M ., P re s id en t o f  th e  S o lid arity  C o m m itte e  o f  C h ild ren  
o f  S o lidarity  o f  th e  P rim ary  School "L u c ila  A layo la ," O c to b e r  27, 1994 (Is la  del C drm en , 
C am peche).
T h is  w as m en tioned  by a  so lidarity  o ffic ia l d u rin g  th e  w o rk sh o p  o f  ev a lu a tio n  w ith  m ayors in 
th e  N a tiona l In stitu te  o f  So lidarity , A u g u s t 10, 1994. M e x ico  city.
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Interesting parallels can be drawn between the Oakland project that 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) described and the implementation of Children of 
Solidarity. In the same way that Washington tried to involve the minority groups in 
the programme to gain the support that the state of California and the city of 
Oakland would not provide, so SEDESOL and the federal government tried to stir 
up local communities to root out what was perceived as corrupt or inefficient local 
politics. In both cases the federal government was seeking to establish a direct 
channel of communication between themselves and certain excluded minorities in 
the case of California, and with poor groups in the case of Mexico. Solidarity used 
its appeal to the people to bypass certain bureaucratic and party structures that are 
unresponsive to new political challenges
PIU N G -U P
Children of Solidarity aimed to change community attitudes in relation to the 
quality of educational provision in the country by involving the community in 
implementing the programme. This was a means to this end, making it profitable 
for parents to keep their children in school. The programme also aimed to produce 
certain adult behaviour desirable in itself and desirable for improving school 
attendance.
However, the overall effectiveness of the programme was diminished by 
attempting to cover these two objectives at the same time. Bardach (1977) calls 
this a ‘piling-up’ process, the adding of objectives and goals to an existing policy. 
In general, the addition of objectives weakens policy implementation. In the case of
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Children of Solidarity, in addition to the formally declared objective o f the 
programme, which was to increase children’s school attendance, there was an 
additional one which attempted to promote a certain kind of adult behaviour in 
relation to how families spent their money. The scholarship money was intended 
for the material needs of the child, (shoes, clothing, notebooks and pencils). The 
designers of the programme, however, made the objectives of the programme 
unrealistic and difficult to implement by attempting to control the behaviour o f the 
families as well as to secure school attendance.
Quite frequently the money was used for other purposes. The programme 
worked in the sense that the money encouraged parents to keep their children at 
school but it did not change the families’ spending patterns. Once in possession of 
the money, the families spent it as they wished, not necessarily for the benefit of 
one particular child. That school attendance and family expenditure would be 
linked in the family’s thinking was an incorrect and idealistic assumption o f the 
programme’s designers. In sum, the family priorities and preferences for 
expenditure remained beyond the control o f the Solidarity Committee. It became 
too difficult a task to ensure that the money was used as intended in an 
environment of such deprivation and economic pressure
Although the assumption was idealistic it was also grounded in political 
considerations. The policy designers had to present a comprehensive programme in 
which the money granted would be used for the benefit of the selected children in
order to gain political support. It was not politically acceptable simply to bribe 
families to keep their children in school.
CONTRADICTORY OBJECTIVES
Although community participation seemed to be desirable from many points of 
view, it also produced contradictory effects on the programme. One of the 
objectives of the programme was to abolish the paternalistic pattern that has 
characterised the provision of welfare in the country. Children of Solidarity 
required that in exchange for the scholarship, parents should participate in activities 
aimed either at reinforcing the programme in the community or to refurbishing and 
improving school conditions. Eventually, officials of the programme realised that 
they could not make this compulsory. According to a federal official of the 
programme, the parents of the sponsored children who had been expected to 
improve the conditions of the school, were not always willing to collaborate in 
these activities.
Instead of generating a co-operative attitude among the community, as 
Solidarity hoped, the scholarships created a division between sponsored and non 
sponsored families. For example, head teachers and teachers not only demanded 
the collaboration of the parents of sponsored children in improving school 
conditions, but also asked them for money. One Solidarity Committee president 
reported that when the head teacher’s wife was the president of the Solidarity 
Committee she asked for money from the sponsored children, threatening them 
with the loss of the scholarship if they did not pay. ‘If money is required, the
Children of Solidarity__________________________________________ ___ _______ 203
C h i l d r e n  o f  S o l i d a r i t y 204
sponsored children are the first to be called; if some activities have to be carried 
out in the school, again the sponsored children were the first’.13 As mentioned by 
the mayor of the municipality of klvaro Obregón, Michoacán, ‘at the end of the 
day the poorest work more* (e¡ más jodido trabaja más ’).3 4
Instead of developing unity in the community, this only reinforced the 
existing differences. In a way the programme was attempting to ride two horses 
which were travelling in different directions!
Another contradiction in Children of Solidarity was that it assumed that the 
participation of the community would improve the quality of education. However, 
community participation was not accompanied by that of the teachers and in the 
end this militated against that objective. As Martin (1994) notes, early leaving in 
the primary school will only be prevented when both teachers and parents work 
together to keep children in school.
Initially the Solidarity officials assumed that the whole community would 
become involved in the programme of activities But while parents o f sponsored 
children had a “moral” commitment to collaborate in school improvement 
activities, such as painting the classrooms and cleaning, frequently they were the
33In terv iew  w ith  M rs. De G u illen  M o ren o , M ., P re s id en t o f  th e  S o lid arity  C o m m itte e  o f  C h ild ren  
o f  S o lidarity  o f  th e  P rim ary  School "L u cila  A lay o la ,” O c to b er  27 , 1994 (Is la  del C ttrm en , 
C am peche).
34N o tes  tak en  d u r in g  the  eva lu a tio n  w o rk sh o p  w ith  m ay o rs a t th e  N a tio n a l In s titu te  o f  Solidarity . 
A ugust 6, 1994, M exico  City.
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only ones who took part. The parents of the other children argued that, since their 
children did not have a scholarship, they had no such commitment
Again, sponsored children were sometimes the only ones who participated 
in the civic ceremonies and festivals. Those activities had a related cost that was 
affordable with the scholarship. These situations were more the exception than the 
rule but they showed that the expected community participation was not realised
P R E L IM IN A R Y  E V A L U A T IO N  A N D  C O N C L U S IO N S
A relatively simple evaluation of the programme could be done by comparing its 
declared objectives with the final outcomes However there are no studies to verify 
whether the programme produced a significant impact on early leaving. There is 
some information about the final effect of the scholarship payment on the children 
and their families and the influence it had on family decisions about taking their 
children out of school. Neither is the state of the children’s nutrition as a result of 
the intervention of the programme known. Despite this, some results of the 
programme are encouraging
For example, the programme partially changed the attitude of some parents 
to the education of their children One president of a Solidarity Committee 
reported 100 percent attendance of sponsored children since the programme 
started.3* There are some indications too that Children of Solidarity was useful in 35
35In te rv iew  w ith  M rs. Pol N ovelo , V ., P residen t o f  th e  S o lid a rity  C om m ittee  o f  School "L ázaro  
C á rd en as ,"  O c to b er  17, 1994 (M u n ic ip a lity  o f  H opclchén , C am p ech e).
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improving the children’s academic performance. In the municipality of Alvaro 
Obregon in Michoacan, two sponsored children obtained the first and second 
places in the municipality in the municipal test.36 The programme also influenced 
the way mayors and municipal authorities fulfil their responsibilities. ‘Social 
participation has put much more pressure on us, that is why we have had to change 
our procedures’.37 Federal officials of the programme openly encouraged the 
communities to ‘occupy the municipal offices if that helps you to be heard by the 
municipal authorities’.38
It is encouraging too that the programme transferred significant economic 
resources to nearly half a million children in primary schools all over Mexico in 
two years of its operation (Salinas de Gortari 1992, p 40). Similarly, the 
programme introduced a strategy aimed to provide children in conditions of 
poverty and extreme poverty, with the necessary resources to stay at school. In 
order to do this, the programme had to impose centralised control of the main 
components of the programme to ensure its success. But Children of Solidarity 
transferred important decisions and powers to new actors, assuming that this 
would influence the way public services, such as education, are provided.
36N otes ta k e n  d u rin g  th e  ev a lu a tio n  w orkshop  w ith  m ay o rs  a t the  N a tiona l In s titu te  o f  So lidarity . 
A ugust 6 , 1994 , M exico  C ity ..
37
In te rv iew  w ith  Lie. C h áv ez , J., Secretary  G enera l o f  th e  M un ic ip a l C ounc il o f  H opelchén , 
O ctober 17, 1994 (M u n ic ip a lity  o f  H opelchén. C am p ech e).
38M ix c ó a tl, G . (1994 , A u gust 6 )  F ield  N otes (M ex ico , D .F .) . C om m en ts m ad e  by  Lie. Je sú s  M a. 
de la  T o rre , D irec to r  o f  M u n ic ip a l P rog ram m es o f  S E D E S O L  d u rin g  h is  p a rtic ip a tio n  a t  th e  
ev a lu a tio n  w o rk sh o p  w ith  m ay o rs a t th e  N ationa l In s titu te  o f  Solidarity .
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Community participation was essential to stimulate the response of the 
participating agencies both in terms of performance and in curbing the power of 
entrenched bureaucracies
Politically, the experience o f community involvement in the programme 
highlights an important element in Mexican politics. The programme demonstrates 
that it is still possible to establish direct contact with actors at the community level, 
bypassing the state and municipal levels It is important to note that this 
demonstrates that the federal government can still command popular support. In 
terms of political culture, the analysis shows that the community still feels that the 
federal government has something to offer. This is surprising, considering the scale 
of the programme and the hostilities and indifference of some state governments. It 
represents the survival of the popular elements in Mexican politics.
The response of the bureaucracies was different On the one hand, federal 
agencies which perceive no positive pay-offs were reluctant to collaborate. For 
them the programme was only producing an overload of work. On the other, 
collaboration was achieved from those agencies that obtained positive pay-offs. 
For state and local governments, the incentives for collaboration mainly came from 
the resources they would receive which could be translated into political support 
for their administrations. However, this depended on the opportune allocation of 
funds by the federation and the state In the end, what could have been an 
opportunity turned out to be a problem because of delays The municipal 
authorities were to blame for these delays, in the eyes of the community.
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The role of the solidarity promoters and officials was to provide 
information in such a way that the Solidarity Committees could exercise all the 
opportunities granted by the programme and boost the performance of all 
participating agencies. However this information was sometimes lacking and led to 
inefficiencies in implementation.
The actions of SEDESOL during the programme showed how the 
federation controlled political manoeuvring at the state and local level. First, the 
mayor or the Solidarity promoter had to deliver the community’s proposals directly 
to SEDESOL for approval. Neither the mayor nor state officials had any 
independent role during the selection process. Second, the formula for funding the 
programme (75 percent from the federation and 25 percent from state resources) 
ensured that the control o f the programme remained in the federation. Still, the fact 
that the programme clearly represented a presidential initiative was not enough to 
generate the necessary collaboration from several participating agencies.
Children of Solidarity offers some lessons for policy implementation. The 
first one is related to the administrative setting in which the programme operates 
and the role assigned to actors within the implementation process. The programme 
shows that some centralisation is needed to bypass traditional bureaucratic actors 
under whose authority the implementation of the policy would have failed 
Children of Solidarity officials considered that its effectiveness might have been 
diminished if the Department of Public Education-SEP had managed the 
programme. Instead, the main actors were SEDESOL itself and its field offices in
C h i l d r e n  o f  S o l i d a r i t y 209
each state and community. Even so, the allocation of scholarships by SEDESOL or 
any other agency, federal, state or municipal, would not have been accepted 
without the participation o f the community. Since the demand was much greater 
than the available resources, substantial though these were, the government 
transferred to the community the responsibility for the allocation of benefits. The 
‘mutual adaptation’ or flexibility which allowed variations according to particular 
circumstances also devolved responsibility. Decisions taken by the community may 
be right or wrong , but at the end of the day, they were the community’s decisions.
The second lesson is that by giving the community the allocation of the 
scholarships, it was easier to ensure that the resources were managed according to 
the criteria set down by the programme, and to curb the discretion teachers, head 
masters, and educational authorities have developed inside the sector. In sum, the 
minor role assigned to the Department of Public Education in the implementation 
of Children o f Solidarity, must not be seen as accidental or as a design error. 
Instead, it reflects the need to bypass the bureaucratic structures that have 
permeated public performance in the country and which make it increasingly 
difficult to reach target populations.
Naturally, the centralised character of the programme was reflected in the 
subordinate role given to the states and municipalities concerning decision making, 
management o f funds, and their allocation. It was also argued that much of the 
centralised character of the programme was aimed at counteracting the 
discretionary decisions and actions that still permeate the administrative culture in
Mexico. Therefore, the possibilities of a greater decentralisation are dependent on 
the state’s ability to enforce the guidelines of the programme and to reduce 
discretion in the selection of schools. Whether the programme was more or less 
centralised depended upon the federation/state relationship and also upon the 
ability and willingness of state and municipal government to perform according to 
the rules.
In terms o f  collaboration with the programme the federal agencies involved 
showed different levels of commitment to Children of Solidarity. The reasons for 
this were a lack of information, jurisdictional and territorial problems and most 
importantly, a lack of positive pay-off for some actors The contrast shown 
between DICONSA and the agencies of the health sector is illustrative of this. 
Another important obstacle to collaboration, notably that of SEP, was the 
displacement of the educational bureaucracy from the programme, something that 
was regarded as an intrusion into its territory. The effects of the different levels of 
commitment to and collaboration with the programme, however, did not affect its 
core objective because of a lack of interdependency.
Children o f Solidarity enjoyed only partial success because while the 
economic benefit encouraged families to keep their children in school, the addition 
of rules about the use of the money received presented problems which could not 
be overcome. It was argued that the main reason for this was that the programme 
considered the family as a single entity which would use the funds according to the 
expectations of the programme and did not consider that once money becomes part
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of a family’s budget, it would be used according to the family’s needs and 
priorities, not necessarily according to child’s needs or the policy designers 
expectations. As in similar programmes in the past, the social distance between the 
policy designers and the target population of the policy made the programme 
overambitious and unrealistic. Future policies may increase their chances of success 
if they diminish the gap between the policy designers’ expectations and local 
attitudes and orientations. Although the verdict on implementation is positive, 
critics of the programme might deem it rather superficial. It could be argued that it 
was successful because it did not try to do very much. If attitudes toward 
education or educational concerns are treated as part of the stated objectives o f the 
programme its success is reduced, but in fact its aims were less ambitious. This 
partially explains why the displacement of teachers did not seriously affect the 
implementation process.
Pressman and Wildavsky’s assumptions would have led to the view that the 
likelihood of the programme being effective would be diminished by its complexity 
and large number of actors. However this did not turn out to be the case. Children 
of Solidarity showed that by reassigning responsibilities, and by giving access to 
actors who had a direct incentive in the effective functioning of the programme, the 
chances of a programme success improved in spite of the number of actors 
involved. Even though some of the components of the programme did not go 
according to plan, the general objective of the programme was achieved.
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The experience of Children of Solidarity also showed the extent to which 
the flexibility of a programme may help in obtaining effective implementation. The 
ability of the programme to adjust its procedures to different settings, was possible 
because o f the direct link between the designers of the programme and the 
community, in charge of its “street level” implementation. The evidence presented 
here suggests that state or municipal actors would have had less success. Flexibility 
and mutual adaptation proved to be rather nonbureaucratic and effective elements 
of the programme.
Finally two further elements are worth mentioning. First, the importance of 
considering local politics must not be underestimated. Even if a programme has full 
political support, it is still difficult to overcome the obstacles created by traditional 
political actors. At the community level local politics are rather autonomous from 
national politics and guidelines. Second, the programme also showed the bias of 
federal programmes to idealistic objectives Instead of aiding the poorest children, 
by attracting attention to them the programme divided the community reinforcing 
the gap created between sponsored and non sponsored children and their parents. 
This was reflected in the composition of the Solidarity Committees which gradually 
changed and started to include more parents of sponsored children (Programa 
Nacional de Solidaridad-UNICEF 1994, p. 43).
In sum, the programme offers interesting lessons in public policy 
implementation. In an attempt to improve the probabilities of success of the 
programme, Children of Solidarity gave back responsibilities to the community,
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one of the essential elements not only to improve academic performance but also to 
prevent children leaving school early. The strategy used was relatively simple, that 
is, by offering an economic stimulus to poor families, the programme tried not only 
to redirect the priorities of parents, but also to convince them that it was profitable 
to keep their children in school Solidarity workers hoped that this would increase 
the parents’ attention to their children as a means of keeping the scholarship. These 
attendance objectives were achieved, but in the attempt, Children of Solidarity left 
out the other essential element necessary to improve academic performance and 
prevent early leaving: the teachers Short term success was gained at the cost of 
long term failure because of the exclusion of teachers.
By displacing them, it reinforced, what Martin calls, the corrosion of a 
relation which is fundamental for the success o f any policy in educational terms. 
The situation shifted from one extreme of not considering the role o f the 
community in educational matters, to another, in which the role assigned to the 
community nullified that of the teachers. Future programmes should not only put 
together the political willingness and the economic resources of a programme 
committed to correct the causes of early leaving but also they should try to avoid 
the overwhelming presence of the federation in community matters and to reinforce 
the role of states and municipalities in the framework of a federal structure. 
Although effective, this is not sustainable in the long term. This depends on the 
ability and political willingness of structuring strong institutions to eradicate the 
reproduction of patronage-oriented practices and discretionary decisions Future
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programmes in the sector will have to attend to this in order to create an 
equilibrium among the actors who are directly concerned in educational matters, 
that is not only parents but also teachers. This depends on the teachers’ and 
educational authorities’ ethical and professional willingness to participate. Future 
attempts must direct their efforts at the community and teacher level in co­
operation with states and municipalities This is not an exaggerated demand, 
considering that the other two programmes under analysis seem to point in the 
same direction. The task will take time but programmes such as Children of 
Solidarity represent a good beginning
Chapter 5
The National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises-FONAES: 
The Need for Centralisation and the Limits to Decentralisation
Introduction
The National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises-FONAES started its 
operations on November 14 1991 as one of the productive components of the 
National Solidarity Program-PRONASOL. To some extent, the initiative was 
useful in counteracting the criticism that the Solidarity strategy was demagogic. 
The design and implementation of FONAES represented the government’s attempt 
to offer a productive option by not only providing communities with the minimum 
welfare benefits but also by creating jobs
FONAES was formed with the objective of generating and supporting 
financially viable and socially feasible enterprises which would create jobs for a 
well-defined target population. This included peasants with or without land, 
indigenous groups, as well as urban dwellers living in poverty and therefore, with 
limited access to financial support from commercial banks. FONAES operated 
according to the same principles as the other Solidarity programmes: respect for 
the wishes of individuals and communities; full and effective participation and 
organisation; joint responsibility, and clarity and efficiency in handling the 
resources. In spite of this, the programme differed from the remaining sub- 
programmes of PRONASOL in very important ways.
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First, the target population and the context in which the programme 
operated imposed serious limitations on implementation. FONAES worked with 
social groups in a sector characterised by low productivity; primarily oriented to 
self-sufficiency; with limited access to credit from commercial banks, and with a 
history of failure to refund government credits. These groups carried out their 
activities in an economic sector neither fully commercial nor social. Instead, they 
were located in a “soft commercial sector”, where operating mode and the 
rationale differs substantially from those of the private sector and from the sector 
which has largely depended on public subsidies and self-sufficiency. It is argued 
here that the most important obstacle to the success of the programme, was that 
the sector which has relied on public support and which the government now 
wished to become market oriented had neither the technical, managerial nor the 
cultural elements to achieve this change
Second, FONAES had a strongly centralised structure. This was partly 
because of the difficulty of finding an intermediate layer between a fully 
commercial sector and a fully social one, and partly because of the risks involved in 
decentralising the programme to the states The implementation of FONAES 
offered a good example of a policy sector in which centralisation was necessary to 
cope in a context prone to politically motivated meddling FONAES officials 
considered that the decentralisation of the programme to the states, would have 
introduced more risks than guarantees for successful implementation. It is argued
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here that an indispensable reference to political, economic and even cultural 
conditions is essential in deciding between the centralisation or decentralisation of 
a policy.
Third, FONAES experienced interbureaucratic tension because of the 
unfounded expectations which many government agencies and actors had 
regarding the programme. The tight control under which FONAES worked, 
created in practice problems of political dissatisfaction and bureaucratic tension 
between the programme and state agencies, mainly because the latter made 
political demands to which FONAES could not agree There were a few but 
significant cases, however, where the centralised manner of operating programme 
could not cope with the political demands of the state.
Fourth, FONAES differed from other programmes in the way the 
community was involved in the implementation process. The programme displaced 
community participation by means of centralised control and rigid procedures, 
presumably to secure the programme’s objectives. In practice, centralisation 
caused rigidity and lacked flexibility
We shall also discuss the issue of the number of actors and the success of 
the programme. The implementation of FONAES shows that a limited group of 
actors is not a sufficient condition for successful programme implementation. The 
lack of effectiveness was not related to conflicting points of view nor to the 
existence of many clearance points Instead, the programme’s effectiveness was
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diminished by firstly, the centralised administration of the programme which did 
not allow flexibility for adaptation to changing circumstances And secondly, there 
was difficulty in matching the rigid structure and procedures of the programme to 
both the target population and the context in which it had to work.
Finally, it is argued that the analytical framework which the programme 
was based and the political distortions to which it was exposed affected its 
implementation and limited its possibilities of success. The chapter is structured as 
follows. After describing the context of the programme, the structure of the 
programme is discussed, followed by an analysis of its implementation. Finally, the 
effectiveness of the programme will be discussed and some conclusions will be 
drawn.
The Economic and Political Context of FONAES
THE TARGET POPULATION OF THE PROGRAMME
Its target population was engaged in diverse economic activities: peasants with or 
without land; forestry producers, fishery and aquaculture co-operatives of different 
economic potential; small scale mining groups; coffee growers and urban and rural 
groups and individuals who were likely to develop sound economic projects. 
Despite the wide range of economic activities they performed, all of them had 
several things in common: little market power; a reduced potential for the creation 
of jobs; weak potential for profitability and low returns and limited current capital 
for day to day commercial operations. Generally they are located in isolated areas
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and depend in turn on merchant middlemen who usually keep much of the profits. 
In addition, their production sometimes depends on climatic conditions or is limited 
to particular seasons of the year.
Because o f all these conditions, they are categorised as risky financial 
operations for almost any commercial institution and as a result, their access to 
conventional programmes of economic support and commercial loans is restricted. 
Moreover, many have been denied further bank loans because of their inability to 
repay earlier loans
While FONAES dedicated some resources to industrial and service 
activities, because of the risks associated with agricultural activities these received 
most help and also the political aim of FONAES was to respond to the end of the 
long established land distribution policy, an important pillar in Mexican politics.
In sum, FONAES aimed to deal with a group whose economic and 
productive characteristics did not fit fully either in the commercial private sector or 
in the public one, and who are not prepared, economically and technically, to 
compete with fully commercial logic. However, according to FONAES’ aims it 
was no longer possible (nor politically desirable) to support them using the 
mechanisms o f the past The “soft commercial sector” in which they have 
developed their activities, has produced a twofold situation. On the one hand, it 
has prevented the people from acquiring the economic and technical abilities 
required to compete in the market, and to qualify for commercial economic
National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises-FONAES 220
schemes o f  support. On the other, what started as a political commitment with less 
favoured groups, only resulted in dependence on governmental institutions that 
created and reproduced patronage, and corruption.
The programme was committed to support almost any economic venture 
with a potential for profitability and for the creation of jobs, but which faced 
difficulties in applying for traditional commercial or governmental support. 
FONAES would help a wide variety of social groups and individuals in urban and 
rural areas collectively known as micro-enterprises. They are small woodwork 
shops, saw mills, flour mills and tortilla factories, cement block factories and 
brickyards, commercialisation firms (mainly of fisheries, fruits and vegetables or 
honey), community staple stores and handicrafts. As long as the eligibility criteria 
were met, FONAES could support a wide range of economic ventures It was in 
this sector that the programme was distinguishable from similar programmes of the 
past. FONAES could finance economic projects presented by collectivities or co­
operatives and individuals. It reflected the neo-liberal stamp of the Salinas 
administration If ejidatarios had constituted the main target group of the 
programme, emphasising collective action against that of individuals, the same 
causes o f  failure might have emerged. But field work showed that particularly in 
urban areas, individual enterprise was supported.
In general, FONAES was created to meet the demands of peasants and 
farmers affected by the process of modernisation in the agricultural sector and
1hence agriculture absorbed most o f its efforts. The end of the land distribution 
process and the constitutional amendments to the ejido system, marked the 
transition to a new model in which peasants, who had grown up under the 
protection of the government, would now have limited alternatives' As Nelson 
(1989, p. 109) notes programmes for the poor are less costly than land reform 
policies which imply a major cost in both political and institutional terms
THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN MEXICO
Understanding the characteristics of these groups will show why FONAES insisted 
on economic viability before offering support. After the Mexican Revolution and 
during the consolidation of the political system, there were three types of 
agricultural producers. The peasant sector was made up of landless wage labourers 
(jornaleros), beneficiaries of land reform (ejidatarios) and owners of very small 
properties (minifundistas) or “middle peasants”. The new economic and political 
model followed by Salinas, aimed to link middle farmers whose operations could 
become commercially viable with domestic and international agribusiness that can 
provide them with finance, technology, and marketing opportunities. For the 
subsistence farmers, ejidatarios and jornaleros, the government had to create 
alternative programmes, such as PRONASOL, aimed to support small-scale 
peasant agriculture (Cornelius 1991, pp 85 and 86). 1
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1 In te rv iew  w ith  Lie. B e rn a l M iran d a , G ., G en era l D irec to r o f  P lan n in g  a n d  T e c h n ic a l A ssistance  
o f  F O N A E S , Ju ly  26 , 1994 (F O N A E S  C e n tra l O ffice, M ex ico  D .F.).
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When the Salinas administration took office (1988-1994), the government's 
policies changed significantly from those of previous administrations in relation to: 
decentralisation; deregulation; tax reform; privatisation and an opening up of the 
economy. For Gates (1993, p. 51), Salinas’ response to the crisis of the agricultural 
sector started by purging the corrupt agricultural development agencies, namely 
BANRURAL, which became a normal banking institution after two decades of a 
paternalistic attitudes in relation to deficits in production. Under the new scheme, 
BANRURAL would only grant credit for crops, and to regions, and producers that 
were likely to show an adequate return on investment, leaving many peasants 
without the support on which they had relied for a long time. The main 
components of the Salinas administration in the sector, were to open the sector to 
the market as well as to create productive oriented support programs for marginal 
producers which would allow them to move away from the traditional 
‘administration of poverty’ (Gates 1993, p. 52).
Salinas’ objective was to develop the productive side o f the sector by 
creating a “business ethos”. Despite the emphasis on productivity, profitability, and 
recapitalization, Salinas’ approach also stressed the responsibility o f producers in 
the process.
This is the framework in which FONAES operated The creation of the 
programme had two main objectives. The first, formal and economic, was to 
provide its target population with alternative resources from the conventional
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development banking institutions which were likely to create permanent jobs as 
well as to discourage migration from the countryside to the urban centres. The 
second, informal and political, was to compensate for the end of the agrarian 
reform which resulted from the amendment of Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution. Because the policy of land distribution had been terminated, it was 
necessary to create associative legal frameworks to generate jobs for those groups 
who traditionally demanded land
The National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises-FONAES
On December 4, 1991 the National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises- 
FONAES became the productive component of PRONASOL, to augment the 
provision of the welfare benefits by promoting the creation o f small enterprises 
with a well-defined target population. The purpose was to generate the jobs that 
the welfare component of PRONASOL had not created.
The promotion o f economic activities supported by FONAES were subject 
to two main conditions: all proposals had to be financially sound, and socially 
feasible. That is, any proposal must show potential for profitability but at the same 
time, it must represent a worthwhile alternative for the community in terms of the 
generation of jobs or other social benefits. In practice, however, some projects 
could be supported even if they were not economically viable.
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OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAMME
The programme was structured around the following objectives. Firstly, to 
encourage productive projects among social groups living in conditions o f poverty 
so as to reinforce their economic autonomy through the allocation of temporary 
risk capital or financing them via the creation of guarantee funds to allow them 
access to soft line credits. The former, is a direct contribution from the programme 
to a chosen project wherein the risk of the economic venture is fully shared with 
the social group. By means of this partnership, the programme ensured that such 
funds were used in an efficient and productive way; if this requirement could not be 
satisfied, FONAES had the right to terminate the ‘partnership’(SEDESOL- 
Empresas de Solidaridad 1993).
A second objective of FONAES was the diversification o f economic 
activities based on location and productive potential within the regions and areas of 
priority. In this respect, it represented an important departure from traditional 
practice in which a bureaucratic agency decided the kind of crop, cultivation area, 
price, and market, on behalf of producers
The programme was also committed to increasing the production and 
productivity of economic units through capitalisation, technological innovation and 
the optimum utilisation of resources. This was perhaps one of the most ambitious 
goals of the programme because of the generalised lack of managerial abilities and 
expertise both in the countryside and urban areas
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FONAES also aimed to encourage the integration of economic units into 
productive chains at the municipal, regional and national levels in order to give 
greater emphasis to production and to improve its terms of exchange with other 
sectors. The productive ethos of the programme aimed to encourage an aggregated 
economic effect by supporting micro-productive units around the country which 
would give security and welfare improvements to low income social groups. 
Finally, to support these objectives the programme provided resources for training 
and technical assistance.
STRUCTURE OF THE PROGRAMME
The programme acted as a deconcentrated unit within SEDESOL which dealt 
directly with applicants at the local level via its branches in each state. FONAES is 
internally organised in several departments according to the nature of the projects, 
such as, agricultural and agro-business enterprises, mining, distributing projects, 
fishing and aquaculture, micro-enterprises, and the department in charge of the 
creation of state and regional funds to grant producers credit. Approval of projects 
was taken at the federal level and many basic functions, such as, evaluation, follow 
up, development, and training programmes, was carried in central offices with the 
help of state branches. Unlike other programmes of Solidarity, such as Children of 
Solidarity or FOMUN, where evaluation, control and management of the 
programme was a community responsibility, in FONAES these responsibilities 
were supervised centrally.
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Figure 1.
THE NATIONAL FUND IN SUPPORT OF SOLIDARITY ENTERPRISES (FONAES) 
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
At the local level, the state branch of federal FONAES had to promote and 
develop investment projects brought forward by the community; it had to deal with 
the initial application for support, and give advice to the groups working with the 
programme. Formally, the state branches of FONAES were under the supervision 
of the state branch of federal SEDESOL to avoid bureaucratic duplication. In 
practice, however, the state branch of FONAES worked independently from the 
state branch of federal SEDESOL and it reported directly to the federal 
headquarters of FONAES in Mexico City. Consequently, interbureaucratic
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collaboration and co-ordination2 between them was poor and sometimes, conflict 
occurred. Furthermore, during the field research, the different perspectives of the 
state branch of federal SEDESOL and the state branch of federal FONAES, 
became apparent.
FONAES, like the Regional Funds of Solidarity-FO/?£S0Z, (see Fox 
1994), a programme primarily managed by the National Indigenous Institute-INI, 
kept relative autonomy even though it was in line with federal SEDESOL. This 
lack of integration of FONAES presented administrative problems The state 
branch of federal SEDESOL sometimes proposed initiatives more politically 
oriented than following the rules FONAES would allow3 Similarly, the relative 
autonomy of the FORESOL programme from SEDESOL, enabled it to keep its 
funds from a potentially political use at the state level Therefore both were rather 
loosely co-ordinated at state level and both reflected a conflict of purpose between 
the state and local level actors and the FONAES and FORESOL objectives. This 
helps to explain the interorganisational lack of co-ordination
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
The programme aims to support those groups which meet the following criteria:
2 Co-ordination and collaboration refer in this context to the activities of all the agencies involved 
in the implementation process which arc necessary for a successful implementation. It docs not 
refer only to bureaucratic collaboration in a vertical axis, but across the spectrum of federal, state 
and municipal agencies.
interview with Antropblogo Salinas, A., Representative of the State Branch of Federal FONAES 
in Campeche, October 10, 1994 (Campeche, Campeche)
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•  Those groups in conditions of poverty, willing to associate with FONAES, and 
whose objectives are coincident with the programme
• The investment proposal, had to be presented to the programme, either 
designed by themselves or with the assistance of independent professionals.
•  Groups had to contribute some resources or cash and had to possess the 
knowledge and experience needed in the particular area of investment.
•  They had to have a healthy financial position and must not be in debt to other 
banks.
• Projects had to be technically, socially and financially feasible, and likely to 
generate jobs in the short to medium term, thereby encouraging social groups to 
settle permanently in their community.
• Each proposal must have had an adequate supply of raw materials, the 
necessary infrastructure and a potential market for its products or services.
• The operation of the project had to include appropriate processes and 
techniques to sustain ecological equilibrium in the community or region.
GENERAL RULES FOR OPERATION
One of the interesting elements of the programme is that cost-effectiveness was not 
applied to the projects. Once the projects were granted funds, the officials of the 
programme monitored the activities of the groups with monthly visits when 
accountancy evaluations, sales reports, expenses analyses and general problems of 
operation were discussed. If the business was working relatively well and no 
misuse of funds was detected, the partnership continued. Otherwise, the contract 
could be terminated and officials could take legal proceedings to recover funds. 
According to SEDESOL the ‘initial contribution was not given as a loss or a
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donation, but the state keeps control which allows it to guarantee that the 
objectives of the investment are achieved. If the goal for which the investment was 
made is not achieved, the Fund will bring its participation to an end and try to cut 
its losses.’ (SEDESOL-Co-Ordination of the National Solidarity Programme 
1993a, p. 131).
In financial terms, the resources were allocated in the form of risk capital, 
or through the creation of guarantor and financing funds.
Risk capital funding scheme
The first option was used when the Fund provided direct contributions to the 
group. FONAES acted as a partner and shared fully the risks of the project. The 
contributions were granted in favour of social groups which had already been 
legally constituted The rationale behind this was that such groups were likely to 
have some experience of economic affairs. FONAES did not insist on the creation 
of a new legal form, but instead aimed to respect the existing legal structure of the 
group. In practice, however, many groups viewed the programme as a means to 
obtain funds that, otherwise, could not have been obtained. Consequently, many 
“enterprises” and associations were created impulsively with no previous 
organisational or economic experience. The partnerships established with 
FONAES did not give the programme any prerogative over the constitutive capital 
of the group or its infrastructure, and therefore, the members of these social groups 
were the proprietors of the Solidarity business.
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Before a legal association could take place, the programme organised a 
meeting with members o f  the group so as to make clear the objectives, structure, 
rules, the amount of money granted by the programme, and other related 
considerations. Once the group knew about the terms of the partnership, this was 
legally constituted in the form of what the programme called a “partnership with 
limited participation” before funds were made available. According to SEDESOL, 
this new legal instrument was a way of supporting the social sector as a minority 
shareholder, without converting these companies into state owned businesses 
(SEDESOL-Co-Ordination of the National Solidarity Programme 1993a, p 131). 
As the programme catered for groups possessing widely varying productive 
experience, productivity and abilities, FONAES strived to remain flexible in the 
structure of the partnerships so as to allow for all possible legal configurations.
Under this scheme the programme financed up to 35 percent of the total 
cost of the project. This comprised FONAES support as well as the group’s 
contribution in cash, machinery and equipment, buildings, land with or without 
commercial facilities, animals, labour, raw materials, or transportation and 
equipment. The value o f all these things was determined by a commercial valuation 
or through a value certificate carried out by personnel of FONAES. FONAES 
could grant up to 35 percent of the project’s total cost. Under no circumstances 
was FONAES to pay previous liabilities If the contributions made by the group 
and FONAES were not enough to cover the total amount of the project, the
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programme sometimes allowed resources from commercial banks and other 
programmes of Solidarity, such as Regional Funds o f Solidarity-YOKESOL or 
Solidarity Funds fo r  Production-^OSOPRO to be taken into consideration, even 
though they might be provided under a different economic rationale.
Because the partnership was based on sharing the risks of the venture, 
FONAES was entitled to a maximum of 35 percent of any profit. When a project 
was successful, profit sharing could take place during or after the first year of 
operations, depending on the financial situation of the enterprise. Should the group 
decide not to give FONAES any profits during the first year, this portion of those 
profits had to be reinvested in the company. The group could also decide to repay 
part or all of the FONAES investment. When this occurred such funds were re­
directed to new projects or used to constitute what the programme called 
Technical Assistance Funds. This was an important element for the success of the 
programme because technical assistance and training are significant components 
for the success of small and medium enterprises. But because community 
repayment was highly unlikely the programme had to confront serious risks in this 
respect. ‘For our partners, there are no current incentives to pay back; really the 
only incentive for them to pay is their honesty and a tradition amongst the poor of 
doing so. Even more, in cultural terms, our members consider themselves silly if 
they pay. There are neither the legal constraints nor the incentives to pay-back the
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money they receive from us. We are currently working towards the definition of 
such incentives, because they do not exist at present.’4
In any case the repayment had to be made by the end of the fourth year. If 
the group decided to change the objectives o f the project, repayment had to be 
made immediately. The programme also allowed for repayment of funds by 
instalments, provided that the final amount repaid equals the original capital 
granted by FONAES.
Guarantor funds scheme
The second scheme with which FONAES supported the creation of enterprises was 
by arranging guarantor funds {fondos de garantía o inversión) with development 
banking institutions such as Nacional Financiera-NAFIN or the Rural Credit Bank 
{Banco Nacional de Crédito /fr/ra/-BANRURAL), for projects that could not 
normally obtain loans from commercial banks. Trust funds were set up with both 
the resources of rural or urban producers organisations, and with funds from state 
governments, FONAES and other Solidarity contributors. These contributions 
were the initial patrimony of the trust fund, which NAFIN or BANRURAL then 
used to open a line of credit for as much as ten times the initial capital. From this 
line of credit came the resources to finance viable projects. Within this financial 
framework, organisations could be the recipients of the trust and a large number of
in te r v ie w  w ith  L ie . B erna l M iran d a , G ., G eneral D ire c to r  o f  P la n n in g  a n d  T ech n ica l A ssistance  
o f  F O N A E S , Ju ly  26 , 1994 (F O N A E S  C en tra l O ffice , M e x ico  D .F.).
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producers could benefit. A Technical Committee was the governing authority and 
included a representative of FONAES, members of the trusteeships and 
representatives of the financial institutions, usually, NAFIN and BANRURAL. 
FONAES could withdraw its contribution if any misappropriation occurred.
OPERATING PROCEDURES
In theory, the process started when a group submitted an idea to the programme 
for financial support During the first meeting with the interested group, FONAES 
provided general guidelines and required as much information as possible in order 
to consider the project further. If the project showed promise both in financial and 
social terms, the group was asked to prepare a formal investment project, assisted 
by professional boards selected by FONAES. Once the project was ready, 
personnel of the state branch of the programme made field visits to corroborate the 
information given by the group. If everything was correct, the state branch 
prepared a preliminary evaluation of the programme and verified whether necessary 
social and financial criteria were met. The report had to include a financial viability 
study detailing marketing procedures, the potential market, expected profits and 
the time required for the project to mature. The proposal was then sent to Mexico 
City for final approval.
Once the project was evaluated at the headquarters of FONAES in Mexico 
City, they submitted their verdict notifying the interested group of the conditions of 
the partnership. When the group agreed both parties signed a contract establishing
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dates for repayment and the way the profits would be divided. The allocation of 
FONAES funds took place through a direct deposit in a bank account in one or 
several instalments, depending on the financial needs of the project. If further funds 
were required they were considered as a new application and followed the same 
procedure as a new project. Finally, the control and follow up of the new 
enterprise was not carried out by members of the group but by officials of the 
programme as part of their responsibilities as a partner Monthly meetings were 
organised between the group and FONAES to audit the financial situation of the 
business, to verify goals and projections, to solve managerial problems, and to 
check that the firm was working in accordance with the guidelines and procedures 
agreed in the contract. In each state branch of FONAES, the Director of 
Managerial Development was the person responsible for this area of the 
programme, and s/he had full authority as a partner of the enterprise. The whole 
procedure took from one to six months. However as described later, the process 
was much more complex and slower when the political context is taken into 
consideration.
CAJAS SOU DARI AS (CS)
Another means by which the community participated in the FONAES programme 
was by constituting the so-called Cajas Solidarias These peasant co-operative 
banks were one of the most important elements of FONAES. Because the
National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises-FONAES 235
programme only provided up to 35 percent of the total cost of the project, the rest 
had to be found from the group’s contributions or from other sources
The Cajas Solidarias were created as a peasant credit and savings 
institutions to meet the particular characteristics of these groups A peasant 
banking system was formed, managed by the peasants themselves. This encouraged 
rural savings, and increased the financial resources available for this sector. Funds 
were made up of the returns made by those groups who received economic support 
from the Regional Funds of Solidarity (FORESOL)5, Production Solidarity Funds 
(FOSOPRO) 6 and FONAES
The interest rates, both for saving and credit were fixed according to the 
cost of money, and in relation to the rates offered by commercial banks. But the 
main difference was that they represented an accessible source of credit If credits 
were used for the acquisition of raw materials for production, machinery and 
equipment, the interest rates were equivalent to the cost of the money so as to 
encourage productive activities in the sector. But if credits were used for other 
purposes, six percent was added to the cost of the money and the loans had to be *
*Thcsc fu n d s a re  p a r t  o f  th e  so lidarity  s tra tegy  for th e  d ev e lo p m e n t o f  in d ig en o u s p eop les . T he 
p ro g ram m e is a im ed  to  'co u n te rac t th e  econom ic b ack w a rd n ess  w h ic h  is  p rev a len t a m o n g  e th n ic  
g ro u p s ' (S E D E S O L -C o -O rd in a tio n  o f  the  N ationa l S o lid a rity  P ro g ram m e  1993a, p. 173).
*T his fund  w as c rea ted  to  support th e  ac tiv ities  o f  a g r ic u ltu ra l p ro d u ce rs  th a t, because  o f  th e  size 
o f  th e ir  p ro p erty  o r  b ecau se  they a re  in  n o n -irrig a ted  a re a s  a n d  p ro n e  to  n a tu ra l d isa s te r , ach ieve 
a  low  y ield  a n d  in  m an y  cases they a re  se lf-consum ption  o r ie n te d . B ecause  o f  th is, m an y  o f  these 
g roups c red it is  h ig h ly  lim ited , an d  w h en  it is g ran ted , it r e p re se n ts  m o re  a  heavy b u rd e n  th a n  a 
so lu tion  to  th e ir  p ro b lem s. T h e  p ro g ram m e is a im ed  to  ‘a s s is t  p e a sa n ts  exc lu d ed  fro m  coverage 
by B A N R U R A L , ap p ro x im a te ly  2 6 9 ,0 0 0  p roducers w ith  1.2 m illio n  h e c ta re s .’ (S E D E S O L -C o - 
O rd i nation  o f  th e  N a tio n a l S o lidarity  P rog ram m e 1993a, p. 149).
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approved by the partners of the Cajas Solidaria. In short, the basic idea was to 
make sure that the funds granted by FONAES or the other programmes of the 
productive component of Solidarity remained in the community.
As with the programme, the Cajas Solidarias were in a middle layer 
between fully commercial activities and fully public ones. The Cajas Solidarias 
were both agencies which aimed to distribute public funds to the agricultural sector 
and, at the same time, they represented the beginning o f a peasant savings bank. 
However, their success depended on the willingness o f the groups to repay the 
funds which they were granted in the first place Unfortunately, as Gates (1993, p. 
48) notes an ‘ethos of institutionalised failure’ prevails in the sector and repayment 
is highly unlikely. Paternalistic and patronage oriented programmes of the past 
reinforced the idea that government loans were merely a donation or that they were 
tied to political support. It became clear during the field work, that peasants 
choose not to repay because, for them, once that money gets back into the 
government coffers it is lost money. ‘I prefer to pay-back the money if it remains 
here in the community. If I pay-back, the money will enter into the bureaucracy 
and they will keep the money. I prefer not to pay-back then.’7 The participatory 
element o f  FONAES depended then, on the programme’s ability to eradicate such 
an attitude towards government support. In a way, the more FONAES moved 
away from a pure agency for the distribution of funds towards the establishment of
i n te r v ie w  w ith  a  re c ip ien t o f  F O N A E S  support, O ctober 2 8 , 1994 (Ju n ta  M un ic ip a l de 
C a n d e la ria , M u n ic ip a lity  o f  Isla  del C d rm en , C am peche).
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a peasants’ savings bank, the more real the participatory element became and the 
more successful the programme was. However, at the time of the field work, the 
results were uncertain. While in some localities paying back was occurring in 
others the results were very poor. For example, in the locality of Nuevo Michoacân 
in the state of Campeche, there was a 100 percent recovery of funds, while in the 
Atasta Peninsula non had been recovered.8
Analysis of Implementation of the Programme
ACTORS AND  PERSPECTIVES
One of the most significant elements of FONAES was the reduced number of 
actors involved in its implementation. Formally, the participants were the 
representatives from the Federal headquarters of the programme in Mexico City, 
its state branches in the states, professional boards of consultants to prepare the 
studies of financial viability, the target population and state authorities. Table 5 
summarises the main actors and perspectives of the programme.
______________ Table 5. Participants and Perspectives of FONAES_________________
Participant Connection with Perspective and Major Sense o f Urgency
_____Programme___________ Objectives___________________
D esign o f  program me in T o support target group o f  Very High,
accordance with Presidential producers who do not qualify for
M andate. commercial credits and who
could create enterprises for the 
generation o f  jobs.
Federal Co-ordination N ational implementation o f  the The programme aim s to  Very High (but 
o f  the Programme. program m e and to choose accomplish two major mediated by rigid and
projects to be funded. objectives: to  become the strict procedures).
productive component o f  the 
National Strategy o f  Solidarity
Federal Department o f  
Social Development 
(SEDESOL)
8 In terv iew  w ith  p e rso n  in  ch a rg e  o f  th e  C a ja  S o lidaria . O c to b er 28 , 1994 (Ju n ta  M u n ic ip a l de 
C an d elaria , M u n ic ip a lity  o f  Isla del C d rm en , C am peche).
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Participant Connection with 
Programme
Perspective and Major 
Objectives
Sense o f Urgency
and; to  provide a political 
solution to  the problem created 
by ending o f  land redistribution.
State Delegation o f  the 
Programme.
Prim ary contact with the target 
groups; serves as a  provider o f  
information about projects and 
groups and executes important 
activities for the approval o f  
funds.
The programme supports 
economic activities o f  a  target 
population but works under 
strict and rigid procedures. 
Therefore, it puts particular 
emphasis on the procedures o f 
the programme and acts as a 
filter for the selection o f  projects.
H ig h  (however, no 
decision  will be made 
u n less  all the necessary 
inform ation  is available 
and  verified, something 
th a t tak es  much time).
Professional boards. T o prepare a formal investment 
project on behalf o f  a particular 
group
They regard the programme as a 
source o f  income. Therefore, 
their priority is to produce as 
many projects as possible.
V ery  H igh (not because 
o f  a n y  commitment to 
the  group they are 
w o rk in g  for or to the 
program m e, but 
becau se  there is a 
ch an ce  to  m ake 
m oney).
Target groups. T o propose a viable economic 
project for funding.
To obtain economic resources 
for an economic activity.
High.
Governor o f  the State. D e  fa c t o  actor who m ay decide 
what groups to support.
The programme may be helpful 
in solving economic and political 
problems in the state.
H ig h  to  very high 
accord ing  to the group 
to  b e  supported.
The first actor, the Federal Department of Social Development-SEDESOL,
was in charge of the design of the programme and its participation was limited to 
this phase. The second actor, the Federal Co-ordination of the Programme, was in 
charge of the whole operation at the national level. Its responsibilities included the 
approval of projects and their follow up. The third actor, the state branches of the 
programme, had direct contact with the target population Its responsibilities 
included the promotion of the programme at the state level and among the target 
population. It also provided information to groups looking for support and in 
general, operated as a bridge between the community and the headquarters in 
Mexico City. The sense of urgency of these three actors was high, but by keeping a 
tight control of the procedures for the approval of the projects, they produced 
many delays.
IThe fourth actor was the group of professional boards which prepared the 
studies of the financial viability of each project. Their perspective was rather 
“pragmatic” because it merely represented a potential source of income. These 
boards were selected and officially enlisted by FONAES to ensure their 
proficiency. However, in Campeche and around the country, such boards were few 
and did not have experience of the wide variety of economic activities that the 
programme embraced. Many boards were rapidly created when the programme 
was introduced. Their sense of urgency was high because their income depended 
on the number of projects they prepared. FONAES covered the costs, even if the 
project was subsequently rejected The creation of these boards lent itself to 
criticism because many of them saw the programme as an opportunity to make 
money. ‘These things did not exist before because they were not necessary. The 
money was given in a discretionary way, so studies such as these [financial 
viability] were irrelevant. Here in Campeche, one of those boards was created to 
prepare all the studies that FONAES required.’9
For the majority o f the target groups the programme represented an 
opportunity to obtain economic resources that were not available from traditional 
banking institutions. Whether the group genuinely wanted to develop an economic 
activity or just perceived the programme as a cheap source of economic resources,
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’ in te rv iew  w ith  Lie. E sq u iv e l C am pos, A ., D irec to r  o f  Social O rg a n isa tio n  in  th e  S ta te  
D ep artm en t o f  Social D ev e lo p m en t, S eptem ber 26 , 1994 (C am peche , C am peche).
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they considered the funds as a free donation from the federal government. Their 
sense or urgency therefore, was always high.
Finally, political authorities at the state level, in particular the State 
Governor, were one of the most important actors of the programme. He had a 
decisive role in the way the programme worked. The Governor could actually 
influence the decision about funding a group. He could even decide to support a 
group whose characteristics did not make it eligible for funding but where political 
considerations were more important. Very frequently, Campeche’s governor used 
the programme to meet community demands and to keep the peace with rival 
political groups Community requests for machinery, financial support, equipment 
or credit were channelled to FONAES, not because other state agencies could not 
respond to these petitions in the traditional way but because the governor tried to 
transform such demands, into an enterprise. However, this was not always 
possible. As soon as a group’s demand was referred to FONAES, the programme 
easily assessed whether it was genuine or resulted from political compromise. ‘The 
problem is that the Governor organises rallies all over the state to supervise public 
works, inaugurate others, but also to keep in touch with the problems of the state. 
But when he does that, suddenly we receive a bunch of petitions from his office 
asking us to deal with the matter because it was a Governor’s compromise. 
Sometimes these petitions are not eligible for support from the programme because 
they only want to receive, but they do not want to offer or even worse, they do not 
want to work. Many groups still want everything for free and the programme is not
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intended to work like that’.10 This would later cause problems between the 
governor and the representative of the state branch of FONAES as sometimes 
political compromises proposed by the governor were not supported by the 
programme, causing conflicts and political dissatisfaction between them. Not 
surprisingly some political actors and agencies at the local level took a dim view o f 
the statutory criteria of the programme
On the whole, the programme involved few participants, compared with 
FOMUN or Children of Solidarity This was not a coincidence but reflected the 
desire of the programme to insulate itself from the influences of federal, state and 
local actors which could have jeopardised the productive rationale on which the 
programme was based. By means of a centralised structure and operation and the 
exclusion of actors, FONAES wanted to secure the achievement of its objectives. 
That is why the programme emphasised a vertical structure and the elimination of 
elements of horizontal co-ordination which usually imply a larger number of 
participating actors.
Despite the reduced number of participants however, the programme was 
characterised by delays and red tape. This was so because of the different 
perspectives between the state branch of FONAES and the federal office of 
FONAES. The norm was that projects which had been already endorsed at the
,0 In te rv iew  w ith  A ntrop61ogo S alinas, A ., R ep resen ta tive  o f  th e  S tate B ran ch  o f  F ed era l 
F O N A E S  in  C am p ech e , O ctober 10, 1994 (C am p ech e , C am peche).
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state level by the state branch of FONAES, were turned down by federal 
FONAES. On average, the process for approval of a project took six months. 
Information was constantly verified so as to make sure that the allocation of funds 
was appropriate. These checks were made both by the state branch of FONAES 
and then by FONAES headquarters in Mexico City. However, these efforts caused 
more delays because of FONAES’s determination that funding should not go to 
inappropriate projects. ‘It is really ridiculous the sort of changes that federal 
FONAES requires to introduce to the projects for their final approval. Then the 
projects are returned to us and then we ask the group to make the proper changes 
which in the end takes a lot of time.’11
Many of the delays in the programme were related to a generalised mistrust 
even between units of the same agency Delays not only resulted from the 
centralised structure of the programme, but also from such mistrust and from the 
need to ensure that financial criteria were met in the approval of projects at each 
stage of the implementation process.
The implementation of FONAES seems to suggest that in terms of policy 
implementation, delays are not necessarily related to the large number of actors and 
perspectives, as Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) suggest In programmes like this, 
delays are much more related to the structure and strategy followed by the 
programme to secure the achievement o f its objectives. If major decisions are *
i t Idem .
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centralised, as happened with FONAES, the delegates play a rather formal role. 
Ideally, the delegates of the programme should be in a position to take these 
decisions because they are in direct contact with the economic and political reality 
of the state, and because they have more and better access to the information 
provided by the applying group. However, FONAES’ designers feared that a 
decentralised programme would represent an irresistible temptation to 
misappropriate funds.
For the FONAES’ representative in the state of Campeche, this situation 
should be changed to improve the performance of the programme As he put it, 
‘the programme should allow us to decide the funding of small projects. We could 
try with small projects first and then if it works, we could eventually approve larger 
ones and thus, decentralise the programme a little more The whole process now is 
bureaucratised and this has to be corrected if social problems are to be avoided.’12 
Many applicants also call for a streamlining of the process for the approval of 
projects. For them, ‘the representative of FONAES in the state is merely a 
messenger between them and central offices. He should take decisions because as 
the system now stands, it is too expensive, both in time and money. For example, 
from 20 proposals we have made, there has been not one single resolution; even 
more, the proyectistas [those who carry out the studies of financial viability] are
l2Idem.
N a t i o n a l  F u n d  i n  S u p p o r t  o f  S o l i d a r i t y  E n t e r p r i s e s - F O N A E S 2 4 4
subsidising the programme with their money, because they appraise the projects 
and have not yet been paid.’13
One of the unexpected results of the different perspectives of the actors 
involved in the programme, was bureaucratic tension and political dissatisfaction. 
When the programme started in Campeche, the State Governor called a cabinet 
meeting in which the representative of FONAES explained the programme’s 
objectives, structure, guidelines and procedures. In this way, it was hoped that 
duplications with similar state programmes would be avoided, while gaining 
collaboration from state departments. Nonetheless, this precaution did not prevent 
many state agencies from conceiving the programme in different ways.
For some departments, such as the State Department of Rural Development 
{Secretaria de Desarrollo Rural-SDR), FONAES merely represented a source of 
economic resources that could be used to satisfy old demands that had not been 
properly addressed. In particular, the burden of work of some state departments, 
such as existed in SDR, had increased, either because of changing policies in the 
sector (privatisation, new rules for the acquisition of credit, etc.,), or because many 
of the promises made by the government had not been fulfilled. SDR is responsible 
for all programmes and actions to promote and support rural development in the 
state and to co-ordinate the distribution of land in the state. But after the *6
^ In te rv ie w  w ith  F ra n c isco  G allegos M endez, A p p lican t to  th e  F O N A E S  p ro g ram m e, D ecem ber
6 , 1994 (E jid o  A lfre d o  V. B onfil, M u n ic ipa lity  o f  C am p ech e , C am peche).
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Constitutional amendment of Article 27 regarding land ownership in the country, 
an increasing number of demands from groups of peasants and ejidatarios were 
channelled to FONAES, not for the provision of land but instead, seeking financial 
support for the creation of enterprises. These groups exerted permanent pressures, 
not only on this agency, but also on the Governor. Furthermore, some of them 
lobbied opposition parties who started to exert political pressure on their behalf 
As a result, many groups of peasants withdrew their political support. In addition, 
increased activity from opposition parties in the state, particularly the Party of the 
Democratic Revolution (PRD), increased the demands of these groups For state 
agencies like SDR, FONAES was yet another programme with unlimited 
resources, which appeared to renew the pact between the state and the peasants 
that had been established after the Revolution. In the end some funds went to 
support projects with limited chances o f  success where the criteria for eligibility 
were ignored and where political considerations prevailed in the funding decision. 
‘On certain occasions, the principles o f the programme are violated (violentado) 
and the result is that the paternalism and clientelism that the programme is trying to 
avoid reappear For example, SDR made a proposal to fund a group of wood 
furniture makers in the locality of lxbacab. The project did not meet the eligibility 
criteria, but because it had the support of the National "Plan de Ayala" Co­
ordinating Committee-CNPA (Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala), central
\offices in Mexico decided to grant funds to the project.’14 The CNPA leads ‘the 
national process o f peasant convergence around struggles for land which had been 
under way since the early 1970s.’ (Moguel 1994, p. 173). The political ascendancy 
of this organisation stems not only from its ability to represent peasants’ claims 
outside the affiliated organisations of the PRI, particularly from the National 
Peasants’ Confederation-CNC (the rural sector of the PRI) but also because it can 
get political support from opposition parties, both at the federal and state level. 
That is why the state government was particularly interested in funding the project 
and in demobilising this peasant organisation.
Another state agency, the State Department of Economic Development 
(Secretaria de Desarrollo Económico-SDE), also believed that the programme was 
doomed to fail because of its unacceptability to the target population. Although 
there was no direct incompatibility with other state commitments, and despite the 
fact that everybody seemed to agree on the need to provide jobs for large groups 
of the population, agencies differed seriously regarding the way this should be 
achieved. For SDE, the programme would not be able to produce permanent jobs 
because its rationale was evidently political and therefore likely to have limited 
economic impact.15
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14Interv iew  w ith  A n tro p b lo g o  S a lin as , A ., R ep resen ta tiv e  o f  th e  S tate B ra n c h  o f  Federal 
FO N A E S in  C a m p e ch e , O ctober 10, 1994  (C am peche , C am peche).
’’ in terv iew  w ith  L ie . S andoval, A ., U n d ersec re ta ry  o f  E co n o m ic  D ev elo p m en t in  th e  S tate o f  
C am peche, O ctober 19, 1994 (C am p ech e , C am peche).
National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises-FONAES 247
Increasingly, these misinterpretations created bureaucratic tension around 
the programme. An example will usefully illustrate the different rationales of 
FONAES and state agencies. The state of Campeche generates almost 70 percent 
of the total national oil production. During the ‘oil boom’ of the 70s in Mexico, the 
industry absorbed a significant number of the labour force and became the base for 
the economic development of Isla del Cármen, the second largest municipality in 
Campeche. Its economy is still based on activities related either to the oil industry 
or fisheries. When international oil prices fell in the 80s, PEMEX {Petróleos 
Mexicanos), the state-owned oil company, had to reduce its production and 
consequently the number of personnel in all areas. Campeche was no exception and 
a large percentage of the labour force found itself without a job and with no skills 
other than those related to the oil industry. Some turned to fishing as an alternative 
and a few, to agricultural activities. However, in recent years the environmental 
effects of oil production have started to appear affecting the amount of fish caught
A group of fishermen on the Isla del Cármen {El Gavilán Pescador) many 
of whom had previously worked in PEMEX and had been affected by the job cuts, 
demanded support to buy more boats and nets. They were told that funds would be 
provided to that end. However, prior to FONAES intervention, the group had been 
in touch with officials of the State Department of Rural Development-SDR, which 
usually deals with problems o f land distribution in the state The fishermen’s 
demands were channelled to FONAES by SDR assuming that funds could be
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provided. But the groups of fishermen hardly complied with the programme’s 
requisites for economic support. Even so FONAES granted funds to the group 
because some of its members had been in touch with opposition groups and with 
the state branch of the Party of the Democratic Revolution-PRD. However, 
predictably the money was used for other purposes; equipment bought as new was 
partially used and internal divisions appeared in the group which stopped working. 
One of the group members explained: ‘This was a mistake from the beginning and 
a bunch of lies. I was never supposed to be part of the group, and now, for official 
purposes, I am one o f the representatives of the group. When the group was asked 
to declare its equipment and infrastructure as part o f our contribution, other 
members of the group invented boats we did not have. Others told me that I should 
not worry about such things, and that I should say such things, because then the 
government would give us money. But now, it has produced nothing but problems. 
Now we have conflicts we did not have in the past. Now, for the government I am 
a liar because when they came to verify the enterprise they discovered that 
everything was a lie’.16
This situation was unfortunately common. SDR and many state agencies 
constantly faced a wide variety of demands The first way of resolving such 
problems was by referring the group’s demands to the most appropriate agency. 
This approach was generally only useful in clarifying the nature of the problem, and
,6 In te rv iew  w ith  Sr. V a len c ia , M em ber o f  th e  C o-operative "E l G a v ilá n  P escador," O c to b er  14, 
1994 (P e n in su la  de  A ta s ta , M unic ipa lity  o f  Isla del C árm en , C a m p e c h e , Cam peche).
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was often an opportunity to shift responsibility to others. During the field work, it 
was common to find that, when the traditional bureaucratic channels had been 
explored and no solution found, then the problem was referred to FONAES, either 
because other agencies perceived it as a “cure all” agency, or because they thought 
that the new money could be used in the same patronage-oriented way as had been 
common in the past ‘SDR thinks that the programme is giving money and that its 
funds can be used for political purposes. When they cannot solve a problem, they 
send it to us They think we have a lot of money to solve everything’ 17 At the end 
of the day, the different perspectives that state agencies had regarding the 
programme produced difficult interagency relationships and an atmosphere of 
bureaucratic tension.
DECISION AND CLEARANCE POINTS
The programme’s decision-making process started when a group submitted an 
investment proposal. Once presented, the state delegation of FONAES evaluated 
the information before deciding whether or not to formulate a more detailed 
proposal to evaluate financial and social viability. This stage was important because 
regardless o f whether the project was finally approved, the financial viability study 
had to be paid for. It was therefore, in the FONAES’ state branch interest to 
reduce the possibilities of failure. Once the project was properly formulated, state
’’ in te rv iew  w ith  A n tro p b lo g o  S a linas. A ., R ep resen ta tiv e  o f  th e  S ta te  B ran ch  o f  Federal 
F O N A E S  in  C a m p e c h e , O c to b er 10, 1994 (C am p ech e . C am peche).
National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises-FONAES 250
branch personnel carried out field visits to verify the accuracy of the information 
provided by the group. During this stage, the state branch o f the programme made 
a preliminary evaluation to determine whether or not the project was suitable for 
funding and if the study of financial viability was to be carried out.
If the project was rejected by the state branch o f FONAES, the proposal 
could still be considered using less formal procedures This depended upon whether 
or not the group presenting the proposal was politically important. This is where 
the governor could reinforce his role as a major decision maker in the process. For 
example, it may be the case that a particular project had a political meaning not 
considered by the state branch of the programme, such as the change in political 
allegiance of the group of fishermen of Isla del Carmen or the wood furniture 
makers. When this was the case, a direct evaluation by the governor and federal 
FONAES officials was made and the programme’s formal criteria were not 
considered. It is clear then that the governor of the state is, under particular 
circumstances, an important clearance point in the programme.
On the contrary, when a proposal was approved locally, the state branch of 
the programme sent the project to Mexico City for final approval, which, under 
“normal” circumstances was the third and most important decision point o f all 
Central offices could propose minor adjustments to the submission and in such 
cases, it was returned to the state for corrections and further consideration. Once 
these corrections were made, the group returned the project to the state branch of
1the programme, which in turn sent it again to Mexico City. When the project was 
granted funds, the group paid the cost of project formulation.
Despite the significant role played by state political authorities, the weight 
of federal officials was overwhelming. According to the representative o f  the state 
branch of the programme, some projects were granted without any intervention, 
either from the governor or the FONAES’ state branch. As he put it, ‘suddenly I 
was informed that a new group had been sponsored and that it should be included 
in the periodical follow-up.’1®
In short, three main decision points existed in the programme: FONAES’ 
state branch, which acted as a filter; the Governor, and the Federal Co-ordination 
of the programme. In this respect, one of the most significant elements in the 
programme was the removal of the community as a decision point in the process. 
Community participation represented a major achievement in other programmes 
such as Children of Solidarity and FOMUN. The significant role that the 
community acquired in those programmes was cancelled in FONAES and replaced 
by rigid and complex technical criteria.
However, officials of the programme argued that its participatory element 
was embedded in the programme’s aim not to create projects but to support those 
which were proposed by the community. According to FONAES19 officials, the
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programme was designed to avoid past practice, when project proposals were 
drawn up by bureaucratic agencies, at the state or federal level, and then presented 
to particular groups for development. Instead, FONAES waited until initiatives 
were referred to it. The objective was twofold: first, to offer a more focused 
solution to a given local social or economic need, and second, to prevented the 
proliferation of “planning units” whose programmes were usually detached from 
local reality or merely reflected a bureaucratic perspective. However well 
intentioned, this objective restricted the programme’s potential because it could not 
promote projects which would have benefited some groups in the state.
For example, one o f the objectives of FONAES was to ‘promote the 
diversification of economic activities based on the productive potential within the 
regions and areas of priority.’ (SEDESOL 1993a, p. 130). However, since nothing 
could be set in motion until a proposal was presented by the community, 
possibilities for the development of economic activities with productive potential, 
financial viability and social feasibility were seriously limited. This was the case for 
a small group of producers o f achiote10. Although it has an important regional and 
national market, it was not promoted or encouraged, because the group never 
requested FONAES’s support. For one Solidarity official at the state level* 21, the 
programme’s strategy was flawed. ‘The programme identifies projects already
10A chiote  is  a  sp ice  used  to  p re p a re  one o f  th e  m ost im p o rtan t d ish e s  in  th e  P en ín su la  de 
Y ucatán .
21In terv iew  w ith  Lie. E squ ive l C a m p o s , A ., D irec to r  o f  S ocial O rg a n isa tio n  in  th e  S tate 
D ep artm en t o f  S ocia l D ev e lo p m en t, S ep tem ber 26 , 1994 (C am p ech e , C am peche).
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working but which require additional resources to enhance their operations. In this 
respect, the programme is limited because it should not be oriented to support 
projects already working, but new projects, by identifying economic opportunities 
where poverty has limited the development of communities. It is in those 
communities that productive projects should be encouraged and developed ’
This exemplifies the limitations of a “bottom-up” model of policy 
implementation and also the lack of flexibility of the programme. In the first case, it 
is clear that in programmes like this, where economic criteria decide policy 
implementation, community proposals may not be the best means of developing 
sound economic projects. SAM and agencies like BANRURAL are good examples 
of this. Backward mapping as a source of policy making then, can also produce 
undesired effects. It is encouraging that FONAES rejected the practice by which 
the identification and promotion of community projects is decided from a desk in 
the central office. But this should not have prevented the programme from 
promoting projects with economic potential, simply because the initiative did not 
originate in the community. In its attempt to differentiate itself from schemes of the 
past, FONAES failed to show sufficient flexibility to adapt to circumstances. ‘It is 
necessary, of course, to encourage the development o f certain economic activities, 
such as the production of honey, which represents the best in terms of support 
from the programme. However, we have not taken the necessary steps to do it, 
because we still believe that FONAES should not instigate community participation 
in this particular respect. Despite this, we believe that we have to find formulae to
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take advantage of such opportunities and to induce community initiative but to 
respect its role in the definition of projects This is a future task for the 
programme ,22
The analysis of decision and clearance points stresses a major issue 
Community participation and decision making proved to be effective in 
programmes such as Children of Solidarity and FOMUN. Although it can be 
argued that the community was not displaced by FONAES because the decision 
regarding the nature of the project was a community prerogative, it is also true that 
the principles of the programme were relaxed according to the situation On the 
one hand, FONAES was rigid in insisting that only projects initiated by the 
community could be considered, thus excluding promising activities such as the 
production of achiote. Conversely, it showed a great deal of flexibility by relaxing 
its procedures and rules to fund groups with no financial viability or that were 
politically motivated The programme displayed an unhappy combination of 
political flexibility and economic passivity.
POLITICAL DISTORTION OF THE PROGRAMME
The risks of political misappropriation of the programme were ever present in 
FONAES. The bureaucratisation of the agricultural sector, its patronage-oriented 
performance and corrupt operations between government agencies and ejidal 2
22In te rv iew  w ith  L ie . B erna l M iran d a . G .. G enera l D irec to r o f  P lan n in g  an d  T ech n ica l A ssis tan c e  
o f  F O N A E S , Ju ly  26 , 1994 (F O N A E S  C e n tra l O ffice. M exico  D .F .).
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authorities, prevented a more decentralised operation of the programme (see Gates 
1993).
But political distortion of the programme also resulted from state agencies 
who regarded the programme as a source of political credit. Eventually, 
bureaucratic tension grew between FONAES and those agencies, because 
FONAES wished to adhere to its mission. The bureaucratic “give-and-take” 
caused delays in the approval o f projects, because any community demand referred 
from other state agencies was considered with suspicion by FONAES.
Nevertheless, in spite of the clarity of FONAES’ aims, it was difficult to 
avoid the temptation of using the programme for political purposes. For example, 
according to the rules, as long as the criteria of the programme were met any legal 
association was encouraged to take advantage of funding from FONAES. This 
would permit the possibility of a mix of resources from other Solidarity 
programmes, or even from the private sector. In one of the counties of Campeche, 
FONAES granted funds to a group that had been invited to participate in an 
existing poultry-breeding enterprise. “Avícola González” is a private and profitable 
enterprise throughout the Yucatán Península Because o f its nature, the group was 
not eligible for FONAES support and therefore, it sought to establish an 
association with a small group of poultry-breeders who satisfied the requirements 
of the programme. The project was formulated by the private firm and a joint 
venture between FONAES, the small group of poultry-breeders and the private
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firm emerged. As part of the partnership, the private firm offered its new partners 
the means of processing chicken excreta that might then be sold to the animal food 
industry. However, when the small group began to sell the material, the private 
group sued them arguing that they had not been informed of the transaction. The 
point is not the legality of the transaction but the political and legal pressures which 
FONAES had to confront because some members of the private group were being 
supported by top politicians of the state Political pressures like this, gave rise to 
the eligibility criteria being disregarded so that a group could merge with a private 
firm whose managerial skills and access to commercial credit made them ineligible 
for FONAES support This distortion of objectives occurred frequently. In this 
case the situation was the opposite of those quoted earlier. Here the project was 
economically viable although not socially within the boundaries of the programme.
The programme was also used as a tool for political demobilisation. 
Following the oil crisis of the 80s the inhabitants of the Peninsula de Atasta 
(settlers from Tabasco state) in Isla del Carmen were without employment. The 
PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) took up their case Formerly Isla del 
Carmen and the whole state of Campeche had been a political paradise for the PRI 
And in response to the demands of the Atastecos the Governor instructed 
Solidarity officials to investigate and resolve the issue. Many Solidarity 
programmes were employed but special emphasis was given to the productive 
component of FONAES. For a year, Solidarity officials held workshops and 
meetings with the Atastecos to listen to their demands and find solutions. During
\that time, FONAES channelled significant resources to the communities. PRD 
leaders were involved in these activities, though some of them did not want to 
participate in the scheme. These were ignored by their constituencies because other 
collaborating groups were working successfully and receiving support from the 
programme After one year, several “enterprises” were formed, even though most 
of them lacked financial viability, social feasibility of the kind desired by the 
programme, and managerial skills Loans were channelled through other Solidarity 
programmes with the result that anti PRI opposition was greatly weakened This 
type of “solution” raised strong criticism of the programme (See Molinar 
Horcasitas 1994; Dresser 1991; Moguel 1994). Harvey (1993, p. 17) notes that the 
Salinas strategy towards independent peasant and urban popular movements rested 
crucially on a policy of negotiation (concerlacion). By creating new areas of 
grassroots participation in several regions, the government isolated the popular 
movements of the PRD and negotiated settlements through the direct intervention 
of the president using PRONASOL. Given the importance of political mobilisation, 
political, rather than economic criteria prevailed in the governor’s decision, a 
distortion that the programme was trying to prevent.
Sometimes proposals did not come from community or organised groups, 
but from state agencies and political actors who were politically motivated The 
programme was used successfully to offer not only a productive alternative to 
those groups but also to weaken the opposition in the Atasta Peninsula This was a 
good example of how the programme showed its two major qualities: first, it
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proved that the method used by Solidarity was effective in involving the 
community in the design and implementation of solutions to its own problems. 
Second, it demonstrated its effectiveness in bringing about political demobilisation 
both by action and by inaction in certain states.23 ‘On certain occasions the 
programme cannot work with a group on the Governor’s request. We have 
problems with some governors because the programme does not distinguish 
between the members of one party or another; there are, for example, certain 
regions dominated by a particular political party with which the Governor would 
like us to work less In the case of Chiapas, for example, although conditions 
existed for the creation of enterprises, we found a lot of resistance and obstacles 
from the state government to working in the state.’24
CENTRALISATION A S A MEANS OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION?
FONAES is one of the most centralised programmes of the whole Solidarity 
strategy. From the point of view of FONAES’ officials, its design was highly 
centralised so as to secure its objectives. There exist economic, institutional and 
political reasons that justify its centralised character
In economic terms, the programme had to verify that funds were properly 
spent and, with this in mind, the programme centralised valuable information
In te rv iew  w ith  A ntropd logo  S a linas, A ., R ep re sen ta tiv e  o f  th e  S tate  B ran ch  o f  F ed era l 
F O N A E S  in  C am p ech e , O ctober 10, 1994 (C am peche . C am peche).
24In terv iew  w ith  L ie . B erna l M iran d a , G .. G enera l D irec to r  o f  P lan n in g  an d  T ech n ica l A ssistan ce  
o f  F O N A E S , Ju ly  26 , 1994 (F O N A E S  C en tra l O ffice , M e x ico  D .F .).
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When an idea seemed to be financially viable and socially feasible, for example, 
FONAES asked the group to formulate a plan which contained detailed 
information on matters such as: the likely market of the project; evidence of 
sufficient raw materials; a description of possible consumers; expected levels of 
production, marketing strategies, and foreseen profits. FONAES received 
independent assistance and sent the group guidelines regarding the manner in 
which such information should be provided However, programme officials offen 
employed “best practice” learned from previously successful applications to 
improve the chances of getting central office approval for later proposals. 
Unfortunately, although this model was used by FONAES’s officials to process 
new investment propositions it was not supplied to the group in charge of the 
formulation of the project. Therefore, when the final proposal was submitted for 
approval, it was frequently returned to the group for alteration resulting in delay. 
After several reformulations, the “proper” version of the project was finished and 
sent to Mexico City for approval. For officials of the programme, a detailed 
analysis of each project, particularly in relation to the financial and social benefits, 
was necessary to guarantee a proper use of funds. The rationale of the programme 
claimed that each project should be treated as an enterprise and a benefactor 
approach should be avoided Thus, each project was expected to return profits, just 
like any other enterprise. So far so good But, if the full details of “best practice” 
had been circulated initially probably one presentation of the project would have 
sufficed and much delay would have been avoided
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The State Director of Managerial Development2* of the programme in 
charge of the reviewing and auditing activities in existing enterprises said that the 
main reason for not providing all the information to facilitate a proper formulation 
of the project, was that if those guidelines were given to the project designers, they 
would alter the information to increase the chances of obtaining funding. 
Therefore, the guidelines continued to be used as means of verifying and 
controlling proper funding.
A second reason for programme centralisation is the lack of institutional 
development. Soon after FONAES was set up, federal officials realised that one of 
the essential components for the success of the programme was the existence of 
independent firms to appraise projects. The requirements for the appraisal of a 
project were technically complex and difficult to achieve considering the lack of 
economic and managerial background of the target population. Besides, at the state 
and local level there were few professionals who were able to elaborate investment 
projects in areas such as agricultural, aquaculture, mining, poultry-breeding. 
According to the General Director of Planning and Technical Assistance of the 
programme at the federal level, this resulted in a major drawback as large regions 
of the country lacked such professionals. Most of them live in cities such as 25
25 In terv iew  w ith  L ie . G o n zález , J. M ., S tate D irec to r  o f  M an ag eria l D evelopm en t o f  F O N A E S, 
O ctober 6 , 1994 (C am peche , C am peche).
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Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, and they knew little of the regions where 
the projects were to be implemented
The related cost of taking a project designer from Mexico City, for 
example, to Oaxaca, Chiapas or Campeche to formulate a project was high As a 
result, a number of consultancy firms were established although the qualifications 
and experience of their personnel was doubtful. Therefore, FONAES had to create 
an official list of reliable specialists to take charge of appraising projects. Firms not 
included in the list, had to pass an exam in order to obtain official recognition, and 
only then could they prepare projects. This lack of institutional development 
persuaded FONAES officials to centralise the programme in order to  control the 
number and quality of project designers
In political terms, centralisation of the programme was necessary in order 
to curb political misappropriation of funds. For the designers of the programme, a 
centralised structure prevented two problems: the political use of the programme 
by state governors and other political actors at the municipal level and the 
economic misappropriation of FONAES’ funds. FONAES officials argued that 
decentralisation would allow state politicians to use the programme to continue the 
traditional pattern of clientelism and patronage politics at the state level. The 
examples already given however indicate that the programme could not prevent 
this: for example in the case of former oil workers in Isla del Carmen, and the 
federal approval of some projects without the intervention of the State or the
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federal Delegation of the programme Centralisation did not avoid the political use 
of the programme, rather it only secured its discretionary use by federal authorities, 
or in some cases, by the governor of the state.
In sum, for FONAES officials, centralisation was a pre-requisite for 
successful implementation, at least during a first phase. Centralisation was not an 
objective in itself, but a means: a necessary pre-condition for programme 
implementation that would later be changed. ‘The conditions for a decentralised 
programme did not exist; the programme had not been able to produce clear rules, 
nor the necessary procedures that would allow all the actors involved at the federal 
and state level, to implement the programme according to its guidelines. This is a 
task for future administrations if the programme is to continue ,26 In other words, 
centralisation of the programme was perceived by federal officials as a means of 
avoiding political intervention, particularly at the level of state governments In 
practice, however, such centralisation did not prevent the political use of the 
programme.
The effects of centralisation on the implementation of the programme were 
visible in different ways. In the first scenario, the programme often supported large 
co-operatives, particularly those involved in shrimp production Credit from 
commercial or developing banking institutions was not difficult to obtain; they had
JSIn terv iew  w ith  L ie . B ernal M ira n d a , G ., G eneral D irec to r o f  P la n n in g  an d  T ech n ica l A ssistance 
o f  F O N A E S , July 2 6 , 1994 (F O N A E S  C entral O ffice , M exico  D .F .).
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a long history in the fishery market, with managerial experience, and with an 
adequate size fleet and infrastructure. In many respects, co-operatives have been 
guided by market principles, and in these cases, the role of the programme was of a 
silent partner whose activities were limited to regular visits to verify economic 
performance and provide help if needed. In this scenario programme centralisation 
could not cope with the political misappropriation of funds. For many businesses in 
the country, particularly co-operatives or cases such as the poultry-breeder 
example given before, the funds of the programme represented a cheap source of 
credit. The impact of the programme in these situations was uncertain because 
these enterprises had been working relatively well in the past. Therefore, it could 
be argued that the programme was simply a source of funds, cheaper than those 
offered by commercial and development banking institutions, and which acted as 
yet another pork-barrel programme These groups had the skills and managerial 
knowledge for a profitable venture If they asked support for the programme, it 
was because FONAES funds were cheap and easy to obtain. Funds, particularly in 
the case of shrimp co-operatives in Campeche, were granted in exchange for the 
political support offered by these groups during Salinas’ political campaign 27 
While, the centralised design of the programme should have prevented this 
situation, in practice, FONAES could not resist such political pressures The 
apparent success of the programme in this scenario was due to their experience in
27 In te rv iew  w ith  A n lro p b lo g o  S a lin as. A .. R ep resen ta tive  o f  the  S tate  B ranch  o f  Federal 
F O N A E S  in  C am p ech e , O c to b er 10, 1994 (C am peche , C am peche).
\their particular area and because they have been working as a profitable enterprise 
for a long time.
Another scenario occurred when FONAES supported those small 
producers, both in rural and urban areas, whose projects were not fully financially 
viable in commercial terms, but nevertheless, had potential for profitability. In this 
case, FONAES intervention was useful in several ways. First, it helped in 
developing an investment idea to create productive units, and by granting funds for 
these projects, it was possible to generate jobs. Second, follow-up activities were 
carried out by FONAES officials on a monthly basis and as a result, opportune 
audits prevented and corrected some economic problems Third, FONAES 
provided these groups with technical assistance in the market they were exploring, 
and organised workshops to increase the managerial skills of these groups. The 
role of FONAES in these enterprises was essential for their development Given 
both the characteristics of FONAES and the nature of the target population, this 
scenario represented successful programme implementation. According to official 
figures, during the two and a half years of operation in the state o f Campeche, the 
programme was able to promote 37 businesses through the “risk capital” funding 
scheme; 70 under the “guarantor funds” scheme where repayment was required 
and 2 where profits were used to create community savings and credit institutions 
or Cajas de Solidaridad which could be used for further funding. According to 
FONAES figures, a total of 2,102 jobs were created that benefited approximately 
2,346 people. The total investment of the programme for the three schemes
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totalled 11,430 million new pesos, roughly US$ 1,588 million (Empresas de 
Solidaridad 1944). At the national level, during three years of operation, up to 
1994, FON AES established 20,000 Solidarity businesses and created 85,000 jobs 
(Salinas de Gortari 1994, p. 65). In this case, FONAES was able to achieve its 
objective because it offered economic support to small businesses where a 
productive potential existed, and where the projects were both financially viable 
and socially feasible. In this scenario, the centralised nature of the programme was 
a useful device, not only to formulate a sound economic project, but also to 
prevent the project’s failure by carrying out vigilance and control activities for as 
long as the partnership existed. It is argued that once the programme recovers the 
funds granted to these groups, their economic future will depend on the managerial 
skills they learnt while working with FONAES To this end, the programme 
assigned specific funds for training and developing managerial skills among the 
supported groups (Fund for Training and Technical Assistance) It is clear then, 
that the weaknesses and limitations of these groups were overcome by constant 
supervision with monthly visits to monitor their functioning as well as to resolve 
problems.
In short, in some cases, particularly in the second scenario, centralisation of 
decisions was a useful tool for programme implementation. However, under certain 
circumstances even centralised control of the programme, could not overcome the 
political misuse of funding It is not possible, however, to conclude that 
decentralisation would have been a better strategy for successful implementation,
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because there was, at the state level, a strong tendency for a discretionary use of 
programme funds.
Without the necessary reference to the context, neither centralisation nor 
decentralisation per se, can guarantee successful implementation. The 
decentralisation of the programme required certain political, economic and 
institutional pre-conditions. In a political context oriented by clientele and 
patrimonial politics, decentralisation of such large resources would have created 
the conditions to reinforce such behaviour. There still existed many worries 
regarding a situation in which many political interests found themselves with “free 
hands” as a result of federal attempts to expand decentralisation in the 
implementation of public policies. Moreover, decentralisation requires institutional 
development, a common agreement about goals and strategies, and most 
importantly, that rules and procedures are respected by all the actors involved in 
the programme implementation. The implementation of this programme seems to 
suggest that, no matter how centralised a programme might be, its success still 
depended on the political collaboration of local actors. Unfortunately, FONAES 
had a structure, guidelines, procedures and objectives which clashed with the 
prevailing political culture in many parts of the country.
In economic terms FONAES demanded from communities conditions 
which were hard to satisfy. This is what Derthick (1972) calls the propensity of 
central government to project idealist goals for its programmes. It was clear that
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many of the groups for whom the programme was intended, lacked the technical, 
administrative and “entrepreneurial culture” necessary for success. The distribution 
of federal funds for the programme in each state, is a good indicator of how well 
the programme’s expectations meet local needs. ‘It is not possible to compare the 
resources assigned to Campeche with those of Oaxaca, because the levels and 
history of community organisation and levels of demand in Oaxaca are more 
significant than in Campeche’ .28
Under these conditions, the only way to generate jobs and bring welfare 
benefits to particular groups of the population, for genuine and not for political 
ends at the state and local level, was by centralising control of the programme. In 
reality, however, the more centralised the programme was, the more alienated it 
became from its target population. The generation of jobs on the desired scale 
remained an idealistic goal, since FONAES was not designed to offer an alternative 
model in terms of economic policy. Even under rigid supervision o f  the 
programme, some projects were a complete failure. For some applicants, FONAES 
represented little more than an extraordinary and cheap source of funds. To some 
extent, FONAES was a programme for groups whose economic demands for 
credit and support could not be met by commercial and development banking 
institutions. Finally, it is clear that when the programme proved to be successful, it 
was not only because the project was financially viable, but also because o f  other
28
Idem .
Vvariables, such as existing managerial and technical skills. In these cases, FONAES 
intervention was limited to the provision of cheap funds as happened with some 
co-operatives in Campeche
In institutional terms, one of the interesting aspects of the programme 
relates to Derthick’s suggestion that a federal initiative must generate local 
collaboration to accomplish its objectives. At the state level, FONAES could not 
promote an appropriate image o f its purposes and structure, nor avoid the political 
dissatisfaction it created among state agencies and other administrative units of the 
Solidarity strategy. Although FONAES started to work under the direct 
supervision of the State Delegation of SEDESOL, it moved to work directly with 
central office. At the state level, only the governor could obtain information about 
the programme. This created a lack of collaboration and institutional co-ordination.
In sum, neither decentralisation nor centralisation per se offers a guarantee 
of successful policy implementation. In a political context, where patronage politics 
is still one of the main influences in the development of public programmes, or in 
which corruption and deviation of funds takes place, a completely decentralised 
programme would erect insuperable hazards to implementation and would result in 
an invitation to prolong this attitude. How centralised or decentralised a 
programme should be, depends to a large extent on the nature of the political 
system in which it is implemented, the nature of the programme and its objectives 
and strategies.
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THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF FONAES
The highly centralised structure of the programme was perhaps the most evident 
response to an underlying and more serious problem. This refers to the difficulty of 
trying to match the programme’s regulations with the characteristics of its target 
population and the economic context in which it operated. It is apparent that the 
programme was trying to intervene in an economic sphere using misleading 
assumptions. The programme was trying to impose a commercial logic to a “soft 
commercial sector” that had never been commercially oriented, but depended on 
the government’s populist and patronage-oriented support
Accepting the existence of this soft commercial sector, the programme had 
to deal with two situations. The first was that good and financially viable projects 
brought forward and financed by FONAES could have been financed by ordinary 
banks. This represented a waste, as private money could have been used instead. 
The second was that more dubious projects were left for FONAES and in order to 
finance them, the programme had to relax its regulations and finance projects, the 
viability of which was neither economically nor socially sound
Whether the programme had to work only with commercially viable 
projects and look for financial support from the commercial sector, or whether it 
should have to support non-viable projects in which its criteria and rules for finance 
had to be eased, is debatable. The latter seemed to be the tendency and, the 
programme had to consider more than merely financial criteria. By requiring
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projects to be financially viable and socially feasible, FONAES introduced the 
possibility of funding only particular groups If it required this and accepted 
projects on a financial basis only, there would have been no need to ask for public 
funds since financially viable projects could apply to private banks. By including 
the notion that some projects could be financed if socially feasible, the programme 
solved the dilemma of groups which did not qualify for financial help from 
commercial institutions. By arguing social needs, projects were financed more for 
political than financial reasons
This dilemma of FONAES arose because it operated neither in a fully 
commercial nor a fully social sector, but somewhere between the two. The result 
was a “soft commercial sector” that might be an illusion. There are many reasons 
why it would have been preferable simply to allocate the resources with social 
purposes in a more straight forward way It would then have been clear that a 
return on, or repayment of funds, was not expected and the programme would only 
have had to ensure that the funds had a social benefit. It would have been simpler 
to base FONAES on social principles rather than on those of profitability and 
enterprise.
However, by accepting that the programme was merely social and that the 
existence of a “soft commercial sector” was an illusion, the government would 
have encountered two problems: it would have reinforced the criticism about the
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populist character of the programme, and it would have reproduced the schemes of 
the past that it was so eagerly trying to replace.
The programme was operated on three levels: a commercial profit-making 
and capitalist practice oriented level; another in which the government supported 
and subsidised projects with no real chance of them becoming fully market- 
oriented; and between these two, a soft commercial level where FONAES officials 
offered special support hoping that profits might result
It seems that the insistence on the transfer of expertise, managerial abilities 
and the encouragement of an entrepreneurial culture, were designed to introduce a 
series of incentives in this soft commercial sector and to turn it into one oriented to 
market principles. Economic imperatives at the national level, such as the free trade 
agreement with Canada and the United States and, the liberalisation of the 
economy, will eventually require many Mexican small producers to develop better 
marketing skills in order to compete in a fully commercial way. Not surprisingly, 
Carlos Rojas29, head of the Federal Department of Social Development- 
SEDESOL, noted that the importance of programmes like this should not be 
minimised. For him, the promotion of this kind of enterprise is essential and he 
suggests that small producers could play an important role in the Mexican 
economy, like the Italian economy which is based on middle and small size
29T e lev ised  in te rv iew  w ith  C a rlo s Rojas. H ead o f  th e  F ed era l D ep artm en t o f  Social D evelopm ent 
(S E D E S O L ) S ep tem ber 5, 1993. In terv iew ed by R o la n d o  C ordcra. N E X O S  p rog ram m e, M exico  
City, C h a n n e l 13.
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businesses. The World Bank has also stressed the importance of developing a small 
industry sector as one of the most significant elements which contribute to a 
country’s economy (Webster 1991, p xiii).
In political terms the programme was also aimed at facilitating the 
transition to a new policy model. ‘The programme not only diminishes the related 
costs of the transition, but also increases its speed.’30 FONAES attempted to assist 
the small business sector o f an economy in transition.
The difficulties of developing the economic middle layer resulted from the 
transition from a highly protected and state-supported economy, to one more open 
to market principles. The difficulties were greater because in the past many large 
and smaller producers grew up under the protection of an overwhelming 
benefactor state, which under present conditions the state cannot sustain. The 
economic modernisation of many countries besides Mexico imposes serious 
challenges in economic and political terms. The programme found it difficult to 
deal with the “middle layer” because it was trying to stimulate, with its principles 
and regulations, a market ethos which did not exist. However, the mere existence 
of the programme reflected the government’s preoccupation with the fact that such 
change is gradual and can not be produced overnight In the North and other 
regions of Mexico where medium and large scale commercial activities have been
30In te rv ie w  w ith  L ie . B e rn a l M iran d a , G ., G en e ra l D irecto r o f  P la n n in g  and  T ech n ica l A ssistance 
o f  F O N A E S , Ju ly  26 , 1994 (F O N A E S  C en tra l O ffice , M exico  D .F .).
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successful, fewer problems may exist in the “middle layer”. But in Campeche, the 
economy has been based largely on agricultural activities carried out under 
subsidised and populist policies. This partially explains why many of the enterprises 
in the state were located in Isla del Carmen and the capital city of the state, where 
a relatively dynamic economy has given social groups the abilities and expertise to 
start an economic venture. Paradoxically, while most of the enterprises supported 
by the programme are situated in the two most economically developed 
municipalities, very few projects are located in the municipalities with the highest 
levels of marginality and poverty. It is true that, on the whole, the ‘success of the 
programme depends on the maturity of each group which is supported.31 But it is 
also true that mature groups are not those which constitute the raison d ’être of the 
programme, nor those which most need it.
In sum, FONAES worked with a rationale that was difficult to match with 
the economic, political and institutional context in which it was implemented. This 
incongruity between the rules and procedures of the programme, and the context, 
was not a design fault. On the contrary, for officials of FONAES, the highly 
centralised design of the programme, the lack of flexibility and the complex 
procedures it established, acted as a guarantee of it accomplishing its objectives. 
Despite this, the programme could not escape from the political imperatives set 
both at the federal and state levels.
31Idem.
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Conclusions
From the foregoing analysis, the first conclusion is that the implementation of 
FONAES showed that delays are more related to the structure and strategy 
adopted by the programme than to the number of actors and their perspectives. It 
is surprising that a reduced number of participants with a similar sense of urgency, 
could not avoid delays and red tape In fact, the so-called relationship between 
cause and effect could not have been more direct. FONAES, as a deconcentrated 
unit inside SEDESOL, aimed to work as a single unit so as to reduce the 
intervening links in the process and also to avoid relationships of dependency with 
other agencies. Despite this, the programme could not reduce the time for the 
approval of projects.
Delays resulted, in addition, from the particular strategy used by FONAES 
to implement the programme. Because FONAES’ officials feared a 
misappropriation of the programme by political interests at the state and local level, 
its design was highly centralised. FONAES assumed that rigid controls and 
constant supervision, would prevent the diversion of resources and the political use 
of the programme In practice, however, the programme’s rigid controls and the 
relative autonomy it enjoyed during the implementation process, merely resulted in 
red tape and bureaucratic tension, not only between the programme and some state 
agencies (SDR and SDE), but also between FONAES and other units of
SEDESOL.
VHowever, centralisation could not have solved the problem of an 
inappropriate causal model. Its attempt to impose an “entrepreneurial ethos” on 
groups who lacked the managerial, technical and economic abilities to manage a 
profitable company militated against its likelihood of success. FONAES could not 
avoid the persistent political demands and pressures which increased its range of 
action, and so, it had to support groups which did not fulfil funding requirements. 
At the end of the day, this corruption of the programme led to failure and criticism. 
‘PRONASOL should design alternative mechanisms to FONAES, not for the 
creation of enterprises, but to generate different types of productive initiatives. 
FONAES was not created to work with a population who live in conditions of 
extreme poverty. This should be a task, for example, for non-governmental 
organisations which could prepare groups and projects, and once they had 
achieved experience and developed technical and managerial abilities, then they 
could send them to us’.32 In short, the structure of FONAES and the groups with 
which it dealt did not match.
Many o f the difficulties of FONAES are related to false assumptions and to 
its attempt to alter a political culture deeply rooted in the economic sector in which 
it applied. It is not the case that the subsidised sector, largely dependent on 
government patronage and support, is incapable of starting a business and learning 
managerial skills. The problem is that because they have been politically protected
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33Idem.
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and subsidised by the government, they are unable to develop the skills needed to 
perform with market logic or according to a “entrepreneurial culture” But at the 
same time, this has resulted in a political culture in which the government’s 
economic support for these groups is exchanged for political support, creating a 
patronage-oriented relationship This partially explains why many of these groups 
still consider government funds as a donation and do not perceive the programme 
as a workable source of income and welfare. For Gates (1993, p. 48) ‘many 
peasants feel that they are entitled to credit and other subsidies, irrespective of the 
harvest outcome, as ejidatarios promised social justice under the 1917 Constitution 
are still awaiting payment in full. As a consequence, an ethos of institutionalised 
failure has developed wherein deficit and debt have become the norm and deceit 
the only reliable economic strategy Such a mentality, once established, is hard to 
alter and obviously militates against the success of future developments ’
For some groups (co-operatives) FONAES’ funds represented a cheap 
source of funding to expand their economic activities. For others, it merely 
represented yet another source of money to be exchanged for political support In 
between, in “the middle layer”, there is indeed a group of producers who are able 
to initiate economic activity and generate productive opportunities for themselves 
and their communities, but who, in the past have seen their opportunities for doing 
so, severely restricted. In this case, the programme has provided them with 
economic support, training and supervision Their success, then, depends on the 
ability of the programme to transfer, what Bullard calls, the ‘know-how, vision and
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self confidence to take charge of their own affairs, manage their own resources and 
participate in the building of institutions’. (Bullard 1995, p 81).
Furthermore, an evaluation of the programme must take into consideration 
the transitional nature of the context in which it works That is, it is obvious that 
the programme deals with groups in which a patronage-oriented culture is still 
deeply rooted, or with groups that are prone to take full advantages o f cheap 
governmental funds. But it is precisely because of the transitional character of its 
context, that it should be much more flexible so as to detect productive 
opportunities that might bring about welfare opportunities for communities. This 
will be possible only if the programme makes its structure and decision-making 
process more flexible, allowing more decentralisation and the ability to react 
favourably to such opportunities
But the decentralisation of programmes like this, requires economic, 
institutional and political conditions, that in turn, are related to the greater 
objectives of the démocratisation of the political system as a whole. The 
bureaucratic procedures of the programme represented the institutional response to 
what the designers of the programme perceived as weak institutional development 
It is, therefore, the nature of the political system that has prevented further 
decentralisation of the programme to the states. Decentralisation is also a problem 
of timing. When institutional weakness changes in the “rules of the game”, and all 
the risks involved in a transition period are present, it may not prove to be the
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proper time to ‘increase discretion at the point of service delivery’ (Elmore 1978). 
As Cornelius suggests, ‘at this delicate and dangerous moment in Mexico’s 
transition to a more competitive political system, a weak presidency could truncate 
démocratisation, leaving large parts o f the country under the control of 1920s-style 
warlords, particularly old-guard PRI state governors’ (1995b).
The likelihood of further decentralisation of federal programmes such as 
FONAES, will depend on the institutional capacity they develop and the 
willingness of local political interests to implement these programmes in a way that 
ensures effectiveness and accountability in the use of public funds In the 
meantime, the programme is constrained by the need for centralisation and the
limits to decentralisation
Chapter 6
A Comparative Analysis of Implementation of Three Programmes 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to carry out a comparative analysis of the 
implementation process of the three programmes so as to assess the theoretical 
arguments in the field of public policy implementation that result from the 
experience generated from such programmes. In addition, prevailing theoretical 
assumptions in the field of policy implementation will be reviewed alone with 
possible alternative explanations based on these case studies In doing so, the cases 
are considered as combinations of characteristics, their inherent features, the 
contextual variables that influence them, and the interactions that result from such 
combinations (Ragin 1987).
Using Browne and Wildavsky’s (1984) definition of successful 
implementation, the chapter assesses each of the components of that definition to 
analyse, across the programmes, to what extent they succeed in the achievement of 
their objectives and how successful they were in the process of implementation.
The chapter is organised as follows. In the first part, the methodological 
approach used is presented. Then follows the comparison of the implementation of 
the three programmes which reviews the most important ideas in the field of policy 
implementation and assesses their usefulness in explaining the cases under study. 
Next, the parameters for successful implementation are discussed and the
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differences and similarities in the programmes to which these give rise Lastly some 
alternative explanations iihd conclusions are drawn.
Comparative Methodological Framework
VARIABLE ORIENTED VS. CASE-STUDY ORIENTED METHODS
According to Ragin (1987, p. 15), comparisons can be made from two different 
perspectives: ‘variable oriented’ studies based on the statistical method, and ‘case- 
oriented’ studies based on the comparative method. For him, the latter is a superior 
strategy for the following reasons. First, the statistical method is not combinatorial, 
that is, each relevant condition is examined at intervals, and comparison of the 
same condition across cases is not explored. Second, the comparative method is 
biased to produce tentative explanations of a certain phenomenon. Although such 
explanations may contain interpretative1 accounts o f one or more deviating cases, 
the comparative method automatically highlights these irregularities and requires 
the investigator to propose alternative explanations. Because of this, this approach 
is especially well suited for the task of building new theories and synthesising 
existing ones. Third, the comparative method does not use samples of populations 
and perform tests of statistical significance The boundaries of a comparative *
'I  w ill u se  the  te rm  in te rp re ta tiv e  a s  described  by R agin , th a t  is, in  a  restric ted  sense. A cco rd ing  
to  h im , o ften  the  te rm  is  used  to  d escribe  a type o f  social sc ien ce  th a t is on ly  rem otely  em pirica l 
an d  co n c e rn e d  p rim a rily  w ith  p ro b lem s o f  m ean in g  o r  h e rm en eu tic s . F o r co m p ara tiv e  w ork, 
in te rp re ta tiv e  an a ly sis  is trea ted  a s  a  type o f  em p iric a l so c ia l science: h isto rically  o rien ted , 
in te rp re ta tiv e  w ork  a ttem p ts  to  acco u n t for specific h is to r ic a l ou tcom es o r  se ts  o f  com parab le  
o u tco m es  o r  p rocesses chosen  fo r study  because o f  th e ir  s ig n ifican ce  fo r cu rre n t in s titu tiona l 
a r ra n g e m e n ts  for soc ia l life  in  g en era l (R agin  1987, p. 3).
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examination are set by the investigator and not in accordance with undefined 
populations of societies or points in time or events in societies. Fourth, the 
comparative method implies that the investigator is familiar with the cases under 
analysis. In this respect, a researcher’s direct examination of the case under study is 
essential so as to make meaningful comparisons of cases and compare each case 
with all other relevant cases. The statistical method, by contrast, requires the 
investigator only to desegregate cases into variables and then to examine 
relationships among variables, not to conduct a direct examination of the 
differences and similarities among cases considered.
In sum, the possibility of offering interpretative explanations of differences 
and similarities among the programmes; the opportunity to work with cases rather 
than with variables in time, and familiarity with the cases selected, make this 
method particularly useful for the analysis of the three programmes in this study.
COMPARING CASE STUDY EVIDENCE
According to Yin (1994, p. 105) there are two general strategies for the analysis of 
case study evidence. The first is the description of a case that helps not only to 
identify the appropriate causal links to be analysed, but also to develop secondary 
strategies for the analysis of data. To some extent this task has been carried out in 
the chapters dedicated to each one of the programmes. The second strategy is to 
identify goals procedures and data collection which will focus attention on the 
theoretical propositions to be tested. For example, although other topics may be 
addressed during the analysis, the chapter will question whether decentralisation,
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limitation of the number of actors, and the maximisation of discretion at the point 
of service delivery, actually result in successful implementation in the three 
programmes. However, this raises another important methodological 
consideration. If a comparison is to be made between successful implementation 
and actual results, then it is necessary to define the parameters of success. This will 
be discussed later.
Testing Implementation Theory
POUCY IMPLEMENTATION IN  A FEDERAL SYSTEM
A recurrent topic in the discussion of policy implementation was the degree of 
centralisation employed. Martha Derthick (1972) was the first to discuss this 
problem in the field of public policy implementation. She argues that the collapse 
of a policy is related the federal government’s inability to control state and local 
governments, and to its limited power to influence implementation actions at the 
state and local levels. In other words, the federal government must work with state 
and local governments to produce political consensus around the policy, and then 
negotiate with them to implement it.
Policy implementation in a centralised political system
Academics who have studied the Mexican political system agree that it is highly 
centralised and authoritarian (Heilman, 1983; Levi and Szekely, 1987; Cornelius, 
Gentleman, and Smith, 1989; Molinar Horcasitas, 1993; Camp, 1993). It is a 
political system in which only a few individuals have access to the decision making
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process, and fewer still are in a position to exercise important political choices 
(Camp, 1993). This has given rise to a presidentialist model whereby authority is 
centralised and most political power lies in the hands of the president (see 
Calderon, 1972; Camp, 1993; Cosio Villegas, 1975; Carpizo, 1978; Villa, 1987; 
Meyer, 1993; Garrido, 1989).
One of the main problems of this centralisation is that states very frequently 
have no real power to confront or challenge federal initiatives during the design 
phase of a policy.
For example, legally articles 25 and 26 of the constitution constitute the 
framework of the National System for Democratic Planning (Sistema National de 
Planeacion Democratica) which gives the states, municipalities and even citizens 
the right to participate in the definition of the agenda of a policy by means of 
popular consultations (consulta popular). In practice, they are rhetoric. Meetings 
are frequently organised by public officials who have already decided on the 
guidelines of future policy and who frequently hold a position in the agency in 
charge of its implementation. Participants are carefully selected so as to hear what 
is needed to be heard. That is why it is not surprising to observe that the resulting 
policy adequately reflects the results of the consulta popular In the end, the design 
of federal policies rarely expresses the needs of the states, municipalities or the 
community.
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But in terms of implementation, things are different.2 States and 
municipalities in Mexico can alter not only the way in which public policies are 
implemented but sometimes also their content. This results from the way the 
political system in Mexico is structured. By the end of the Mexican revolution the 
political imperative was to put together the multiplicity o f regional and local 
powers in a system that would create political stability and shift power from one 
group to another inside the triumphant coalition. Legally, this was achieved by the 
principle of ‘no re-election’ and by the creation, years later, of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) which has acted ever since as a vehicle through which 
to access and remain in power (Camp 1993, p. 15).
Local powers in Mexico, both formal and informal have always challenged 
the political power of the politicians in Mexico city who remain at the centre of the 
political life of the country. But in order to keep political stability among the many 
groups that comprise the so-called ‘revolutionary family’, the system allows room 
for political manoeuvre to state and local political actors. This might not always be 
legal, but it has been quite effective when the federal government needs local 
collaboration for the implementation of certain policies and programmes. This has 
significant implications in terms of policy implementation. Federal guidelines can 
either be strictly applied or relaxed according to the political balance between the 
state and the federation. Very frequently the design of the policy is inappropriate
2 Few  re fe ren ces  h av e  b een  m ad e  to  th is  topic. See Levy an d  S z ik e ly  1 9 8 7 , pp. 4 9 -50  an d  S errano  
1996, p .7 .
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and it is left to  the state and municipal officers and to the network of economic 
and political interests, to ‘rescue’ federal intentions in so far as they are able and 
willing to do so. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, the federal powers tend to 
lose sight of what is happening in reality .3 The result is a “factual federalism” based 
much more on ‘unwritten’ rules than grounded in the Constitution.4 It is a paradox 
that although there exists a legal framework to claim and challenge the initiatives 
from the federation, informal procedures are not only employed by the states but 
also they prove to be more effective and less risky in political terms * 
Given the centralised and authoritarian nature of the Mexican political 
system it is important to discuss how these characterisitcs affected the 
implementation of the programmes and to what extent they were immune to 
contextual influences.
For example, considering FOMUN, the Solidarity Committees 
accommodated the programme to their own interests and according to their own 
understanding Again, in urban municipalities, for example Isla del Carmen, some
3It is d ifficu lt t o  b e liev e  th a t th e  political a n d  eco n o m ic  s itu a tio n  in C h iap a s  took  politic ians in  
M exico  city  by  su rp r ise . T h e  s itu a tio n  in C h ia p a s , as happens w ith  m any o th e r  m a tte rs  in  the rest 
o f  th e  coun try , h a d  g radually  evo lved  and  g iv en  m an y  signs o f  a la rm  w h ich  w ere  ignored . 
‘A g u ila r C a m in  a n d  M eyer (1 9 9 3 , pp. 2 5 3 -2 5 4 ) suggest th a t ‘th e  p residency  m u st engage and  
nego tia te  w ith  v a rio u s  pow ers, seeking  to  c o n c ilia te  th e  d iffe ren t forces, w ho  m ust act 
sim u ltaneously  w ith  a  g rea t d isc re tionary  p o w e r  an d  w ith  a  g reat need  for co n cilia tion  and  
nego tiation '.
*Perhaps o ne  o f  th e  m ost in te re s tin g  po litical e v e n ts  under th e  p residency  o f  Z ed illo  Ponce de 
L eón is th a t f o r  th e  firs t tim e  in  M ex ico 's  re c e n t h istory, th e  gov ern o r o f  T ab asco  took to the  
suprem e co u rt o f  ju s tic e  a p re s id en tia l a lleg a tio n  to  investigate  th e  d iversion  o f  s ta te  funds for the  
G o v ern o r 's  p o li t ic a l  cam p aig n . P aradox ically , by  fo llow ing th e  con stitu tio n a l procedure , the 
governor c h a lle n g e d  the  p resid en cy  an d  fo r m an y , th is  only can ce lled  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f  solving 
the  prob lem  in  th e  trad itio n a l a n d  m ore e ffec tive  way. Legal p rocedu res usua lly  m ean  in  M exico 
open  c o n fro n ta tio n  an d  the can ce lla tio n  o f  o th e r  a rra n g em en ts  by po litical m eans.
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pressure was exerted by municipal officials to persuade the Solidarity Committees 
to forgo their responsibility in building the public works either in favour of private 
contractors whom municipal officials wished to favour or to facilitate the 
implementation process
Something similar happened with Children of Solidarity. Although the 
programme was centrally designed, in terms of implementation it had to accept a 
great deal of flexibility in adapting not only to the heterogeneity of settings in the 
country, but also to the ethical and moral considerations that sometimes oriented 
the implementation of the programme
In relation to FONAES, federal officials thought that highly centralised 
implementation using inflexible control and supervision, would prevent the 
misappropriation of funds at the state and local level. The programme was certainly 
more successful in displacing some actors and interests at the local level, but a 
closer examination suggests that despite its highly centralised character, it was 
quite difficult for both state and federal officials to resist the temptation of using 
the programme as an effective tool for political demobilisation.
In sum, although centralisation prevailed during the design phase of these 
three programmes, during implementation the search for local consensus and 
negotiations with local actors was also almost nonexistent and it was impossible 
for federal officials to impose rigid control. Moreover, the implementation of two 
o f them, FOMUN and Children of Solidarity, showed a mixture of no consensus
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building and no negotiation at the local level, but a great deal o f  flexibility in later 
implementation, something that was essential for effectiveness.
However, the implementation of FONAES neither created local consensus, 
nor negotiated with local actors. It lacked the flexibility showed by FOMUN and 
Children of Solidarity. Tight centralisation, combined with the lack of consensus 
and negotiations at the local level and most importantly, lack of flexibility or 
mutual adaptation, erected insuperable hazards for the programme. The evidence 
suggests that negotiation with local actors in formulation were not essential to 
produce effective implementation, as Derthick suggested. Rather, flexibility, 
mutual adaptation and a great deal of political negotiation at the local level were 
essential in the implementation process
The question arises whether a more decentralised strategy during the 
implementation of the programmes would have produced better results. FOMUN 
and Children of Solidarity seem to suggest that when programmes give way to 
mutual adjustment or ‘mutual adaptation’ (Berman 1978), the results are better 
because strategies and objectives are redefined continually. If FONAES had shown 
this disposition for adaptation and had changed its strategies to connect its 
instruments of policy with the desired objectives, it is likely that its implementation 
would have been more effective FONAES better illustrates Derthick’s 
propositions regarding the limitations of centralisation and the impossibility of a 
federal government avoiding local modifications of a policy. However, she does 
not seem to understand that in particular circumstances, the implementation of a
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policy must be carried out by means of rigid control so as to avoid 
misappropriation of the policy in a context prone to politically motivated meddling 
such as the Mexican one Centralisation certainly makes procedures more difficult 
and complicates the process of mutual adaptation, but decentralisation, under 
particular circumstances, might produce even worse results.
However, an examination of the process of implementation of FOMUN, 
FONAES and Children of Solidarity, shows that even in a highly centralised 
political context like the Mexican one, it is during the implementation of a policy 
that federal power is confronted by state, local and community participants. 
Negotiation, rather than control and imposition, suggest both that the centralised 
and authoritarian nature of the Mexican political system might not be all-powerful 
after all (Cornelius 1995), and that decision-making prerogatives, both legal and 
illegal are being exercised at the state and local level.
Finally, whether the programmes were less or more decentralised depended 
on two things. A more decentralised operation in FOMUN and Children of 
Solidarity was possible because federal objectives and local ones were coincident. 
There was some degree of consensus and compatibility of interests within which to 
work, and in this respect, decentralisation and flexibility did not cause too many 
problems. On the contrary, in the policy area in which FONAES performed, there 
was a fundamental conflict of interest between rich and poor, between the business 
approach of FONAES and the sentiments of the target population. This made 
FONAES crucially different from both Children of Solidarity and FOMUN. The
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popular and egalitarian ethos of FOMUN and Children of Solidarity coincided with 
the sentiments of their target population. Whereas the more business oriented ethos 
of FONAES was not coincident with the ethos of the target population, which 
diminished its chances of success. The crucial difference was the extent to which 
sharply conflicting interests were involved in the FONAES programme.
This does not mean that programmes like FONAES are not capable of 
being implemented in the context of Mexican politics. It might be the case that they 
are only possible in certain regions of the country where the principles of the 
programme are more coincident with the reality in which it is taking place. But for 
the state of Campeche, its regulations were unrealistic. That is why, for instance, 
the main efforts of the programme were located in the municipality of Isla del 
Carmen and the city o f Campeche and not in those municipalities in which poverty 
was much more persistent.
In analysing the centralised way in which the programmes were 
implemented some other elements have to be considered According to Derthick 
(1979) three main conditions are necessary to avoid policy failure. The first one is 
to have local representation in the programme. FONAES certainly lacked this 
because of its centralised design and implementation. There was no opportunity in 
the normal operation of the programme for local views to be heard or adjustments 
made. In the case o f FOMUN, state, municipal and community interests had the 
opportunity to state their points of view during the implementation, and the 
community was involved in the decision-making process. Although the design was
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also centralised, the creation of the Solidarity Municipal Council and the Solidarity 
Committees, were formal structures that made local representation available, an 
element absent in FONAES.
In the case of Children of Solidarity, there were two main avenues for local 
representation in its implementation. The first, was the ‘special day’, on which the 
selection of the children was made, and the second was during the validation 
process in which the Solidarity Committee approved or rejected the selection made 
by the children.
Derthick’s second condition for avoiding failure during the implementation 
process is the creation o f local support for the federal initiative. The Solidarity 
Committees were not only one of the most important actors in two of the 
programmes, but also they represented allied organisations. FONAES was the 
exception which, rather than creating local support, created conflicts with other 
state agencies.
Finally, the third condition for avoiding failure is that federal programmes 
must be able to adjust their goals and means to the local interests. In the case o f 
Children of Solidarity and FOMUN such adjustment was apparent because both 
allowed local participation in the decision making process. FONAES, on the 
contrary, by reinforcing its commitment to its objectives, and by making the 
procedures of the programme even more strict and firm, prevented the 
incorporation of other actors in the decision-making process. In fact, any sort o f
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adaptation to local interests, was perceived by FONAES officials as a deviation 
from the programme
Resources and interorganisational collaboration
According to Derthick some conditions are essential to improve the 
implementation of a public policy. One of these is that there have to be appropriate 
resources and that these should be available on time. In the case of FONAES, its 
unlimited access to funds gave it an important advantage over Children of 
Solidarity and FOMUN. However, their final allocation to the applicants, was 
significantly delayed because of the complexity of its regulations and the advantage 
gained was lost.
FOMUN and Children of Solidarity faced some financial constraints both in 
the adequacy of their budget and in the way that the budget was transferred to the 
states. Most of the delays shown by these programmes were precisely as a 
consequence of this dependence. Despite this, FOMUN and Children of Solidarity 
performed better than FONAES because of their comparatively decentralised and 
flexible operation.
According to Derthick another necessary condition for success is that the 
federal government must be able to influence local actions. Where FONAES is 
concerned, the federal government was unable to gain collaboration or co­
operation from the state agencies involved in the programme. Since state and local
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agencies demands were not satisfied and the federal government would not relax 
its rules, institutional collaboration was not achieved
In the case of. Children of Solidarity, although state and local agencies 
collaborated fully in the implementation of the programme, this was not so of some 
federal agencies, particularly the health sector, such as ISSSTE, IMSS, SSA, and 
this generated the main problems for the programme. Such lack of collaboration 
resulted from the extra work load engendered by the programme without any 
compensations. By merely increasing the responsibilities of these agencies without 
offering them the proper incentives to obtain collaboration, the designers of 
Children of Solidarity lost an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of the 
programme. The same happened with teachers and head teachers. Their role in the 
supervision and continuous evaluation o f the sponsored children, was neither 
recognised as extra work nor properly valued.
In sum, while in FONAES the need to stick to its rules and procedures and 
its lack of flexibility resulted in poor collaboration at the state level, in the case of 
Children of Solidarity, the government’s ability to influence local actions was 
diminished not because of a lack of flexibility but because of the lack of incentives. 
This produced a lack of collaboration during the implementation of the policy (see 
Nelson 1989, p. 13).
By contrast, FOMUN, the programme that better influenced local actions 
and gained collaboration and co-operation, was more flexibly structured and open
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to the definition of objectives. There was also a certain laxity in the regulations that 
opened up to its participants the possibility o f obtaining compensations for 
participating in the programme, although not always legally grounded. Even when 
some of the actors perceived that their interests were being affected as in the case 
of private contractors and public officials who had benefited in the past from the 
awarding of such contracts, the rules of the programme were general enough to 
allow rewards for participating in the programme. By leaving open to 
interpretation the regulations of the programme, incentives were available to 
influence local actions, the participants simply had to find the way.
A continuum is discernible. At one extreme FONAES with all its resources 
was too rigid to offer incentives and gain the collaboration it needed. Children of 
Solidarity had limited resources and while it was more flexible it was unable to 
offer incentives to key actors. At the other extreme, FOMUN, in spite of limited 
resources proved itself to be the most flexible and to be able to offer incentives so 
as to gain necessary collaboration.
THE COMPLEXITY OF JOINT ACTION 
Participants, perspectives and sense o f urgency
According to Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) two main elements must be 
considered in explaining the success or failure of a public policy. The first is the 
number of actors involved in implementation. The second, the extent to which 
perspectives are shared Pressman and Wildavsky believe that the probability of
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success increases as the number of actors decreases and as they share similar 
perspectives about the programme. However, an analysis of the three programmes 
challenges this belief.6
An analysis of the programmes shows that extensive participation by 
government agencies in each programme certainly prevented direct and simple 
implementation, but it did not necessarily decrease its possibilities of success. One 
of the main characteristics of FONAES, was the small number of agencies involved 
in its implementation, as well as its apparently simple operation. In practice, its 
implementation was less successful because of the rigid rules and procedures it 
established which did not satisfy its target population Furthermore, financial 
viability and social feasibility were frequently difficult to combine and problems 
arose in trying to achieve this combination. By contrast, Children of Solidarity and 
FOMUN had more participants but they achieved their goals in a more effective 
way.
Different perspectives and a different sense of urgency of even a small 
number o f  actors are important in explaining success or failure of a public policy. 
Fewer participants might have been expected to produce a better consensus about 
the goals and means of the programme, and more effective implementation.
6O n e  o f  th e  m a in  c ritic ism  o f  th e  p robab ilis tic  app ro ach  em p lo y ed  by P re ssm an  an d  W ildavsky is 
th a t th e ir  m o d e l is used to  e x p la in  an d  p red ic t fa ilu re  in stead  o f  success. It is  a rg u ed  that th e  use 
o f  a  m u ltip lic a tiv e  m odel fro m  p robab ility  'le ad s  to  p re d ic tio n s  o f  fa ilu re  in  a ll m u lti-s tage  
im p le m e n ta tio n  scenarios, ev en  w hen  the  odds a ssoc ia ted  w ith  success a t e a c h  stage a re  h ig h .’ 
(B ow en  1 9 8 2 ).
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However, the implementation of the programmes show that participants’ 
perspectives varied according to: the seriousness of their commitment to the 
objectives of the programme and their perception of the pay-offs from participating 
in the programme. In the first case, while for some FONAES officials at the federal 
and state level the dual goals of the programme (to generate productive 
alternatives for poor groups and to solve political problems related to the end of 
land distribution) were clear and non contradictory, others, for example the state 
branch representative o f FONAES in Campeche, believed in close adherence to the 
objectives explicitly stated in the programme and regarded any deviation as 
improper, as it was the case in the Atasta Peninsula. The direct consequence of 
such disparities among actors, was the position the state branch representative 
assumed to try to secure the goals of the programme and to prevent inappropriate 
funding This partially explains why the programme ran into so many delays. Even 
so, participants still managed to find ways to manipulate the situation Delays in 
this programme then, resulted from the inflexibility of its procedures which 
produced delays in the allocation of funds and the mismatch o f social feasibility and 
financial viability
Finally, the participants’ perspective also changed according to the pay-offs 
which they would receive from their participation. When an actor perceives that his 
participation would mean positive compensation, he will urge and facilitate the 
implementation of the programme no matter whether his perspective is positive or 
not. This was particularly the case of the professional bureau in charge of the
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appraisal of the investment projects. For many of them, their sense of urgency was 
very high, not because of a commitment to the programme, but because it 
represented an opportunity to make some money.
The situation with FOMUN was different, both because of the large 
number of participants and because of the complexity this implied. FOMUN made 
use of a range o f actors and government agencies each with a varying perspective 
and sense of urgency. As in FONAES, participants’ perspective varied according 
to their commitment to the programme; their position during the implementation 
process and according to whether participation would produce pay-offs. Some of 
the FOMUN participants were not directly involved in the implementation of the 
programme, but they participated because of their legal and constitutional authority 
over important processes in the project This was particularly the case of the 
Municipal Council (Cabildo) and of the COPLADE whose functions were much 
more extensive than those relating to Solidarity programmes, but whose authority 
was necessary to fulfil the legal procedures of the programme.
However, although they had different perspectives about the programme, 
the participants shared a similarly high sense of urgency. According to the 
evidence, it seems that even where participants may have different perspectives, 
they can still share the same sense of urgency. That is, private contractors may 
have a different perspective from that of the programme’s officials and yet share a 
high sense of urgency. For the former, the programme only represents a chance to 
make money from public funds and therefore, they showed a high sense of urgency
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in order to obtain more contracts. This is important because this suggests that the 
success in implementing a public policy rests not necessarily in shared perspectives, 
but perhaps in obtaining benefit by participating in the programme.
Different perspectives and senses of urgency about the programme also 
resulted from the position of some of the participants in the implementation of 
FOMUN. For example, the sense of urgency showed by the Solidarity Municipal 
Council varied according to the mayor’s perspective. Since he is the highest 
authority in the Council, he could block or exert his veto authority for some 
projects according to whether he received their electoral support or some other 
political consideration.
Finally, the participants’ perspective about the programme also changed 
according to whether they perceived a positive pay-off through their participation. 
Through its method of implementation, FOMUN offered pay-offs to all the actors 
involved. Although the programme was explicitly displacing traditional actors 
during its implementation, all of them showed commitment and a high sense of 
urgency, probably attributable to the benefits that the programme produced for 
everyone. For all o f  them, the programme represented one of three things: political 
credit for the Governor, mayors and federal agencies; economic benefit for private 
contractors and some corrupt public officials and the solution of a public problem 
for the community. Different actors gained different advantages
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In comparison with FOMUN and FONAES, Children of Solidarity involved 
a larger number of participants and produced a more complex pattern of 
interaction. As in the other two programmes, participants’ perspectives about the 
programme varied according to their commitment to the programme; their position 
in the implementation process and their perception of eventual pay-offs. In the first 
case, the agencies responsible for children’s medical attention generated most of 
the problems o f the programme. Although collaboration with the programme was 
offered at ministerial level, in practice some problems of jurisdiction and territory 
became apparent during its implementation. Most community and mayors’ 
complaints about the programme, were related to the quality of the service 
provided by these agencies and their lack of commitment to collaborate effectively 
in the implementation of the programme This lack of commitment may be 
attributed to the fact that during the process of implementation a group o f ‘natural 
participants’ was displaced, or their role significantly diminished, these were the 
Department o f Education-SEP, as well as teachers and head teachers.
The participants’ perspective about the programme was also affected by 
their position in the implementation process. For example, the Department of 
Education only provided its resources for the promotion of the so-called ‘civic 
activities’ among the schools selected. These activities were too general and rather 
ineffective, and instead of producing community mobilisation around the quality of 
education at the community level (the unstated objective of the programme), it 
only generated community divisions between the children and families supported
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by the programme and those who did not benefit from it. This was because often 
the activities started for the repair of classrooms or general maintenance of the 
school, were performed only by those parents whose children benefited from the 
programme whereas, previously, parents recognised this as a general responsibility. 
It is even more significant that an educational programme like this was not 
managed by the Federal Department of Education-SEP but by the Federal 
Department of Social Development-SEDESOL. Despite this, all the problems 
directly impacted on the Department of Education. For the community, the school 
and its staff were the natural channel for make complaints about the 
implementation of the programme.
The programme also significantly diminished the role of two of the most 
important participants in the implementation of the programme, teachers and head 
teachers who traditionally had controlled the allocation of an earlier scheme of 
scholarships in primary schools. By involving the community, particularly children 
and parents, in the decision about who should benefit from the scheme, the 
authority and power of the teachers and head teachers was significantly diminished. 
Nevertheless, they had to collaborate with the programme by supervising and 
monitoring the progress of the children selected by the programme. In practice, this 
resulted in an extension of their responsibilities alongside a perception of the 
lowering of their professional status
Finally, the programme was also affected because some participants found 
no incentives to perform more effectively in the programme. Children of Solidarity
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not only required an increase in their workload from some agencies and actors, but 
also offered no additional rewards or compensations. That is, a programme which 
by its very nature was educational, should have been seen to stress the role of 
teachers and head teachers during its implementation and not to diminish it. By 
giving less importance to these participants, the programme lacked a significant 
source of support and diminished its effectiveness. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that public officials frequently complained about the lack of involvement of these 
actors during the implementation of the programme.
The experience of the health sector workers was similar to that of the 
teachers. For them, the programme only represented an increase in their workload. 
Although formal commitments to support this presidential initiative were made at a 
ministerial level, in practice, at the level of health centres in rural and isolated areas 
of the country, problems related to the organisation of this sector, proved to be a 
serious obstacle to the success of the programme In spite of federal commitment, 
it seems that the programme officials did not anticipate how the conditions in the
health sector would alter the impact of the programme. The teachers, head teachers
%
and medical practitioners were in general agreement about the positive nature of 
the programme and if there had been some payment for their increased work load, 
perhaps more collaboration would have been secured.
By contrast, DICONSA, the agency in charge of the distribution of the 
family package supplies, had proper incentives to collaborate with the programme. 
For these officials the programme represented an opportunity to  be directly
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associated with a presidential initiative as well as an way to increase their sales, and 
therefore, their sense of urgency was high.
The reasons for the extensive delays in all the programmes merit 
examination. For FOMUN and Children of Solidarity the significant element 
responsible for this seems to be the structure and legal framework of the prevailing 
budget cycle in Mexico, which prevented the allocation of funds on time. FOMUN 
funds arrived six to seven months late. The delivery o f scholarships to participating 
schools often occurred after a three months delay. This aroused community 
criticism and affected the outcome of the programme Finally, FONAES’ delays 
were related to the tight controls over funding exerted by the programme.
One significant element in the comparison of the programmes is the effect 
of the number of decision points in implementation. For example, FONAES had 
the smaller number of actors than either FOMUN or Children of Solidarity. 
However comparative analysis shows that it is not the number of actors, nor indeed 
the multiplicity of decision points which governs the degree of success of a 
programme but rather the participants’ perspectives on the programme, and the 
rewards on offer. In relation to FOMUN,' for instance, either political credit or the 
perception of getting ‘easy money’ from public funds, or even community 
satisfaction, had a positive effect on the implementation of the programme
Children of Solidarity, by contrast, experienced a smaller degree of 
collaboration because of lack of incentives This affected the health agencies and
some teachers who saw their authority being curbed by the way the programme 
was designed Finally, in relation to FONAES, the existence o f interorganisational 
problems arose essentially because the agencies of the public administration at the 
state level, could not satisfy certain political demands with the funds of the 
programme By contrast, the professional bureau in charge of the appraisal of the 
economic projects enthusiastically participated in the programme because of the 
payment they received for the preparation of each project
In sum, one of the main points to be highlighted here is that Pressman’s and 
Wildavsky’s assumption regarding the number of actors and the success of policy 
implementation is not borne out in relation to these projects. Research shows that 
incentives seem to matter more than the complexity of joint action irrespective of 
the number of actors. The contrast between FONAES with its small number of 
actors and least success, and FOMUN and Children of Solidarity with their large 
numbers of actors and comparatively high levels of success is noteworthy.
Implementation complexity andflexibility
Complexity in implementation arises not only from the number of actors involved 
but also from the degree of rigidity and the number of decision points employed in 
a programme. The particular policy area involved may also be significant. 
FONAES had a limited number of participants but its procedures and rules were 
rigid There were only 3 points of decision: the state branch of the programme, 
central offices and the state governor. Even so, inflexibility and delays were the 
main characteristics of the programme
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FOMUN and Children of Solidarity, although they had significantly more 
participants, showed a great deal of flexibility and ability to redefine procedures 
“on the way”: the ‘evolutionary or learning view of implementation’ (Browne and 
Wildavsky 1984, p. 230). Such complexity did not seriously affect the 
implementation of these programmes. Education and public works necessarily 
included community participation. However the generation of jobs is more 
complex than this. These policy arenas interact with other macro economic 
variables leaving little room for discretionary decisions in policy implementation.
Mistaken analytical framework
One of the most important suggestions of Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) relates 
to the ‘causal theory’ behind the implementation of a programme. That is, the 
extent to which the techniques used produced the desired change in each particular 
programme. FONAES offers an interesting example. The programme centred its 
efforts in urban areas, such as Isla del Carmen and Campeche, where, the main 
economic activity of the state takes place The criteria used by the programme in 
order to fund projects, demanded from the target groups certain experience and a 
minimal level o f ‘entrepreneurial culture’ as well as some evidence of their abilities 
to engage in an economic activity. It is clear, that these requirements could not be 
matched by groups who live in the marginalized areas of the state, or where levels 
of education are poor, or where the technology used in their particular area of 
production is out-of-date.
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In sum these requirements could not be met where, following these authors, 
the ‘informal connection with the job market has been atrophied’.(Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1984, p 151). These are groups o f producers with limited prospects for 
the development of a profitable economic activity In such areas, presumably the 
poorest, the programme would not work7, not just because these groups did not 
fulfil the requirements of the programme, but also because in such conditions of 
isolation a reduced number of economic activities would prosper according to the 
requirements of FONAES The programme, then, is an anti-poverty programme 
whose requirements and criteria to fund economic projects, are in contradiction 
with the reality in which it is working. Thus the efforts of FONAES are located in 
urban areas of the state-the most active in economic terms. FONAES is giving 
economic impulse to marginalized counties and communities where certain groups 
of producers urgently need that support.
Paradoxically, by the rigid and unrealistic procedures of the programme this 
was an anti-poverty programme which could only work in those circumstances 
where is no poverty. That is, the programme seemed to work better in those 
regions where some entrepreneurial ethos or certain business capacity already 
existed. Such regions were the Isla del Carmen and the city of Campeche This
7F o r ex am p le , from  9  coun ties in the  state, F O N A E S  w orked  p rim arily  in  2 o f  them , Isla  del 
C à rm e n  a n d  th e  C ity  o f  C am peche, that a cco rd in g  to p u b lic  officials, show  th e  low est level o f  
m a rg in a lity  in th e  sta te . In opposition , in the re m a in in g  seven  coun ties , the  p rog ram m e scarcely 
fu n d ed  pro jects, p resum ab ly  because it w as q u ite  d ifficu lt to  find  o rgan ised  g roups o f  p roducers 
w ho  co u ld  fu lfil th e  requ irem en ts o f  the  p ro g ram m e.
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represented a serious mistake in terms of the analytical framework in which the 
programme was based.
As an anti-poverty programme, supposedly designed to cover the financial 
needs of poor groups and to offer them economic alternatives by means of cheap 
resources, it would be expected that the programme would match the 
characteristics of the target groups. Nevertheless, the programme was based on a 
set of requirements that in practice could not be matched by those groups. If the 
programme was aimed at poor groups, with limited abilities and skills, so that they 
could engage in economically profitable activity, then the programme should have 
used techniques in accordance with the nature of the context it aimed to change. 
The use of rigid criteria, embedded in a strong commercial rationale, did not match 
the ‘soft commercial’ nature of these groups At the end of the day, it seemed that 
the programme was more interested in the proper use of the funds, than in the 
creation of economic improvements for poor groups. The means prevailed over the 
objectives of the programme. It would have been preferable if, from the very 
beginning the programme had been designed with requirements and corresponding 
funding which would have allowed its social purposes to be met
For Children of Solidarity and FOMUN the situation was different in that 
these two programmes were implemented in policy arenas that allowed community 
participation The programmes were designed and structured with a rationale that 
established that the involvement of the customer in the provision of the service, 
would increase satisfaction and performance. Both programmes reflected both in
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their design and practice, a coherent connection between instruments of policy and 
desired objectives. Both programmes, for example, required the creation of 
Solidarity Committees with power to make decisions within their structure.
BACKWARD AND FORWARD MAPPING
One of the most appealing approaches in the field is that which argues that most 
implementation problems result from the fact that the logic of implementation is 
back to front. Instead of a hierarchical, top-down, rigid and inflexible 
implementation (forward mapping), a policy should be implemented in a 
transactional, bottom-up, adaptable and flexible way (backward mapping). Two 
main arguments characterise this approach. The first is that implementation 
problems stem mostly from the interaction of a policy with its institutional setting, 
and that the policy outcome rests with local deliverers, not with federal 
administrators (Berman 1978). A successful implementation then, is characterised 
by a process of mutual adaptation between the federal and local organisations.
The second is that the closer one is to the source of the problem, the 
greater is one’s ability to influence it; and the problem-solving ability of complex 
systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximising discretion at the 
point where the problem is most immediate (Elmore 1979-80). Therefore, a 
‘backward mapping’ process is regarded as a better strategy than ‘forward 
mapping’ in securing successful implementation.
\institutional setting, adaptation and maximising discretion
One of the main arguments in the political discourse of the Solidarity strategy in 
general, and of the three programmes in particular, is that their design would 
facilitate a more decentralised implementation process. It was argued that, in this 
way, the programmes could be implemented more effectively because they would 
be able to deal with local administrative, political and even cultural characteristics, 
that is, the institutional setting of the programmes. In addition, the whole process 
would be improved if the community could be involved. This would allow the 
programme to meet community needs and to respond to its problems in a more 
effective way.
However, each programme had a particular formula to adapt to its 
institutional settings as well as to involve the community in the implementation 
process. Again, FONAES is different from FOMUN and Children of Solidarity. 
The design of the FONAES programme and the way it was implemented, 
eliminated both the possibility for local deliverers to participate in the 
implementation process, and also any adaptation between the federal initiative and 
local organisations. The programme was designed in such a way as to diminish the 
intervention of state and municipal organisations during the implementation 
process.
By contrast in Children of Solidarity, adaptation to local needs or flexibility 
was essential. For example, different mayors delivered the scholarships in different 
ways according to the needs set by the geographical conditions of the country.
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Also some mayors made the delivery of the scholarships and the family supplies 
package, an opportunity to improve their relationships with their constituencies 
and gain political credit. This adaptation to local needs was not only limited to the 
procedures used by local mayors, but was also present in the definition of 
objectives. The community played a significant role in the implementation of the 
programme and demanded from the federal government its acceptance of a certain 
deviation of objectives that in principle, contradicted the original purposes of the 
policy. For instance, the criteria used for the selection of the children varied and 
sometimes were governed by moral or ethical assumptions. The federal 
government allowed this, rather than impose any measures of control that could 
oppose internal community organisation.
In FOMUN, the situation was similar. Decisions and even the means to 
achieve the goals of the programme were dependent on the commitment of the 
local officials and community to the original objectives of the programme. For 
example the choice between public and private contractors for carrying out public 
works. In a similar way, the financial structure of the programme worked by 
granting funds for public works only if such projects were requested by a Solidarity 
Committee, something that shows that the initiative emphasised the participation of 
local deliverers.
In terms of adaptation to local needs, the programmes also performed in a 
different way. FOMUN was much more ‘procedural’ than goal-oriented; that is, in 
order to meet community demands and expectations in the best way possible, the
A  C o m p a r a t i v e  A n a l y s i s ________________ _______________________________________________________________
programme applied a great deal of flexibility accepting a wide range of options in 
the definition of public works. The refurbishment of the local church, for example, 
was hardly a priority in terms of the regulations of the programme, and yet, funds 
were granted for the project Indeed, such laxity in the procedures and the 
definition of objectives, opened up the possibility of diverting funds and producing 
a lower level of performance of the programme, because such diversion of 
resources is not necessarily to the advantage of the recipients. In an institutional 
setting prone to politically motivated meddling, the maximisation of discretion may 
bring about more problems than opportunities for successful implementation
The allocation of scholarships to children using other criteria than those set 
down by the programme, although congruent with community’s perceptions, 
resulted in an improper allocation of funds FOMUN and Children of Solidarity 
certainly showed this ability to maximise discretion where a problem arose, but in 
particular circumstances and according to the context, this also opened up the 
possibility for the distortion of goals. FONAES reduced discretion to the minimum 
at the point of service delivery. From the previous analysis it can be argued that at 
least for the cases under study, programmes which include community participation 
are more likely to emphasise local deliverers and flexibility in the implementation of 
the policy.
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An Evaluation of the Implementation of the Programmes
Neither centralisation, complexity resulting from the number of actors nor the 
adaptation of procedures is as important as the achievement of the programme’s 
goals. This is the measure of success. But this complicates the task, because 
success for the designers of the programme (i.e., popular mobilisation around the 
construction of public works), was failure for others (i.e., those who criticised the 
strategy as a pork barrel programme). Similarly, while using the programme as a 
tool for political demobilisation was regarded as a success by political actors, it 
was nothing but a failure compared with its original purpose, working for the 
poorest in the community, i.e., for the state branch representative of FONAES. 
Furthermore, success is often measured from the perspective of designers rather 
than that of the beneficiaries. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980, pp. 149-50) for 
example, emphasise that policy evaluation should also accommodate the concerns 
of ‘constituency groups’. This is not to say that the political implications of a 
programme like Solidarity should be disregarded. Many critics of the Solidarity 
programme have stressed the political aspects involved in its design and 
implementation (Cornelius, Craig and Fox, 1994; Dresser, 1991; Bertranou, 1993). 
Community satisfaction should not be ignored either. For many communities 
around the country the introduction of a sewage system or public lighting or 
drinking water systems represent a major achievement in their everyday life. For 
them, whether those public works merely represent a pork barrel strategy, or 
whether they are primarily oriented by electoral politics is not really important.
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Because of the poor living conditions which they have endured for many years, 
their perspective is not only pragmatic but also comprehensible.
The problem seems to be one of defining success and failure. According to 
Browne and Wildavsky (1984, pp 212-213) quantitative measures of goal 
attainment and efficiency are the most obvious criteria of successful 
implementation, but they are only a beginning. For them successful implementation 
should consider various factors. First, the policy must effect change in behavioural, 
organisational, or environmental conditions. Second, it should be able to structure 
the implementation process by means of clear objectives and priorities. Third, it 
should have a valid theory of causality connecting instruments of policy to desired 
objectives. Fourth, it must possess adequate financial resources at the start, and 
sufficient power-co-operation among implementing organisations. Lastly it must 
have the ability to get the clientele involved as desired. This definition is followed 
here because it takes into consideration elements that traditional evaluations leave 
out but that are relevant to the evaluation of the implementation of a public policy.
COMPARING GOAL ACHIEVEMENT, EFFICIENCY AND QUALITATIVE EVALUATION 
One of the main problems in evaluating goal achievement in relation to FOMUN, 
Children of Solidarity and FONAES is that they each had a double set of 
objectives, stated and unstated ones In evaluating the programmes’ performances
a distinction must be made between these
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In relation to its stated objective, FONAES was less successful than the 
other two. The exigency of matching its regulations with its target population and 
the fears regarding the misappropriation of funds, limited its performance. For 
example, many of its projects were concentrated in areas with a high level of 
economic activity which showed minor levels of marginalization in the state. 
FONAES’ supported projects which could have obtained funds from commercial 
institutions, rather than helping the poorest groups. By contrast, FOMUN and 
Children of Solidarity, produced better results, limited only by the size of the 
demand or by the availability of resources. Furthermore, the approval of projects 
different from those originally intended in FOMUN (e.g., the refurbishment of a 
church), and the increase in the quota of scholarships for each school in Children of 
Solidarity, enable them to achieve more than FONAES. There is one point to make 
clear in relation to the achievement of objectives of the Children of Solidarity 
programme. Although during the field work it was repeatedly suggested by 
officials of the programme that it had already produced an impact on scholar 
attendance, there is no assessment of the impact of the programme on early 
leaving. 46 percent of a sample o f 378 children increased their attendance (NSP- 
UNICEF 1994, p. 36). Despite this, a more thorough analysis covering a longer 
period is still necessary.
Concerning the unstated objectives, FONAES and FOMUN were 
comparatively more effective than Children of Solidarity. While FONAES showed 
the possibilities of political demobilisation, FOMUN generated significant
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community participation around the construction of public works, something that 
imposed a dynamic on local governments and required them to change their way of 
operation. But Children of Solidarity failed to perform better in this respect 
because the scholarship scheme only benefited a limited number of children per 
school and, therefore, the majority of the children and their families, considered 
that their responsibilities in collaborating with the programme were limited.
In terms of efficiency, FONAES represented a good cost-benefit option for 
the projects which could match its regulations because its funds were cheap in 
comparison with those offered by commercial credit institutions. However, in 
terms of the time involved for the approval of a project, the programme faced 
serious delays, again, due to its complicated procedures. FOMUN in contrast, was 
able to lower the cost of public works because using the community labour force 
saved money. As a direct result of community participation, the work was finished 
in good time and the level of satisfaction of the community was increased. When 
the public works were carried out by private contractors, however, the quality was 
not as good and complaints from the community increased The most frequent 
delays were related to the structure of the budget cycle, rather than to procedures 
The inefficiency of the Children of Solidarity programme was directly related to 
the poor performance of the agencies of the health sector and their lack of 
collaboration with the programme As with FOMUN, the delays of the programme 
resulted from the dependence on the budget cycle in the country.
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Qualitative evaluation includes the ability of the programme to effect 
change in behavioural, organisational or environmental conditions Again FONAES 
is different from the other two. By using the programme as a tool for political 
demobilisation, it merely reinforced the values and practices that had prevailed in 
the Mexican public administration and political system. FOMUN and Children of 
Solidarity, by contrast, introduced institutional changes such as the Solidarity 
Committees and Solidarity Municipal Councils that allowed the participation of 
new actors in policy areas that were previously dominated by bureaucratic actors. 
This is a significant element because it influences the way public institutions have 
to perform in the future at the community level. This is one of the most significant 
elements of the solidarity strategy. It created institutions that opened up 
opportunities for actors that traditionally have been excluded from the decision­
making process.
Qualitative evaluation of the implementation process, is related to the 
programmes’ ability to restructure the implementation process Although FONAES 
had clear objectives, the procedures and rules governing its implementation limited 
its efficacy and efficiency By concentrating on the criteria for the allocation of 
funds, the programme lost its social aim The procedures and rules were only 
relaxed as a result of a political imperative and not in a search for social feasibility 
as was stated. FOMUN and Children of Solidarity were flexible and their 
objectives and means were redefined as necessary to allow the programmes to 
operate with maximum efficiency and efficacy.
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Another component of qualitative evaluation concerns the analytical 
framework behind the implementation of the programmes. As far as FONAES is 
concerned, it applied rigid requirements of a commercial nature to an economic 
sector characterised by its inability to meet commercial criteria. However, it is too 
soon to say whether the programme produced a behavioural or organisational 
change, and even if that was possible, it is significant that the largest number of 
groups supported by the programme, were in urban areas, Isla del Carmen and 
Campeche, and thus, it is easy to suppose that if change in behavioural or 
organisational terms occurred, it might have been as a result of their previous 
experience in economic activities and not as a result of the programme. By 
contrast, FOMUN and Children of Solidarity programmes developed a coherent 
relationship between the instruments of policy and the desired objectives
FONAES had unlimited access to funds in contrast to FOMUN and 
Children of Solidarity. These two faced problems throughout of insufficient and 
unreliable funding because of their dependence on the budget cycle.
In terms of power and ability to gain the co-operation among the 
participating agencies and to get the clientele involved, FONAES again was the 
least effective particularly because its design did not contemplate community 
participation. FOMUN obtained collaboration from the agencies involved and was 
able to involve its clientele, because it offered benefits to those who participated. 
Children of Solidarity, was only partially able to involve its clientele in the process, 
namely those children that benefited from the programme. The health agencies
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failed to collaborate adequately, because their participation implied increased work 
and no extra pay
Finally, in so far as the programmes overcame their problems, this was 
because they all had presidential support; popular mobilisation and access to funds. 
In relation to presidential support, this allowed FONAES, for example, to have 
unlimited access to funds or, as happened with Children of Solidarity and FOMUN, 
to displace actors that traditionally had controlled some policy arenas such as the 
allocation of contracts, or the allocation of scholarships (see Streeten 1994, p. 
140). Although resistance had to be overcome and informal negotiations and 
concessions made, the programme still managed to perform as desired.
The allocation of resources in the three programmes was also a common 
element. Popular mobilisation was a sine qua non in Children of Solidarity and 
FOMUN. In both, popular mobilisation was perceived by public officials as 
essential to improve the quality and, in the case of FOMUN, even the quantity of 
the provision. Community involvement, however, was not essential in FONAES. 
Here it was limited to the presentation of projects and was relatively unimportant.
The analytical framework that underpinned the programmes was adequate 
in FOMUN and Children of Solidarity, but not in FONAES. Paradoxically, the 
programmes with limited access to funds, showed better results that FONAES with 
unlimited funding. Children of Solidarity and FOMUN showed more power than 
FONAES in gaining collaboration and co-operation between agencies and
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clientele. The characteristics that would have made FONAES a decentralised 
programme were never apparent because it was not a service-oriented programme 
like FOMUN and Children of Solidarity. This programme was not offering a 
service like Children of Solidarity and FOMUN, both of which required continuous 
interaction over time between the deliverer and the recipients of the service.
Community participation was only possible in those programmes where the 
delivery of a service was involved. The inclusion of the community in the process 
was less costly and more effective in terms of matching needs and resources, and 
thus increasing the level of satisfaction. While in Children of Solidarity and 
FOMUN this component was fundamental, in FONAES it was more a formality 
than the real thing.
Explaining differences and similarities
According to Yin (1994), if there are more differences than similarities empirical 
generalisation is not possible and the study will become one of historical 
interpretation. But if there are more similarities than differences, then 
generalisations can be drawn and the study will become one of causal analysis.
From the previous analysis the programmes show the following similarities:
• All programmes had presidential support
• All of them are part of the government anti-poverty strategy of Solidarity with a 
bias to project idealism.
•  All experienced delays
• The programmes had a hidden political agenda, that is, their unstated objectives.
Their differences are:
I
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• The programmes are different in their degree of centralisation, FONAES was 
centralised and FOMUN and Children of Solidarity were equally decentralised
• FONAES showed less local representation than FOMUN and Children of 
Solidarity.
• FONAES gained little local support whereas this was strong in the case of the 
other two programmes.
• FONAES had fewer actors than FOMUN and Children of Solidarity, each of 
which had an equally large number of actors.
• FONAES was not dependent on the budget cycle, as were the others and was 
also much more generously funded.
• Two of the programmes, FOMUN and Children of Solidarity, aimed to provide 
a service and not to produce a process like FONAES.
• FONAES showed no flexibility to adjust its procedures to local conditions as 
with Children of Solidarity or FOMUN.
It is clear that the study was more fertile in identifying differences than 
similarities. In general, FONAES stands alone, while FOMUN and Children of 
Solidarity share more characteristics. This suggests an historical interpretation and 
not one of empirical generalisation. The atypical case is FONAES which although 
included in the anti-poverty strategy, showed, by virtue of its objectives, strategies 
and methods of implementation, a mismatch with the solidarity strategy. Its 
achievements are to be seen in the long term, and as such, its natural bureaucratic 
environment cannot be tied to a presidential term. If it had been possible to insert 
this programme in a long term strategy, rather than in a conjunctural anti-poverty 
initiative, success would have been more likely. By contrast, FOMUN and Children 
of Solidarity, are suitable for short term strategies because they represent a trend in 
terms of anti-poverty programmes, that is, the inclusion of non bureaucratic actors 
whose participation has been temporal and tied to certain political projects.
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However, when comparing Children of Solidarity and FOMUN, the similarities are 
overwhelming. They only differ in the incompatibility shown with other 
commitments. While the old scheme of scholarships was considered by some 
teachers and head teachers a better strategy, FOMUN represented a better option 
because in many cases the programme increased the funds that local and state 
governments had received traditionally by the normal federal funding scheme.
One condition necessary to produce better implementation is to offer to all 
actors involved, attractive pay-offs to gain their collaboration and increase their 
sense of urgency. If a programme cannot offer pay-offs to the actors involved, it 
will not generate collaboration and an appropriate sense of urgency. In fact, the 
sense of urgency only seems to be important to participants when they perceive 
that their collaboration will bring positive compensations.
The number of actors involved in the implementation of a programme is not 
an important factor for a policy to be effective, rather the kind of actors involved, 
the nature of the programme and the set of norms which establish their 
interactions.
From the previous analysis, the inclusion of the target population in 
designing a policy and in the implementation process is important, no matter the 
number of actors it may require and the perspectives they have. Collaboration and 
co-operation with the programme will be obtained from all the actors involved if, 
by participating in the process, they receive compensations. Perhaps one of the
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problems with policies aimed to effect change in behavioural, organisational or 
environmental conditions, is that they usually represent threats to bureaucratic 
actors within any area of policy. A policy is more likely to succeed if it transforms 
such threats into opportunities FOMUN clearly exemplifies this. Although its rules 
were clear so as to minimise the diversion or misappropriation of funds at the state, 
municipal and community level, they were also vague enough to accommodate the 
interests of all its participants. All they had to do was find the way. Sufficient 
allocation of funds is essential but FONAES demonstrates that this does not 
guarantee successful implementation.
There is no one single cure-all technique for a successful implementation. 
The context, the programme, the participants and the rules of the programme, can 
all produce different combinations. That is why few recommendations may be 
drawn from the analysis of the implementation o f each programme. When 
considering the cases under study as a whole, as combinations of interactions, the 
possible results will always be different
Although Derthick (1972) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) have 
different measures of successful implementation, they conclude that only limited 
and relative success is possible. For Derthick, mutual adaptation essentially means 
that no federal programme will be a complete success The process of mutual 
adjustment will necessarily produce a programme which is not federal, nor local, 
but a mixture of both. This mixture also explains the delays, costs, and lack of 
achievement of the objectives which are the natural consequence of the process of
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implementation. For Pressman and Wildavsky, on the other hand, success will 
always be a function of the technology required to effect change in behavioural, 
organisational and environmental conditions, and also, will depend on the size of 
the problem and the magnitude of the change required. As Browne and Wildavsky 
(1983, p. 230) argue ‘in our evolutionary (or learning) view of implementation as 
mutual adaptation a little anticipation and a lot of resilience go a long way. 
Combining the two so that there is continuous mutual adaptation between 
programme and experience, implementation then being both prospective and 
retrospective, is admittedly a compromise It is neither insistent on existing 
programmes or on systemic change but on the gradualism implied in the 
evolutionary metaphor. Error remains, but, we think, it is not as great as if either 
approach were followed alone.’
Therefore, there are no absolute criteria for success because any products 
from the learning process which result from the implementation of policies, will be 
incorporated into the design of new policies. In this sense, the innovations or the 
results of the learning process will remain in the area of design and not in the area 
of implementation, an area that has to be open to trial and error and continuous 
learning.
Conclusions
An examination of the process of implementation of the three programmes 
illustrates that even in a centralised political system like the Mexican one, local
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actors successfully challenge the rigid procedures that such centralisation implies 
during the implementation of public policy. Indeed, the FONAES programme 
supports Derthick regarding the limitations of centralisation and the impossibility 
of a federal government avoiding local modifications of the policy. But conversely, 
decentralisation or maximising discretion at the point of service delivery in a 
context prone to politically motivated meddling, without effective means of 
control, may result in worse results. Furthermore, the evidence presented suggests 
that Children of Solidarity and FOMUN were successfully implemented despite 
fundamental decisions remaining centralised and despite the lack of consensus and 
negotiations with local actors. This was because the programmes were flexible 
enough and adapted their procedures and goals according to the context. 
Nevertheless, flexibility seemed to be much more important than building a local 
consensus or promoting negotiation with local actors
In relation to the allocation of resources and interorganisational 
relationships, the evidence suggests that the availability of substantial resources, as 
in the case of FONAES, does not guarantee effectiveness. The analysis suggests 
that in order to influence local actions and gain collaboration, the creation of 
incentives seems to be essential. FOMUN offers the best example in this respect 
and FONAES the worst.
Local representation proved to be important in the implementation process. 
FONAES again stands alone because spaces for local representation were not 
created. The same situation accounts for the generation of local support during the
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implementation. Finally, in two of the cases, Children of Solidarity and FOMUN, 
an adaptation process allowed the goals and the way they were achieved to be 
transformed or adapted to the needs and expectations of the target population, an 
element absent in FONAES. By doing this, the Children of Solidarity and FOMUN 
programmes achieved more effective implementation.
It is clear that the number of actors involved is not directly related to the 
success of the programme. Perspectives and rewards, rather than the number of 
actors, matter most. However, complexity is certainly related to the number of 
participants but also to the particular policy area In this respect, FONAES shows 
that although the number of participants was comparatively small, its 
implementation was less effective. Whereas Children of Solidarity and FOMUN 
were complex but yet more effective.
An important element in the effective performance of the programmes was 
the analytical framework that oriented their implementation While Children of 
Solidarity and FOMUN rightly connected instruments of policy with objectives, 
FONAES failed to do so. Maximising discretion is not necessarily effective in 
improving the implementation of a public policy. The conditions in which this 
occurs determine its usefulness
Finally, there is a distinction that has to be made in understanding the 
differences between the programmes. This refers to procedurally-oriented 
programmes and goal-oriented ones If a programme can be successfully expressed
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in procedural terms, if its success depends upon the adoption of certain procedures 
and on the involvement of certain people, then its chances of successful 
implementation are much greater. In a goal oriented programme, where success 
depends on results and not on procedures, then the chances of successful 
implementation are less. It is true that FOMUN and Children of Solidarity are both 
committed to the achievement of goals and procedures but they are more 
representative of the first case in which the objective was to get people involved. 
But even if the construction of public works or increasing school attendance were 
partially achieved, popular involvement was important for its own sake. In 
FONAES on the contrary, the whole structure was subordinated to producing real 
jobs and if the programme could not do that, then the programme was a failure. 
Because of this, it was more vulnerable to implementation failure. While FONAES 
depended only on one measure of success, Children o f Solidarity and FOMUN 
depended on two, in terms of process and in terms of goal achievement.
In short, this research shows that there are some areas in which we have 
confirmed existing theory and other areas in which we have added new knowledge 
to the understanding of the process of policy implementation. What the 
implementation of the programmes shows is that there are no formulae for the 
implementation of a policy, which can be applied without considering contextual 
variables. This is the problem with the three theoretical approaches reviewed in this 
chapter. Decentralisation seems to be a better strategy to connect federal initiatives 
with local needs It is logical to think that the more participants in the
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implementation of a policy, the more complex it gets and the less chances it has of 
succeeding. Or that maximising discretion at the point of service delivery will 
improve the effectiveness of a public policy. Nevertheless, all sorts of 
recommendations with such degree of generality are condemned to fail if they do 
not take into consideration the context in which they will be eventually 
implemented. It is necessary therefore to insist that the implementation of a public 
policy be considered as a whole, as a combination of characteristics which include 
the inherent features of the policy and the contextual variables.
In political terms the research has also produced useful information. The 
comparison of the programmes showed that in Mexico the presidency still exerts 
important influence in policy making and implementation. But we must not 
overlook the importance of the political manoeuvring of bureaucratic actors at 
federal, state and municipal level. Studies like this one are useful in illustrating the 
means by which bureaucratic actors can obstruct policy implementation. This 
reinforces the assumption that the governing coalition in Mexico is far from 
homogeneous. Because of its multi regional composition, interests at the federal 
level may not be coincident with those in the states. Indeed, policy design does not 
reflect this, but during the implementation stage local interests and perceptions 
emerge, frequently erecting insuperable obstacles to the implementation of federal 
policy.
The disparities between federal intentions and local ones, also reflect the 
extent to which the intra-elite struggles of the governing coalition in Mexico are
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affecting policy making and implementation. This partially explains why the 
communitarian model of policy implementation of Solidarity was so unanimously 
rejected by party actors at all levels in Mexican politics, who perceived it as a 
threat to vested interests and to the patronage and clientelistic oriented model in 
which policy making and implementation had been based for decades.
Because of this multi-regional composition of the political elite, it was 
difficult to find a single and recurrent pattern in the country. In some places the 
programme achieved more because the implementation of the programme 
encountered a balance of power receptive to the model embedded in Solidarity. In 
others, like Chiapas, the programme was perceived as a federal attempt to change 
that balance of power and the successful implementation of the programme was 
seriously diminished. Likewise, in Campeche the results were mixed. While in some 
municipalities the programme performed well (Hopelchén), in others (Campeche 
and Isla del Carmen) its performance was less effective.
In sum, because the implementation process is political, the success of 
Solidarity depended largely on the extent to which it affected the balance of power 
in a given situation. Where resistance was significant, presidential power, 
availability of resources and incentives, and community participation were essential 
to overcome it. Because of this, policy implementation may well be a process of 
mutual adaptation, but most importantly it is a process of political negotiation 
which cannot be anticipated and which has to be directed with flexibility, 
resources, clear objectives, and as Wildavsky notes, with a bit of luck.
Chapter 7
From Solidarity to the National Alliance for Welfare 
Introduction
Presidential transitions in Mexico represent an opportunity for the governing 
coalition to redefine the political agenda and to alter the distribution of power in 
the country. Changes may show certain continuity (Miguel Aleman/Ruiz Cortines) 
or signs of rupture (Cardenas/Avila Camacho); these may be restricted to certain 
policy areas, while others may show some sort of continuity. But such changes are 
a key element in the political and economic reshaping of the Mexican political 
system.
However, there are other causes of change In a political system in which 
the President has a significant role in the designation of his successor (the Calles 
syndrome), the new president and his administration are nevertheless urged to 
show autonomy and independence in the design and implementation of policies. 
Presidential transitions in Mexico then, allow the incoming coalition to impose its 
vision of the country and to break with the previous one. This partially explains the 
lack of continuity in many areas of policy. This is aggravated by the fact that 
presidential initiatives have traditionally been the most important source of policy 
making in Mexico. Therefore as soon as the new administration takes office, those 
policies that have the former president’s personal stamp are either modified or
abandoned
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But the country has also changed in the last 12 years. Economic and 
political circumstances have limited the manoeuvring of new administrations. In the 
context of economic disaster, growing social concern, and political instability, the 
chances of designing radically different policies have been seriously reduced.
The context in which the last presidential transition took place was hardly 
smooth. Economically, the Zedillo administration had to cope with several 
problems: a devalued peso; a banking system on the brink of collapse; eroded 
international reserves; increased external debt and capital flight.
Politically, although Zedillo’s presidential election was legally recognised 
by all parties, the new president took office facing a lack of political support and 
credibility and in general, a political crisis of a kind not seen in the country for 
more than SO years. Political assassinations, an alarming increase in crime and 
public insecurity, not only in the city but around the country, coupled with growing 
repression by recalcitrant governors, characterised the first days of his 
administration. The problems of Chiapas, far from being solved, have been added 
to by the guerrilla movement in Guerrero. The are signs too, that similar 
movements exist elsewhere suggesting the growing militarisation of the country. 
During the first year of government, important changes at ministerial level reflected 
the lack of political stability inside the new administration. The Home Secretary,
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considered as a moderniser, was replaced by an old politician identified with PRJ’s 
hard-liners and the governor of the state of Nuevo León resigned1
Economically and politically then, the new administration must find policy 
innovation difficult. Some sort of continuity is more likely. In economic terms, the 
Zedillo administration has strengthened structural reform by further deregulation, 
privatisation and the reinforcement of a market oriented economy (Carstens and 
Schwartz 1996). In terms of social policy, the new administration is also following 
an antipoverty programme that does not differ greatly from that of the Salinas 
administration. The so-called National Alliance for Welfare-NAW has replaced the 
PRONASOL and although many of the sub-programmes of solidarity have 
disappeared, the most important still remain.
The objective of this chapter is to describe the new anti-poverty policy of 
the Zedillo administration, the National Alliance of Welfare-NAW, and how the 
current political and economic context has affected its design and implementation. 
The main differences with its predecessor will be highlighted less in terms of 
procedures than in terms of the politics involved in its redefinition. Some remarks 
will be made concerning NAW’s future before drawing some conclusions.
1 T h is  is  a n  u n w ritte n  ru le  o f  th e  M ex ican  Political System . G o v ern o rs  a re  no t responsive to  th e ir  
e lec to ra te  b u t in  fo rm al term s. In  p rac tice , they  do  no t re s ig n  to  th e ir  p o sts  un less th e  P residen t 
d ec id es  so a n d  on ly  i f  th e re  ex is t se rious co n cern s a b o u t th e ir  loyalty  to  th e  P residen t. Publicly , 
th e ir  re s ig n a tio n s  a re  ju s tif ie d  o n  the  g ro u n d s o f  'h e a lth  p ro b lem s’ o r  se rious scan d als  o f  
co rru p tio n . A lth o u g h  th e  R izo  ad m in is tra tio n  in cu rred  in  n ep o tism  an d  in fluence tra ffick ing , it is 
com m o n ly  accep ted  th a t th e  G o v e rn o r’s personal re la tio n  w ith  fo rm er P re sid en t S a lin as p layed a 
m o re  s ig n if ic an t ro le  in  h is  resigna tion .
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N A W ’s  Political and Economic Framework
The context in which the National Alliance for Welfare is being implemented is 
completely different from that of Solidarity where there was a plethora of 
resources produced by a major process of privatisation, a strong fiscal reform and a 
re-negotiation of the Mexican external debt The economic situation within Mexico 
changed radically in December 1994 and the new administration under Zedillo was 
inaugurated in a context of severe austerity. As Panuco-Laguette and Szekely 
(1996, p 189) note, a combination of an overvalued exchange rate; the lack of a 
clear policy in this matter and a high trade deficit as well as the rise of interest rates 
in the United States, resulted in massive capital flight and the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso. A severe financial crisis followed due to a lack of international 
reserves to meet short-term obligations, namely tesobonos, amounting to more 
than $40 billion. This ended with an impressive rescue plan from the United States 
and the International Monetary Fund Internally, the Mexican government took 
measures both to increase domestic savings and to reduce public expenditure. The 
prices of some public sector goods and services such as electricity, gasoline and 
petrochemicals were increased and government expenditure was reduced by 1.3 
percent o f  GDP (Carstens and Schwartz 1996, p. 123)
Politically the situation was not easy either Although factionalism inside 
the governing coalition had dominated the political scenario since 1982, when a 
new group of politicians joined the presidential office, it was under Salinas that this 
was problem became more severe. This caused political turmoil that directly
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affected old forms of political control used for a long time by hard-line PRI 
politicians. The arrival o f the so-called modernisers posed a threat to their 
interests. The exacerbation of the political violence of recent years could partially 
be explained in this way.
Unlike previous presidential transitions in Mexico, this political and 
economic context not only seriously restrained the government’s room for 
manoeuvre but also gave continuity to certain areas of policy. The reasons for this 
are: first, Zedillo shaped his political career inside the Salinas camarilla or clique 
where he was appointed first as Secretary of Planning and Budgeting and later of 
Education2, and therefore, many of the policies implemented now by Zedillo were 
already known to him. Second, continuity is likely to be the tone of the Zedillo 
administration because he holds that an economic policy of deregulation, an 
increasing role of market forces in the economy and the retrenchment of the state 
apparatus, are, under present conditions, the only viable and feasible economic 
alternative for the country. Finally, continuity is more likely because of the 
constraints imposed by the international climate. The process of integration implicit 
in the NAFTA and more importantly the conditions imposed by the economic 
rescue package granted jointly by the IMF and the government of the United States 
in 1995, limit the room for action of the new administration.
2F o r  a  study  o f  th e  S a linas p o litic a l c lique , see C am p  1990.
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Despite the fact that continuity is likely to be the tone of the Zedillo 
administration, his policies of new federalism and decentralisation, the 
reinforcement of the rule of law and his apparent distance from the PRI, deserve 
particular attention.
ZEDILLO’S  NEW FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALISATION
The “new federalism” of the Zedillo administration aims to redistribute authority, 
responsibilities and resources to states and municipalities in the country, as well as 
to bring to an end the historical inclination towards centralisation and 
authoritarianism which has concentrated resources, decisions and incentives and 
which has discouraged the participation and balanced development of Mexican 
regions. It is his conviction that by means of a decentralisation process, a more 
effective use of resources and a more sensible response to local needs will be 
achieved. Implicit is the fact that by transferring resources and decision-making 
responsibilities to states and municipalities, it will be easier to palliate the effects of 
the economic crisis and the related costs of the stabilisation and structural 
adjustment programmes. So far, according to Zedillo’s Second State o f  the Nation 
Report (1996), specific actions have been taken to ensure the achievement of this 
objective, such as the transfer of two thirds of the national resources allocated to 
anti-poverty objectives and the increase of power in states and municipalities, 
allowing them to control levels of taxation in their jurisdictions It is too soon to 
evaluate whether these policies have fulfilled their administrative purposes; but 
their meaning in political terms is significant
\The new federalism and decentralisation policies of Zedillo serve to bring 
the government political legitimacy in times when it is badly needed Many policies 
under Salinas were implemented with a firm and tight control from the presidential 
office. Indeed, the centralised way in which federal programmes are implemented 
around the country is not new. But there is a general agreement that it was under 
the Salinas administration that such centralisation reached its apex. In the case of 
Solidarity for example, the role of the state branches o f federal SEDESOL 
competed and sometimes seriously confronted the authority o f state and municipal 
political actors. The role played by the state branches of federal SEDESOL was a 
source of conflict with governors and mayors who either perceived Solidarity 
officials as a threat to their vested interests, or as a threat to their authority 
Political differences between the federation and some states were so strong that by 
the end of the Salinas’ administration, 17 governors had been forced to resign 
(Serrano 1996 p. 17). It is true that the country can no longer afford the costs of 
centralisation in the current economic and political circumstances. But, it is also 
true that the policies of the new federalism and decentralisation may well serve the 
purposes of re-establishing the balance of power that the Salinas administration 
seriously disrupted
This is one of the differences between the Salinas and Zedillo 
administrations. While Salinas had the resources, both political and economic, as 
well as international support, to bypass entrenched bureaucratic and regional 
political interests, Zedillo is highly limited in this respect Salinas could afford the
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Vimplementation of an ambitious social initiative by bypassing bureaucratic interest 
and by actually confronting the traditional forms of political domination and party 
politics. But Zedillo is seriously constrained and he cannot afford to shake-up the 
political structures and institutions as Salinas did. On the contrary, he has to clean 
up the political mess left by Salinas and try to calm the intra-elite struggle that 
Salinas seriously altered. This is partially why the changes introduced to the NAW 
reflect the ascendancy of bureaucratic actors in the implementation process.
However, while those changes may bring political support from governors, 
federal advocates, and in general from those groups who were affected during the 
Salinas administration, they are not visible for ordinary people. Instead, the Zedillo 
administration is looking for popular support by presenting his administration as 
one morally concerned, based on honest and rigorous performance, and by 
reinforcing the rule of law. This is the basis o f his political appeal and presumably 
that is why he does not need spectacular new policies.
The National Alliance for Welfare-NAW
Based on a philosophy of new federalism, decentralisation, regional development, 
and community participation, the new government’s anti-poverty policy aims to be 
comprehensive, federalist and participatory, all-embracing and effective. In 
accordance with the National Development Plan's guidelines, the NAW will 
implement its programs to pay appropriate attention to Indian peoples, agricultural 
day-workers, young people, the disabled, and the elderly. Like Solidarity, the
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NAW covers essential areas that according to international organisations (ILO 
1995, p. 25), any anti-poverty strategy must cover in periods of economic 
adjustment. In the new anti-poverty strategy of the government, programmes such 
as the Emergency Employment Programme, the modified version of the FONAES 
programme, and a programme for the decentralisation of health services, seem to 
echo this preoccupation
The NAW is made up of 5 national Funds: the Fund for Social Municipal 
Development (FSMD), the Fund for the Development of Indigenous Groups, the 
Fund of Support of Social Groups, the Regional Development Fund and the 
National Fund in Support of Solidarity Enterprises (FONAES). Four other 
programmes are also included. These are the National Programme for Family 
Nutrition, the Emergency Programme for Temporary Employment, the National 
Artisanship Fund and a programme in support of arid zones through the National 
Commission for Arid Zones-CONAZA.
The NAW differs from Solidarity in two important respects. First, it has 
redefined both its target population and the regions which deserve urgent attention. 
While the resources of Solidarity allowed broader targeting, the NAW is more 
narrow in its scope and therefore less politically beneficial. This is so because 
better definition of target groups diminishes likely spin offs which, as with 
Solidarity, carries political advantage. Rigid targeting as in the case of Solidarity 
was not necessary because the programme wished to accomplish two objectives: it 
had to palliate the effects of the major economic restructuring process of the
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country, and also to build new political relationships. By means of loose targeting, 
the programme created spin offs from which political support was gained and this 
was reflected in the 1991 elections However, NAW has a more strictly economic 
rationale and so rigid targeting had to be applied. Thus the popular support that 
usually accompanies more broadly targeted programmes is lacking.
A second difference with Solidarity is that the policy of decentralisation has 
actually reinforced the role of states and municipalities in the decision-making and 
implementation process of the programme, something that had been diminished 
under the solidarity scheme. In practice, decentralisation has meant the reallocation 
of more resources to states and municipalities and the reinforcement of their 
authority vis-à-vis the federation. According to Zedillo’s second state of the nation 
report (Zedillo Ponce de Leon 1996), 7,150 billion pesos of the 11 thousand billion 
of the anti-poverty budget, the so-called Brand XXVI, in 1996 have been 
transferred to municipal governments
FUND FOR SOCIAL MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT-FSMD
The Fund for Social Municipal Development-FSMD aims to provide poverty 
pockets with minimal urban services by the allocation of funds in areas o f basic, 
social and productive infrastructure Basic infrastructure includes drinking water 
projects, sewage, health and educational infrastructure, electricity and rural feeder 
roads. Public works of a different kind can also be funded upon the decision of the 
Municipal Development Council (MDC), the basic unit of operation of the 
programme. The FSMD also allocates federal funds in municipalities for the
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implementation of educational programmes such as the Incentives for Basic 
Education-IBE {Estímulos a la Educación Básica), which replaces the Children of 
Solidarity programme. Finally, in productive terms, the FSMD allocates funds for 
the implementation of the programme Credit on Word-CW {Crédito a la Palabra), 
which substitutes Solidarity Production Funds and the objective of which is to 
share the risk with producers in zones of barrenness. Compared to Solidarity, an 
important element has been added to the operation of the programme. This is the 
funds allocated for projects aimed to strengthen the administrative abilities of 
municipal governments by including in its operation budget allocations for courses, 
the acquisition of equipment as well as studies that might help to develop 
administrative and institutional capabilities at the municipal level of government.
The allocation of funds to states and municipalities is made according to 
their level of income as well as levels of poverty. The FSMD now transfers up to 
two thirds of national funds of the anti-poverty budget branch 26, ‘Poverty 
Suppression’ {Superación de la Pobreza)3 to the municipalities through the state 
governments which must distribute the funds in their territory according to a 
formula based on population distribution.
As with the PRONASOL, community participation in the funding of the 
projects is important. The community has to contribute at least 20 percent of the 
total cost of the project, either money, manpower or local materials. If the projects
3U n d er th e  P R O N A S O L  th is  b udget b ran ch  w as ca lled  'S o lid a rity  a n d  R egional D ev elo p m en t’.
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are for pavements or streets, the percentage must be 35 per cent, and in the case of 
parks, civic squares and small sport facilities, the community must contribute 50 
per cent of the total cost of the project. It differs however from Solidarity in that 
more is expected from the community. Again the limitation of resources seems to 
be at the root of the problem.
In organisational terms, the Fund creates the Municipal Development 
Council (MDC) which substitutes the Solidarity Municipal Council as the central 
operative part of the programme and which replaces the community in deciding the 
projects to be implemented in the communities of the municipality. No allocation of 
federal funds is made to the municipality if it has not created its MDC. Although 
the Fund limits the kind of public works to be implemented, municipal 
governments may decide with the MDC the kind of public work, even if this has 
not been originally considered in the regulations of the Fund. Additionally, the 
MDC may be replaced by the Planning Committees for Municipal Development- 
COPLADEMUN, a bureaucratic board in each municipal administration that 
centralises the planning efforts at this level of government and which is also chaired 
by the Mayor. The new Fund, however, stresses that this can only be done if social 
participation is encouraged inside the COPLADEMUN. But this is a municipal 
prerogative
A municipal proposal of the number of public works to be carried out in 
each municipality is submitted to the state government for validation and funding. 
On submission, each project must be accompanied by technical files in which
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details of the project are given. Community projects where the total value does not 
exceed £3,500 (roughly 40,000 new pesos) will be approved directly by the MDC 
without the State Government endorsement. Projects which exceed £3,500 have to 
be approved by the State Government. In both cases the resources are allocated to 
the municipality once they have been approved by the State government. Each 
community whose project was selected must create a Communitarian Committee 
which will be in charge of the implementation of the project. As with PRONASOL, 
the committee is selected in a community assembly and it is made up of a chair 
person, one secretary, a treasurer and a spokesperson from vigilance and control. 
Similarly, the implementation of the project must be carried out by the community, 
but if this cannot be done, it is up to the MDC to decide whether the project is 
contracted to a private company or carried out directly by the municipal 
government
Differences from FOMUN
An obvious difference is that the new programme is less comprehensive than its 
predecessor. Although several programmes have been cancelled, the highly 
sensitive areas have been maintained Because of the political discredit that the 
cancellation of certain programmes would cause, the former Children of Solidarity 
programme keeps its aims but with a different system for the allocation of the 
scholarships Under the new regulations, the selection of children is made by a 
committee made up by parents and school authorities Almost 800,000
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scholarships were delivered to poor children around the country during 1996 
(Zedillo Ponce de León 1996).
In organisational terms, the new Fund presumably works in a more 
decentralised way by transferring important decisions regarding financial and 
operational matters to states and municipalities The Fund has reinforced the 
authority of mayors and state governors in the implementation of the programme. 
While Solidarity aimed to bypass recalcitrant governors and mayors who often 
diverted public funds, the FSMD now reinforces their role in the decision making 
process with regard to the kind of projects to be implemented, the management of 
resources and even in defining the modalities of community participation in the 
programme. One of the reasons for the centralised way in which the Solidarity 
programme was implemented was both to bypass some political actors at the state 
and municipal level who frequently divert public funds and at the same time to 
displace the power that bureaucratic actors have traditionally exerted in the 
implementation of public policies. But the new programme has reversed this. By 
introducing important institutional and financial changes, the role of state and 
municipal authorities in the decision making process has been reinstated
Institutionally, the objective and functioning of the Municipal Development 
Council (MDC) has changed. Projects are now approved for implementation inside 
the MDC. While under the Solidarity programme community projects were funded 
as long as they were presented by a Solidarity Committee and met the regulations 
o f the programme, now the approval of projects depends on the decision of the
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MDC and not on the community’s initiative In this respect, under Solidarity 
municipal authorities sometimes played a rather formal role. Even if they blocked a 
community proposal, the state branch of federal SEDESOL, could still grant funds 
directly for the project, overriding municipal jurisdiction. Institutional and direct 
links existed between the community and the programme, in cases where reluctant 
municipal authorities could obstruct community initiatives. Now, although 
community proposals are considered by the MDC the decision for funding is taken 
inside the MDC which is chaired by the mayor, and who controls the whole 
process. It is then at the municipal level where community proposals are approved. 
Furthermore, the support which the community received from the state branch of 
federal SEDESOL, has been reduced According to the Fund’s manual of 
operation, the representative of federal SEDESOL can participate in the MDC with 
a voice but not with a vote.
Financially too, the role of the federation in the implementation of the 
programme has been diminished. Under Solidarity, for example, if a project met the 
regulations of the programme, and the municipal authorities blocked the project for 
any reason, the state branch of federal SEDESOL could fund the community 
proposal bypassing municipal jurisdiction. The direct link between the community 
and the source of funds created under Solidarity no longer exists. This has 
seriously diminished the community’s bargaining position because, once presented 
for approval inside the MDC, the mayor will have an important say in deciding 
which projects are funded. The new role assigned to federal SEDESOL is that of
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merely ensuring that the regulations of the programme are met and reporting the 
implementation of the programme to Mexico city. The role that bureaucratic actors 
lost under Solidarity, has now been restored. The problem is that in a bureaucratic 
structure like the Mexican one, public funds are frequently diverted by bureaucratic 
actors whose performance is oriented by patrimonial and parochial values and 
where public accountability does not exist.
The decentralised way in which the FSMD now aims to work, must be 
analysed against the unwavering and determined way in which federal SEDESOL 
and the President himself implemented the Solidarity programme Although the 
federal spirit of the new programme is positive, there is still the question of how 
such an spirit will be interpreted and implemented by recalcitrant governors and 
many other municipal governments who still rule in their territories employing and 
reproducing the same centralist attitude which they reject and where the rule of law 
is frequently displaced by discretionary decisions, patronage and clientelism.
THE NEW NA TIONAL FUND IN  SUPPORT OF SOLIDARITY ENTERPRISES-FONAES 
Important changes have also been introduced to the FONAES programme. Under 
the new regulations, the state branch of the programme now allocates funds to 
productive projects in urban areas while those for rural one, are managed by the 
Credit on Word Programme. The projects are funded only if they have been jointly 
selected by a committee made up of representatives of the municipal government, 
the state branch of the National Chamber of Transformation Industry- 
CANACINTRA and representatives of state and federal SEDESOL. The funds are
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now managed by each municipal government and the state branch of FONAES 
merely ensures that the regulations are met.
Proposals are now presented by individuals through the municipal 
government, which also helps the group with the formulation of the project. If the 
project meets the social and economic criteria of the programme, funds are 
allocated through an agreement between the programme, state SEDESOL, and the 
mayor. It is at this level that the control and supervision of the projects funded by 
FONAES are carried out. Federal and state SEDESOL simply monitor the 
management of the programme
Differences with the old FONAES
The most significant difference from the old FONAES is that decisions regarding 
the approval and funding of a project are no longer taken in Mexico city. The 
central role of the federation in controlling the resources of this programme has 
been diminished. The more decentralised way in which the programme now 
operates will presumably speed up the process of allocation of resources to 
community projects but most of all, will presumably allocate resources in a more 
effective way. Under the old scheme, the time for funding a project took on 
average 6 months and sometimes, the projects which received funding were not 
necessarily the neediest. The new scheme assumes that by allowing the 
participation of local actors who are more familiar with the economic situation of 
the municipality, to select the projects, there will be better and faster targeting.
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However, left to local politics, the selection of projects will not necessarily 
improve. First, if the regulations of the new programme regarding the use of funds 
are similar to  the previous scheme, the degree of technical skills required for the 
elaboration o f the project could hardly be met by municipal authorities who now 
must help individuals in the design of the projects since the private firms that used 
to do this have now disappeared Second, the replacement of federal decisions by a 
collegiate and local body, will not necessarily translate into less time or better 
targeting, rather it might increase the time for deliberation since several actors (the 
mayor, the representatives of local business associations and those of federal and 
state SEDESOL) are now involved. The priorities of the governor, the mayor and 
local business may differ. Because it is highly unlikely that local politics will change 
during the next few years, the governor or the mayor will end up deciding what 
projects are funded. This was so in the old scheme but their role was held in check 
by the federation. Now that their role has been strengthened, there is less reason 
to be optimistic.
Another difference between the new FONAES and its predecessor, is that 
rural projects are now funded with resources from the Credit on Word programme, 
while FONAES will fund only those in urban areas Better targeting could hardly 
be the reason for the new structure of the programme In a state in which the main 
economic activity is agricultural, and in which the main pockets of poverty are 
located in rural areas, the exclusion of rural projects from the programme will 
seriously limit its impact, not only because the kind of enterprises that can be
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created in the cities of the state will produce fewer jobs, but also because the 
population is already better off in the cities than that in the rural areas.
T h e  L i k e l y  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  N A W
Some features of NAW cause concern about problems which may arise in its 
implementation and its ultimate success. These were elements of importance in the 
Solidarity programme which have not received priority under NAW.
BUREAUCRATIC PREVALENCE OR MASTERY
A common thread runs through the new programme, that is, that the role of 
bureaucratic actors has been strengthened in comparison with that of the 
community. The new regulations of the programme have increased the power of 
bureaucratic actors in the implementation process. This can be justified to a limited 
extent. As noted by a municipal officer in the city of Campeche4, allowing the 
community to decide and implement public works does not necessarily translate 
into better results. In some communities, for example, it is quite hard for its 
members to reach agreement about very simple objectives. Deliberation, meetings, 
deciding whether the project will be public lighting or pavements, are processes 
that take time and which are not always coincident with the timing set by the 
federation for resource spending
4P erso n al co rresp o n d en ce . M a rch  7, 1996.
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A second reason that reinforces bureaucratic leadership in the 
implementation process, is that community participation frequently represents a 
source of conflict among its members and political problems for municipal 
authorities. For some communities, approving projects in this or that area, usually 
reflects the preferences o f the authorities for some groups inside the community. 
As mentioned by one informant, ‘if you give to one, you have to give to all’5, a 
common situation is one in which projects only benefited members of the 
community who supported the mayor during his political campaign or the clientele 
of powerful neighbourhood leaders who grew up with PRI support.
Municipal authorities then not only decide where and the kind of projects 
to be carried out in the communities, but also implement the public works so as to 
speed up the building process and to diminish the conflict between community 
members and authorities.
NUMBER OF ACTORS AND PERSPECTIVES
The inclusion of new actors in the decision making and implementation of the 
programme is a significant element of the NAW. It is true that, particularly in the 
case of the Fund for Social Municipal Development-FSMD, the number of actors 
has not been increased compared with that of FOMUN. But in terms of policy 
implementation, it will be interesting to find out whether the FSMD is effectively
*P ersonal co rrespondence . March 7, 1996.
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implemented having changed the norms that regulate the interaction between the 
actors involved in the implementation process.
Although the FSMD has not increased the number of actors, the likely 
success of its implementation has been diminished because the actor with a direct 
incentive for a successful implementation has been relatively displaced by the 
preponderance of bureaucratic actors. In contrast with FOMUN in which the 
reinforcement of institutional mechanisms increased the community’s bargaining 
position in the implementation of the programme, the NAW in practice discourages 
community involvement and confines important decisions to state and municipal 
actors.
The new FONAES offers an interesting contrast. Under the old scheme, 
because the number of actors was very small, more effective implementation was 
expected. However, the results of the programme did not support such an 
assumption. Although in the case of FONAES the explanation for such a failure 
was not related to the number of actors but to the misleading analytical framework 
used by the programme, it proved that the programme was highly ineffective 
regardless o f its reduced number of actors. Although it is too soon to evaluate the 
new programme’s performance, it is likely that the increased number of actors 
involved in the decision making process will require more time, and the resources 
will not necessarily be better targeted because of the influence of local political
actors.
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PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT
Presidential support proved to be an important feature of the implementation of the 
Solidarity strategy The personal link that Salinas established with Solidarity gave 
the programme the necessary vigour to curb the administrative and political 
obstacles at the local level and to surmount the political inertia and technical flaws 
rooted in state and municipal administrative structures. But it is perhaps because of 
this personal link between the programme and the former president, that the new 
programme has not received the same political support from the presidential office. 
The enthusiasm of the Salinas administration for Solidarity was set aside and NAW 
was implemented like any other federal policy with only official support. But, as 
became clear with Solidarity, more than official support is required if anti-poverty 
programmes are to succeed in the context of weak institutions bedevilled by 
patronage and clientelism. Some groups may oppose the channelling of funds 
through local communities where this might interfere with patronage and where 
alternative power centres may develop In the absence of a Salinas-style 
Presidential/community link, NAW is empowering bureaucratic actors in the 
process of implementation and decreasing the community’s bargaining position, 
that is indirectly supporting patronage and the old order
Conclusions
The policies of new federalism and decentralisation of the new government have 
introduced important differences in the operation of the NAW compared with 
Solidarity. The programme was designed not only to carry out a major transfer of
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resources to states and municipalities, but also to give them a more important role 
in the decision making process as well as in the implementation of the programme.
It still remains to be seen whether such decentralisation actually translates into 
more effective bureaucratic performance and satisfaction of local needs.
It has been contended here that bureaucratic structures and institutions in 
many states and regions in Mexico, are still under the control of local bosses and 
local governing coalitions who are unwilling or incapable of developing institutions 
that guarantee accountability and democratic procedures. Besides, the 
administrative skills in many municipalities in Mexico are too weak to receive and 
implement policies efficiently in a context of scarce resources.
It is too soon to know whether the NAW with its new framework will be 
effectively implemented What is clear is that it has reversed some of the elements 
which made Solidarity a successful programme. It is true that recent changes in the 
economic and political circumstances of Mexico have limited the availability of 
resources and diminished the government’s room for manoeuvre. But by 
empowering bureaucratic actors and depriving the community o f an important ally 
in presidential support, the new NAW is putting aside important lessons from the 
Solidarity programme that could improve its chances of success.
But as in the past, it seems that the chances of improving bureaucratic 
performance in the implementation of public policies are not related to the learning 
process that is stressed by many authors (Brown and Wildavsky 1984; Korten
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1980, 1984) Because the process of implementation is by its very nature a political 
one that alters the balance of power in a given society, it is subject to a complex 
process of political negotiation in which learning from the past is limited. This is 
precisely the way in which social policy in Mexico has been designed and 
implemented; not prospective nor retrospective, but short term oriented and always 
defined in the heat of the political moment
Chapter 8
The Mexican Context: Lessons for Effective Implementation
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Drawing lessons in the field of policy implementation is not simple. One problem is 
that it is frequently assumed that by means of an improved design, problems related 
to the implementation stage will be minimised. But by placing the emphasis on the 
design of a policy it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the particular context 
determines the way in which a policy is actually implemented, regardless of 
whether it is well designed. Therefore, particular care has been taken to highlight 
the influences of the context.
Related to this, there is a problem of generalisation. Because many of the 
lessons emerge from and are confined to a particular context, it is difficult to 
estimate their value under different conditions. Despite this, the research provided 
significant information both for a re-examination of theory in the field of public 
implementation and for a discussion of the nature of the Mexican political system.
The objective of the chapter is to present a group of propositions that have 
emerged from the analysis of the implementation of the three programmes and to 
reflect both on the kind of obstacles that future implementation will encounter and 
on the changes required to improve the effectiveness of a policy in the context of 
the Mexican polity.
The Mexican Context: Lessons 3 5 2
L e s s o n s  o f  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  T h e o r y  i n  t h e  M e x i c a n  C o n t e x t
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND POLITICAL INERTIA
The implementation of the programmes was substantially improved by an 
institutional reform, the aim of which was to empower relevant actors during the 
implementation of the policy and to curb the professional power that bureaucratic 
actors had retained in delivering public goods and services. This institutional 
reform opened up opportunities for communities which affected the vested 
interests of bureaucratic actors and political bosses in some regions of the country. 
The creation o f the so-called National System for Democratic Planning during the 
De la Madrid administration (1982-1988) and the creation of official opportunities 
such as the Solidarity Committees and the Municipal Development Councils 
(Consejos Municipales de Solidaridad), created an institutional means of allowing 
community involvement in an area that had previously remained under the control 
of bureaucratic actors. The empowerment o f these new actors explains many of the 
tensions that arose between traditional leaders who had grown up with PRI 
support and the new kind of leadership created by the Solidarity strategy.
In terms of implementation theory, the research shows that even though 
accompanied by institutional reform, the addition of new actors does not 
necessarily increase the probabilities of failure of the implementation process. This 
is so because the new set of rules altered the whole logic of the programme. It was 
not a mere addition of a new actor to an old programme, but rather a new actor in 
a renovated institutional setting.
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The institutional reform introduced by the PRONASOL also exposed some 
of the problems and opportunities embedded in the Mexican political system. But 
this institutional reform had more than a single objective. On the one hand, it 
served the purposes of reinforcing the image of the president and helping to rebuild 
the bases of political domination in the country (Dresser 1991). On the other, it 
created the conditions for implementing public policies that, in practice, increased 
the communities’ bargaining position in the implementation process. This affected 
the interests of the old bureaucratic actors and opened the possibility of producing 
new political relations between the state and society.
In a similar way, the progressive establishment of institutions, first with the 
creation of the National System for Democratic Planning and a few years later with 
the Solidarity Committees, as the basic unit of operation of the National Solidarity 
Program, must be regarded not only as a step forward in the creation of more 
accountable and effective public institutions, but more importantly also as a further 
development of the intra-elite struggles between the modernizers and hard liners of 
the PRI which have characterised Mexican politics for more than a decade (see 
Knight 1990, p. 13). Whether such an institutional reform has had an impact on the 
balance of power in the country is still subject to debate But in the end the 
institutional opportunities that opened the programme, actually empowered new 
actors and affected the way in which political bosses and cliques appropriated 
public funds. This is something that should not be minimised.
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Internationally too, there are some interesting experiences which show that 
even when the stated goals of a policy are not entirely clear and consistent, the 
process that comes with the implementation of the policy nevertheless produces 
results of major importance. Consider for example the way in which health policy 
in the United States was ‘reorganised’ by involving community participation in 
planning activities in the sector. According to Morone (1995), community 
mobilisation became the backbone of a federal strategy to control the growing 
costs of medicare. But because legislation was not easy to achieve in the context of 
the ‘antistatist ideology and weakness of political institutions’ of American politics, 
federal control of the problem was not viable. Therefore, the new strategy appealed 
to the people to diminish the power of health ‘professionals’ in the field and to 
control growing costs Once the strategy started to operate, community 
involvement in the field created problems in the sector. As the author notes, ‘in the 
end, the lack of power which secured the legislation doomed the agencies. They 
did not have the political authority to achieve their policy goals However, it is the 
process that mattered The simple repetition of the HSA’s regulatory circus, year 
after year in community after community, stripped the medical profession of its 
authority over medical politics ’(1995, p 199)
However, the institutional reform initiated by the programme had to 
challenge the political inertia which is normally encountered in programmes that 
are subject to change. This was particularly evident in the sort of conflicts that 
emerged between old community leaders systematically cultivated by the PRI and
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new leaders supported by the Solidarity strategy. Such conflicts were more acute in 
urban areas where vested economic interests have developed around public funds 
in Mexico. It was not surprising for instance, to find that some municipal 
authorities colluded with old community leaders against the new leaders supported 
by Solidarity. The re-allocation process of scholarships described in the chapter 
dedicated to the Children of Solidarity programme, and the disagreements between 
the municipal treasurer of Isla del Carmen and the federal representative of 
Solidarity in the municipality, not only highlights the problems that arise when a 
programme aims to effect change in structures and bureaucratic practices, but also 
provides evidence of the political nature of the implementation process.
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL LEARNING
Community involvement in national programmes is frequently criticised because it 
presumably ‘ends up as a set of programmes centrally designed, implemented by 
bureaucratic actors and highly unaware of local preferences’ (Korten 1984, p. 
176). However, this research shows that community participation can actually 
improve the process of implementation if accompanied by institutional reform.
First, although centrally designed, the Solidarity programme allowed 
opportunities for community participation in the decision making process and 
therefore, community preferences, needs and orientations were reflected either in 
the kind of works carried out in each community (FOMUN), or in the selection of 
children, as was the case in Children of Solidarity Less obviously, the reluctance of 
FONAES officials to actively promote the creation of economic projects in
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communities responds to the same logic. By allowing the community to come 
forward with economic projects that reflected its needs and preferences instead of 
forcing communities to engage in activities that might not be of interest to them, a 
direct link and a more clear identity between federal objectives and local needs and 
preferences was achieved. However, the importance given to community 
mobilisation in the three programmes varied. While in FOMUN and Children of 
Solidarity it was the priority, in FONAES it was subordinated to the creation of 
jobs.
Second, instead of merely assigning to communities a role in the decision­
making process, their participation was extended to the implementation of the 
programmes. By this means, the dominant bureaucratic structures, which have 
usually captured public funds during the implementation process, were to some 
extent displaced. This produced not only political legitimacy for the new 
government but also more effective implementation because resources were better 
targeted. In short, in a favourable institutional environment through community 
involvement in the decision-making and implementation processes more effective 
implementation was accomplished.
Politically, community involvement in the programme was a significant 
political asset The community participation element of the programme also 
produced an interesting debate. The institutional reform that the programme 
inaugurated opened up opportunities for actors who had traditionally been 
excluded from the decision-making and implementation process of public policy.
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Apart from a more effective achievement of policy objectives, it is contended here 
that it helped to develop a process of social learning that can eventually transform 
the way in which communities interact with authorities in the provision of public 
services. The political significance of this process of social learning must not be 
underestimated. By means of a continuous interaction between authorities and 
communities the bureaucratic processes of decision-making and policy 
implementation are uncovered. This increases the community’s knowledge of and 
bargaining position in the policy process
The learning process generated by Solidarity has also a political meaning. It 
helped to develop what Somjee (1982, pp 17-18) calls the community’s political 
capacity which eventually can transform the political relationships between 
authorities and community. Cornelius (1975, p. 10) has also noted in analysing 
urban popular movements in Mexico, that a significant process of political learning 
results from the interaction of political and government agencies with communities. 
For him, this has important consequences not only for future political participation, 
but also for the development of attitudes and values towards the political system as 
a whole. Although a direct relationship between the implementation of the 
programme and government credibility and political performance is debatable (see 
Bruhn 1996), the recovery of the PRI in the 1991 elections is an indicator of the 
impact a programme like this can have on the political system (see Molinar 
Horcasitas and Weldon 1994).
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Critics of the programme tend to neglect this issue arguing that even if the 
programme succeeds in creating new political structures, they are doomed to fail 
because they cannot escape from the control of the state. The root of this is a 
conceptual problem because for many the community approach of the 
PRONASOL was identified with a ‘radical’ tendency of community work which 
was ‘primarily in the business of seeking ways radically to transform our present 
society into a very different one and was seeking to utilise community work to that 
end.’ (Twelvetrees 1989, p. 46). It is in relation to this that the main criticism 
arises. Although some interpretations suggest that the National Solidarity Program 
was much more than a single anti-poverty strategy (Dresser 1991; Craske 1994) 
with wider and more significant political implications, its political importance 
should be carefully considered.
As an anti-poverty strategy, both its stated and unstated objectives were 
limited. In relation to the former, it is clear that the reduction or elimination of 
poverty requires more than a single administration1. In relation to the latter, the 
programme could never have achieved a radical political transformation in such a 
short period of time because this was not its purpose in the first place. On the 
contrary, the social and political learning implied in the implementation of the 
programme must be regarded as an official effort in which popular demands have a 
specific place and are carefully limited in political terms. As the research shows, *
1
F or a  d isc u ss io n  o f  the  e v o lu tio n  o f  poverty  in  Latin A m erica , sec L u stig  1994.
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when political alliances emerged between communities and opposition parties, as 
happened in the Atasta Peninsula in Campeche (see FONAES chapter), the 
programme used considerable amount of resources to break the link between the 
communities and those parties. The Salinas administration may be labelled with 
many things but not naivety. The programme certainly affected the balance of 
power in many communities around the country, but it was far from re-shaping 
political domination in the country, which requires much more than resources and 
strong political leadership to be accomplished.
The role of community participation in the programme has been 
exaggerated in another way. It is commonly assumed that there is a relationship 
between popular movements and démocratisation. Heilman (1994, pp. 137-139) 
notes that there is a difference between a group dedicated to the day-to-day 
struggle for life’s basic necessities and a political party that more properly bears the 
burden of theorising and organising to promote broad societal change and the 
expansion of institutionalised forms of democratic expression.’ It is precisely such 
a difference that should be kept in mind when assessing the role of the programme 
in promoting community mobilisation. The programme aimed to improve the 
design and implementation of the anti-poverty strategy by involving community 
participation, and by means of this, to counteract the political power that 
bureaucratic actors had had in the process It never attempted to transform the 
political system or the bases of political domination in the country. If the 
programme was successful in achieving a political objective, it was, as Craske
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(1994, p. 45) notes, the establishment of a process by which traditional corporatist 
structures would be changed or displaced by new forms of corporatism.
This political evaluation of the programme is not necessarily at odds with 
the positive evaluation of Solidarity in terms of its policy implications which is 
implicit in the main body of this research. It is clear that different evaluations may 
result depending on the areas under scrutiny. While the policy implications of 
Solidarity were interesting and encouraging, the political meaning of the 
programme may be less promising. Therefore, the reader must not confront the 
political evaluation of Solidarity with its policy one. While Solidarity produced 
positive results in terms of policy, it also could have produced new forms of 
political cooptation, something that it is not necessarily contradictory.
The social learning process and the development of the community’s 
political capacity that resulted from streamlining the implementation process, was 
the more immediate and pragmatic result of the programme and should not be 
minimised (see Haber 1994). The experience of the programme shows that in those 
places where previous experience of community involvement had taken place, 
implementation was substantially improved, showing that social learning has pay­
offs not only for communities but for the political system as a whole. Indeed, the 
programme by no means attempted to transform the political system, its aims were 
less ambitious. It established on the contrary, a different pattern of interaction 
between authorities and communities which could eventually develop new political 
relationships. This is important in a country like Mexico where the prominence of
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bureaucratic actors has led to a system of corruption and lack of accountability and 
where a programme like Solidarity represents an opportunity that must be fully 
exploited.
The social learning process also had an impact on the authorities’ response 
to community needs. Responses varied from place to place depending on their 
perceptions, on how the programme affected the web of interests of certain actors 
and on the way it altered the balance of power in each community. This was not an 
unplanned objective of the programme either. As described in the FOMUN 
chapter, Solidarity officials and even the president himself, exhorted communities 
to bypass local authorities if they repeatedly obstructed the programme.
Finally, community involvement in the programme had another political 
significance. For a programme which was committed to effect changes in people’s 
attitudes and to affect the interests of bureaucratic and political coalitions, the 
search for allies was essential. One of the assets of the Solidarity strategy was the 
creation of allies in the form of Solidarity Committees. The alliance between 
presidential political power and local communities was important in producing a 
shake-up in the balance of power and local established interests. The limitations on 
presidential power and on federal initiatives in the implementation process, were 
reduced by establishing such alliances with local actors. This was particularly 
evident in the case of the FOMUN programme in which central power achieved 
more than was expected considering the web of interests which surrounded the 
implementation process
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d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n : t h e  c a s e  a g a i n s t
It is commonly accepted that a process of decentralisation is not only essential for 
the modernization and démocratisation of the country, but also would produce a 
more democratic exercise of power in the Federation. Nevertheless, the Mexican 
context a decentralisation process might not bring about the expected results. In 
some regions of the country, where institutions are weak and where in general the 
rule of law has been supplanted by discretionary decisions, politics are still 
dominated by recalcitrant local bosses. While in some states the programmes of 
solidarity were implemented according to their original purpose, in others, 
particularly where local political leadership differed from the Salinista project, 
objectives and resources were misappropriated. The states of Chiapas and Durango 
(see Haber 1994) are perhaps the most evident, where recalcitrant governors and 
local political elites saw in the programme a threat to their vested interests. Any 
decision to undertake further decentralisation in Mexico should bear these 
contrasting responses in mind
Decentralisation may be helpful in advancing the modernisation of a 
country if, and only if, institutional strength and political commitment converge. If 
decentralisation is implemented in a context which lacks institutions and where the 
rule of law is weak, federal initiatives may be captured by local coalitions hostile to 
federal power (see Knight 1990, pp 33-34)
This is not however a case in favour of centralisation. Historically and 
politically, centralisation is no longer viable nor desirable in Mexico. Centralisation
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is only a means by which certain policies can be better achieved in a context 
characterised by weak institutions, where the rule of law has given way to 
discretionary decisions and in which there are no mechanisms and procedures that 
guarantee public performance. The new regulations of the new anti-poverty 
strategy introduced by the Zedillo administration, are presumably designed to this 
end. Zedillo has put special emphasis on mechanisms to accompany the new 
federalisation policy in the country. The question, however, remains whether such 
mechanisms, namely the Supreme Auditing Office of the Federation (Auditoría 
Superior de la Federación), will have the power and autonomy to overcome the 
political inertia of a political system in which the rule of law has given way to the 
discretionary powers of many regional and state political authorities. The flagrant 
violation of human rights and peasant assassinations in the state of Guerrero or the 
misappropriation of funds for political purposes as was the case in the state of 
Tabasco, leave little room for optimism
INCENTIVES
The research has been useful in identifying incentives as an essential element in 
successful implementation. From a review of the literature in the field, only a few 
authors (Berman 1978, 1980; Hucke 1978, Lufi 1976) explicitly recognise the 
importance of this issue. Incentives are particularly necessary in Mexico where 
bureaucratic performance in the country is characterised by rent-seeking practices
(see Heller 1993).
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Both the regulations of the programmes under the Solidarity scheme and 
those of the National Alliance for Welfare, leave room for discretionary decisions 
that at the local level, are usually transformed into opportunities for rent-seeking 
activities, as happened in the municipality of Isla del Carmen (see FOMUN 
chapter). These activities offered greater incentives than mere compliance with the 
federal mandate. In particular, some regulations of the programme, such as the 
possibility o f transferring the implementation of public works from communities to 
municipal officials, speeded up the process of implementation and helped to gain 
collaboration from local authorities. They clearly perceived the benefits of 
managing the resources of the programme instead of allowing communities to 
control and spend such resources, as was intended by the regulations of the 
programme. But the search for incentives for participating actors and agencies in 
the implementation of the programme was not limited to economic and illegal 
benefits. Political credit and even bureaucratic prominence proved to be effective 
incentives in gaining collaboration from certain actors and agencies, as in the case 
with the DICONSA agency. As noted by an official of DICONSA, the political 
prestige that stemmed from participating in a presidential programme was also 
important. The lack of incentives diminished the collaboration from the health 
sector actors, for example, in the implementation of the Children of Solidarity 
programme.
Previous experience in Mexico support this argument Redclift (1981, p 9) 
notes that the SAM programme gave a ‘boost to some government agencies which
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were given priority under the programme [particularly to CONASUPO 
that], under the SAM it assumed a much more central role ’ According to him, 
this helped the programme not only to gain the collaboration of its most important 
component, but also to improve its effectiveness. During the implementation of the 
Integral Programme for Rural Development-PIDER programme, the use of 
incentives to gain collaboration was also a determining factor. Cemea (1992, p. 9) 
notes that participation often fails because ‘such programmes have not taken the 
organisational steps to translate the desirable participation into practice, or did not 
provide economic gains to the people expected to participate. ’
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY
The literature recognises that bureaucratic autonomy, that is, the degree to which 
certain public agencies are autonomous from pressures from other powers, i.e., 
legislative, or other bureaucratic agencies as well as from pressure groups, is an 
essential element in successful implementation (Davies and Mason 1982; Gunn 
1978; McMahon, Barret and Hill 1982; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979, 1981, 
1983). Politically, however, the emphasis given to such bureaucratic autonomy 
might be detrimental to some of the foundations of a democratic government, such 
as federalism or the system of check and balances. However, its importance can 
hardly be exaggerated in a context which lacks institutions and effective means to 
ensure that the objectives of a federal policy will be achieved
In the Mexican case, bureaucratic autonomy was achieved not only by 
granting the federal agency in charge of the programme (SEDESOL)
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representation at ministerial level, but also by strong and direct political support 
from the presidential office. Thus, SEDESOL bypassed state and municipal powers 
undermining their constitutional authority. Severe criticisms were voiced about the 
so-called centralist and authoritarian way in which the programme was being 
implemented. Coupled with this autonomy and strength SEDESOL was also 
reinforced with an impressive budget for the implementation o f the programme, 
which sometimes was used for different purposes from those established by the 
programme.
However, both the experience gathered from previous programmes and the 
nature of a context prone to politically motivated meddling with public funds, 
reinforced the assumption of the officials of Solidarity that a centralised decision­
making process along with control of resources and isolation from political 
pressures from other agencies and powers, was actually an effective way of 
achieving the objectives of the programme 2
But the kind of bureaucratic autonomy achieved by SEDESOL was not in 
contradiction with the ethos of the community participation element of the 
programmes. That is, while bureaucratic autonomy implies the respect for the 
rules, levels of professionalism and efficiency, community involvement implies 
relaxation of rules and poor performance. Such a contradiction however, was 
diminished by making coincident the objectives of SEDESOL and those of
2 S im ila r  in te rn a tio n a l lessons can  be fo u n d  in  G rah am  1994 a n d  N elson 1990 .
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community participation. In fact SEDESOL responsibility was precisely to ensure 
that community involvement was achieved in the way intended; that the possible 
relaxation of rules was minimised by adjusting programme regulations so as to 
cover all possible situations that emerged during the implementation process, and 
that certain levels of efficiency were achieved by improving targeting. The kind of 
bureaucratic autonomy and political importance granted to SEDESOL was 
different from that o f other agencies. While SEDESOL became the means by 
which presidential control was exerted in the programme, other agencies had to 
fulfil their responsibilities and obey regulations, but at the same time, had to adjust 
their procedures to the logic of Solidarity. Indeed, this difference eventually 
resulted in jurisdictional and interbureaucratic problems due to such 
incompatibility.
PRESIDENTIAL POWER REVISITED: STRONG IDEALS, WEAK INSTITUTIONS 
If the implementation of a policy is to succeed in the context of Mexican politics, it 
will require strong political commitment and support in overcoming the 
bureaucratic, economic and political interests that surround the implementation 
process. The reinforcement of presidential power in the absence of a strong 
institutional environment might produce undesirable effects on the implementation 
process.
It has been commonly accepted that the executive branch, and particularly 
the President, has a prominent role in Mexican politics. The President’s legal and 
extra-legal powers have overshadowed both the legislative branch and the
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judiciary. This has been seriously criticised on the grounds that it has undermined 
and prevented the development of democratic practices and institutions, that might 
eventually produce a more accountable and democratic political system While this 
is true, it is also true that presidential power in Mexico has been useful in holding 
together a political system composed of a wide range of regional political interests.
Despite this, bureaucratic agencies both at the federal and state level, as 
well as regional and local political actors, can influence the policy process and 
actually oppose presidential power. But while their influence is hardly perceived 
during the design of a policy, which remains a highly centralised federal activity, it 
is during the implementation of a policy that they can pull strings to determine its 
success or failure. It is at this level where policies are adjusted, changed, or even 
ignored according to the needs of local political coalitions and interests. In 
Mexican politics, governmental programmes and policies are frequently taken over 
during their implementation. It is at this point that it becomes evident that 
presidential power is incapable of controlling the whole range of interests involved 
when a policy is implemented. As demonstrated in the research, even basic 
objectives of a policy can be distorted at the local level because of the array of 
interests surrounding the implementation of a policy. When the objectives of a 
federal policy are coincident with those of the local powers, the policy has a better 
chance of being implemented according to its original design But on the contrary, 
when federal policy alters the structure or interests of those local powers, even
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presidential power can sometimes be incapable of imposing its authority on local 
political coalitions.
The most important factor to be considered in order to understand the 
ability of regional political coalitions to resist and confront federal policies is that 
of elite circulation. Elite circulation has not taken place regionally as it has at the 
national level While the so-called “revolutionary family” at the national level can 
afford different and even contrasting political projects (Cárdenas-Ávila Camacho 
or Echeverría/López Portillo-De la Madrid/Salinas), local or regional coalitions 
show less circulation and more cohesion and political ascendancy over time. In 
many states, it is the same old family and its inner circle that have held political 
power for a long time In some regions political power is inherited from one 
generation to another (i.e., the Figueroa family in Guerrero) making local politics 
‘jobs for the boys’. This gives local powers the political strength to escape from 
the control of federal initiatives The president in turn then is limited in his ability to 
control all the political groups around the country that in many cases have seen 
many federal administrations and presidential initiatives come and go. This has 
given them the power and ability to influence the outcomes of federal policies. 
Because presidential power is frequently unable or unprepared to counteract the 
political inertia embedded in the system, the implementation of the programme had 
to appeal to popular support to counteract the inertia and resistance of vested 
interests and bureaucratic actors during its implementation This partially explains
The Mexican Context: Lessons 3 7 0
the populist character of the programme and also the firm tenor with which it was 
implemented.
Nevertheless, it is clear that in a context of multiple political actors and 
interests, weak institutions, and discretionary decision making, strong political 
leadership and commitment as well as bureaucratic autonomy, are essential if a 
policy is to succeed. Its impact in developing a democratic political system is 
debatable, but it is the only way of confronting the wide range of political and 
economic interests that surround the implementation process. This is not a case for 
the authoritarian and centralised nature that characterises the Mexican political 
system, but it is clear that political leadership, commitment and power are essential 
for successful implementation in the context of weak institutions and adverse 
interests.
C o n c l u s i o n s
The importance of ‘context’ is the common thread running through this chapter 
and indeed through the research project. As O’Toole (1985) notes, this issue has 
been generally neglected in studies of policy implementation. That is why the 
emphasis placed on the Mexican political context has been a permanent concern. 
Some of the most influential ideas in the field of policy implementation have been 
reformulated because of their limited usefulness in explaining the implementation 
process in the Mexican case It seems that, for instance, the debate between “top- 
down” vs. “bottom-up” does not make sense except in academic terms. In practice,
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the choice between one or another of these approaches depends on the nature of 
the context in which the process of implementation takes place In a strong 
institutional environment, where rules are clear and where all actors are expected 
to follow them, a “bottom-up” approach might yield good results because 
expectations of controlling the whole process are grounded in assumptions of 
minimal discretion at the lower levels where the policy is actually implemented. On 
the contrary, in a weak institutional environment, in which a highly discretionary 
decision-making process prevails, with a multiplicity of actors and interests, and 
where bureaucratic performance is more parochial than rational, in a Weberian 
sense, a “top-down” approach may be more useful in controlling as many variables 
as possible in the implementation process.
Instead of using a deductive analysis of institutions and practices in general, 
and then deducing the way in which they can affect the performance of policies, the 
research has described the implementation of certain policies and worked-back 
from there inductively to explain the way those practices and institutions operate in 
the political system. This proved to be an effective means of reviewing both the 
usefulness of implementation theories and many assumptions regarding the 
Mexican political system as well.
A second issue emerged from the analysis in this chapter, that of the 
transitional nature of Mexican politics. As Cornelius (1991, p. 4) notes, Mexican 
society is more complex and heterogeneous, more urban, better educated, rapidly 
being integrated into the world economy. Coupled with this, it is also the
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accumulated effects of the economic model followed by the country form more 
than 65 years which has privileged economic growth but has not been able to 
trickle down its benefits to large sectors of the population and whose political 
behaviour is now more pragmatic than ever before. Finally, the political 
liberalisation process reinforced by the Salinas administration opened not only 
spaces for greater political participation but also produced important fissures in the 
governing elite and among bureaucratic structures as well. This has produced a 
slow but systematic change in voting patterns ending with the PRI overwhelming, 
though sometimes illegitimate electoral control.
Whether such transition will take the country to a more democratic society 
is debatable. As Cornelius notes (1991, p. 115) many scenarios are imaginable, but 
one thing is certain, after Salinas the Mexican economic and political system will 
no longer be the same. The important process of institutionalisation, shows 
encouraging signs of a democratic change But its consolidation will depend on the 
strength of Mexican society and its ability to resist the opposition o f political 
structures and practices still deeply rooted in the Mexican political culture.
This helps to explain many of the problems the programme had to confront 
during its implementation which are rooted in the clash between old structures and 
practices and new principles and rules, which is a distinctive feature of this 
transitional character of Mexican politics. It is precisely the transitional character 
of Mexican politics which makes necessary a rigid control of the implementation 
process, as was the case in the National Solidarity Program. The so-called
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authoritarian and centralised way in which it was implemented is only 
understandable by reference to the context in which the programme had to be 
operated In a political context riddled with patronage, paternalism and clientelist 
practices, coupled with weak institutions and lack of accountability, the significant 
transfer of public funds which the programme carried out would have encouraged 
the misappropriation of funds that the programme wanted to avoid if tight control 
had not been maintained. In this respect, the creation of allies during the 
implementation process by means of community mobilisation, not only produced 
more effective implementation by keeping local authorities in check, but also 
helped to counterbalance local political actors who are usually more independent 
from federal control than has been commonly accepted. That is also why the 
usefulness of a decentralised implementation process in a political context like the 
Mexican one is limited.
The transitional character of Mexican politics also imposes another 
challenge for the implementation of a programme like Solidarity. When an initiative 
attempts to displace or minimise the role of a group of actors in the implementation 
process, the policy must find ways of gaining their collaboration. In this respect the 
creation of incentives proved to be essential in gaining collaboration from 
participating agencies. But the creation of incentives requires a rather unrestrained 
control of the implementation process that can only be achieved by increasing the 
autonomy of the agency in charge of the implementation process. Many of the 
objectives of the National Solidarity Program were achieved because federal
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SEDESOL had sufficient bureaucratic autonomy to control the programme and to 
create incentives alongside the implementation process.
It is evident that the debate regarding the relevance of the “bottom-up” or 
“top-down” approach in the field of policy implementation is unrealistic and 
therefore superfluous as long as it is not grounded in empiricism. The debate has 
not given proper attention to the fact that the implementation process is essentially 
a political one, which affects the interests of groups and because of that, which is 
subject to negotiation and continuous redefinition. That is why the analysis of 
policy implementation is useful in describing and understanding the way in which a 
political system works The implementation of policy will not be improved by 
better design. The implementation process will have a better chance of success if it 
is accompanied by mechanisms of political negotiation that allow not only the 
achievement of its objectives, but also the minimising of political and bureaucratic 
resistance as well as gaining the collaboration of those groups which will eventually 
be affected by the implementation of the policy. Constant negotiation, setbacks and 
achievements, characterises the implementation process.
The lessons drawn in this chapter then are not aimed at prescriptive 
formulae that could improve the design of future policies, in order to increase the 
chances of successful implementation On the contrary, we have stressed that the 
implementation process is a political one and that its success will be more likely if 
opportunities and limitations are identified and if those who give effect to policies 
fully understand the balance of power in a given political context.
\Chapter 9 
Conclusions
The objective of this research was to analyse the process of implementation of 
three of the programmes of PRONASOL and to demonstrate the influence of 
Mexican politics in this process, with particular reference to the state of Campeche. 
The analysis of implementation was placed within the context of the development 
of social policy and anti-poverty programmes in Mexico It was shown that 
although some of the most common interpretations of its development offer 
interesting explanations, they are limited in explaining its variations through 
history. It was argued here that the development of Mexican social policy can be 
understood as a “muddling through” rationale, subject to particular circumstances 
and the attendant political climate By its nature, social policy is eminently a 
political governmental activity. But this has been reinforced by the uses Mexican 
politicians have made of this policy. That is why more than one interpretation may 
exist in relation to its meaning and purposes.
It is in this context that anti-poverty programmes have gradually acquired 
importance in Mexico as immediate and rapid interventions which, although badly 
needed to ameliorate social inequalities, have not addressed the problem 
systematically. PRONASOL represented the latest effort to accompany the 
economic modernisation in which the country has been engaged for almost 15 
years. The programme showed several similarities to some of its predecessors, but 
also significant differences The analysis of implementation showed for instance.
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that its political uses did not vary greatly, let us say from PIDER, but given the
political conjuncture, it acted as a catalyst which prompted political changes and 
community attitudes which challenged vested interests and in the end, affected the 
balance of power in the country.
The case studies o f FOMUN, Children of Solidarity and FONAES, were 
useful not only in confirming the explanatory value of existing propositions in the 
field of policy implementation, but also in providing alternative explanations that 
may improve the process o f  implementation.
The implementation of the FOMUN programme showed a tension between 
centralisation and decentralisation. A more decentralised implementation of the 
programme was achieved by an institutional reform, namely by the creation of the 
Solidarity Municipal Council and the Solidarity Committees, which opened up 
opportunities for community participation in the decision-making process and the 
implementation of the programme. However, such an institutional reform could not 
curb the power of bureaucratic actors who still managed to retain control of some 
parts of the programme This demonstrated that the federal government was rather 
weak because it could not impose the programme without local support neither 
could it prevent its political appropriation by local actors. This partially explains 
why the programme had to  be carefully controlled and why fundamental decisions, 
particularly regarding the use of funds, continued to be a central government 
prerogative. Federal delegates and representatives of SEDESOL at the state and
Conclusions 377
municipal level, played an essential role in this process. Through them, presidential 
control of the programme was achieved
FOMUN also made evident the limited ability of federal government to 
control the implementation process and how this can be increased when the federal 
actor finds allies in the community. These allies helped to limit the power of the 
conventional, well organised elements in Mexican party politics and to produce a 
substantial shake up in the balance of power at local level. This showed particularly 
that Derthick is right when she explains and describes the limitations of central 
government in implementing public policies. But her analysis did not apply fully in 
the Mexican context where the president found allies among the divided local 
actors. Central power was thus able to achieve a great deal, despite the fact that 
this programme aimed ambitiously to introduce changes in the foundations of the 
Mexican political system
FOMUN also showed that flexibility in the implementation process is 
essential for a successful programme. Such flexibility was derived from the 
procedural nature of the programme. Although goal achievement was important, 
the success of FOMUN can be better measured in terms of its implicit process, the 
way in which it altered the balance of power around the country and the social 
learning process that it produced in many communities. Whether the programme 
reduced poverty is debatable, but it succeeded in producing community 
mobilisation to shake up vested interest.
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Contrary to one of the most important assumptions in the field o f  policy
implementation, FOMUN showed that the inclusion of a new actor did not 
prejudice success. This was so because the logic of the programme was different 
from that of its predecessors. FOMUN was not an old programme that included a 
new actor. Its structure was based on a new actor around which a set of rules and 
institutions were created making the programme completely different. Thus the 
institutional reform which accompanied the implementation of a policy determined 
its success despite an increase in the number of actors.
The implementation of Children of Solidarity also generated important 
lessons in terms of policy implementation. As with FOMUN, Children of Solidarity 
had to impose a centralised control of the main components of the programme to 
ensure its success The programme was controlled from outside its natural 
administrative home, the Department of Public Education-SEP, which inhibited the 
collaboration of this agency But at the same time, Children of Solidarity 
transferred important decisions and powers to new actors, assuming that this 
would influence the way public services, such as education, are provided. 
Community participation was essential in stimulating the response of the 
participating agencies both in terms of performance and in curbing the power of 
entrenched bureaucracies
Children of Solidarity also demonstrates that the generation of incentives is 
essential if policy implementation is to succeed. Participating actors who perceived 
no positive pay-offs were reluctant to collaborate, as was clear for agencies of the
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health sector and for some teachers and educational authorities. For them the 
programme only produced an increase workload On the contrary, collaboration 
was achieved from those participants that obtained positive pay-offs, as was the 
case with of the federal agency DICONSA. For state and local governments, the 
incentives for collaboration came mainly from the resources they received which 
they could translate into political support. However, this depended on the timely 
allocation of funds by the federation and the state. In the end, what could have 
been an opportunity turned out to be a problem because of delays.
With FOMUN, community mobilisation was used not only to secure the 
programme’s objectives but also as a political tool to curb discretion which 
teachers, head masters, and educational authorities had developed inside the sector. 
This explains why SEP was not in charge of the implementation of the programme 
and reflects the federal wish to bypass the bureaucratic structures that permeate 
public performance in the country and which make it increasingly difficult to reach 
target populations.
Children of Solidarity also confirmed the findings encountered in FOMUN 
in relation to the number of actors and the conditions necessary for success. The 
programme showed that by reassigning responsibilities, and by giving access to 
actors who had a direct incentive in the effective functioning of the programme, the 
chances for a programme to succeed improved in spite of the number of actors
involved.
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As with FOMUN, flexibility was essential for the success of the 
programme Local adjustment, was possible because of the direct link between the 
designers of the programme and those in charge of its “street level” 
implementation. Flexibility and mutual adaptation proved to be essential in the 
programmes success.
Children of Solidarity also shows that the displacement of actors during the 
implementation process does not guarantee successful implementation. In an 
attempt to improve its probability of success, Children of Solidarity gave back 
responsibilities to the community, as an essential instrument for achieving academic 
success and preventing children from leaving school early. But in the attempt, it 
left out the teachers, the other essential element in preventing early leaving. In a 
way, short term success was bought at the cost of long term failure because of the 
exclusion of teachers.
The implementation of the FONAES programme also offered important 
lessons. It helped to corroborate the findings of the previous chapters in the sense 
that it is not necessarily the number of actors and perspectives that determines 
delays and unsuccessful implementation, but rather the structure and strategy 
adopted.
In contrast to FOMUN and Children of Solidarity, the implementation of 
this programme remained highly centralised. This was so because FONAES’ 
officials feared the capture of the programme by political interests at the state and
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local level. By means of rigid controls and constant supervision, it was possible to 
prevent the diversion of resources and the political use of the programme. But the 
programme’s rigid controls and the relative autonomy, enjoyed during the 
implementation process, resulted in bureaucratic delay and tension, not only 
between the programme and state agencies but also between FONAES and other 
units of SEDESOL.
Examination showed that major decentralisation of programmes like 
FONAES will depend on the institutional capacity of the states and the willingness 
of local political interests to implement these programmes in a way that secures 
effectiveness and accountability in the use of public funds. It is clear that in present 
conditions, the release of such an important source of funds to the states would 
have resulted in misappropriation, more patronage and clientelism.
Compared to the relatively successful implementation of FOMUN and 
Children of Solidarity, the main reason for the less successful implementation of 
FONAES was that it was based on a mistaken analytical framework. It attempted 
to impose an “entrepreneurial ethos” on groups who lacked the managerial, 
technical and economic capacity to operate with commercial success. It was clear 
that the programme, although created to promote different types of productive 
initiatives, was not able to work with a population who live in conditions of 
extreme poverty. Its assumptions did not match the target population something 
that militated against its success This mismatch benefited some groups, namely co­
Conclusions 382
operatives, for which FONAES’ funds represented a cheap source of funding to 
expand their economic activities.
The comparative chapter shows the main elements that resulted from the 
analysis of implementation of the three programmes. It demonstrates that current 
models, “top-down” and “bottom-up”, of policy implementation are not useful in 
explaining particular cases and particular areas of policy as in the state Campeche. 
The context in which the implementation process took place proved crucial. In 
addition, it was demonstrated that a principle that could be applied in a certain area 
of policy, was not useful in another. While decentralisation increased the 
effectiveness of FOMUN, it would have produced worse results in FONAES.
While the advocates of a “bottom-up” approach suggest that by increasing 
discretion at the point of service delivery more effective implementation can be 
achieved, the research has demonstrated that increasing discretion in the conditions 
of patronage and clientelism of Mexican politics, would have produced the 
opposite result. The adoption of one particular model or approach to the 
implementation of a programme depends then on the power of local coalitions and 
on the political balance in each community where the policy will be implemented. 
In urban and more economically developed areas the programmes encountered 
more obstacles to their implementation, whereas in rural and less economically 
developed areas the implementation process was more effective. This, was so 
because the web of economic and political interests that have grown up around the 
implementation of public policies and public funds, are more powerful in urban
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areas where the concentration of public funds and efforts have boosted the local 
economy and where the popular mobilisation component was more difficult to 
activate It is in these situations where local political actors have a significant 
margin of political and administrative manoeuvre, that opposition to change is at its 
greatest. These actors have created a network of political and economic 
relationships that confronts and effectively counteracts central power. This was 
particularly evident in the case of FOMUN and for the construction of local urban 
infrastructure, where the ‘project by contract’ scheme has traditionally favoured 
the misuse of public resources.
The comparative chapter also highlighted the importance of incentives and 
local representation for successful implementation While in Children of Solidarity 
and FOMUN local participation occurred, in FONAES this did not happen. The 
same situation accounted for the generation of local support during the 
implementation. Finally, Children of Solidarity and FOMUN, followed an 
adaptation process which allowed a transformation of their goals and the way they 
were achieved to the needs and expectations of the target population, an element 
absent in FONAES. All these conditions proved to be essential for achieving 
effective implementation
The comparative chapter emphasised too the nature of the three 
programmes and how this affected their success While Children of Solidarity and 
FOMUN were procedurally-oriented programmes FONAES was goal-oriented. It 
was shown that the possibilities of success are greater in procedural than in goal
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oriented programmes. It is true that FOMUN and Children of Solidarity were both 
committed to the achievement of goals and procedures but they are more 
representative of the first case in which the objective was to get people involved. 
Therefore, even if the construction of public works or increasing school attendance 
were partially achieved, popular involvement was important for its own sake. In 
FONAES on the contrary, success meant producing real jobs and if the programme 
could not do that, then the programme was a failure Because of this, it was more 
vulnerable to implementation failure. While FONAES depended only on one 
measure of success, Children of Solidarity and FOMUN depended on two, in terms 
o f process and in terms of goal achievement.
In chapter seven the new anti-poverty strategy of the Zedillo administration 
is discussed, and its character is examined. The National Alliance for Welfare- 
NAW was designed not only to carry out a major transfer of resources to states 
and municipalities, but also to give them a more important role in the decision 
making process as well as in the implementation of the programme. It was 
concluded that by empowering bureaucratic actors and by depriving the community 
o f an important ally in presidential support, the new NAW is overlooking 
important lessons from the Solidarity programme that could improve its chances of 
success.
This research also produced important lessons on how the political context 
influences the implementation process. The importance o f ‘context’ was a constant 
theme in the research. Some of the most influential ideas in the field of policy
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implementation have been reconsidered here because of their limited usefulness in 
explaining the implementation process in the Mexican case The debate between 
“top-down” vs. “bottom-up” is useful in academic terms. But in practice, the 
choice between one or another depends on the nature of the context in which the 
process of implementation takes place In a strong institutional environment, where 
rules are clear and where all actors are expected to follow them, a “bottom-up” 
approach might yield good results because expectations of controlling the whole 
process are grounded in assumptions of minimal discretion at the lower levels 
where the policy is actually implemented. On the contrary, weak institutional 
environment, highly discretionary decision-making, a multiplicity of actors and 
interests, and parochial bureaucratic performance, could justify the adoption of a 
“top-down” approach so as to control as many variables as possible in the 
implementation process.
In emphasising the context of implementation, it was also evident that many 
o f the problems encountered during the implementation of the programmes are 
rooted in the clash between old structures and practices and new principles and 
rules, which is a distinctive feature of the current transitional character of Mexican 
politics. This implied a rigid control and political autonomy of the agency in charge 
of the implementation of the programme Many of the objectives of the National 
Solidarity Program were achieved because federal SEDESOL had sufficient 
bureaucratic autonomy to control the programme and to create incentives 
alongside the implementation process
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Thus the implementation process is essentially a political one, which affects 
the interests of groups and because of that, it is subject to negotiation and 
continuous redefinition. That is why the analysis of implementation is useful in 
describing and understanding the way in which a political system works. It is clear 
that the implementation of a policy will not be improved merely by a better design. 
The experience of implementation in Campeche shows that a policy has more 
chance of success if it is accompanied by mechanisms of political negotiation, if it 
minimises the political and bureaucratic resistance, and gains the collaboration of 
affected groups.
The experience of community involvement in FOMUN and Children of 
Solidarity, highlights an important element in Mexican politics. The programme 
demonstrates that it is still possible to establish direct contact with actors at the 
community level, bypassing the state and municipal levels. It is important to note 
therefore that the federal government can still command popular support. In terms 
of political culture, the analysis shows that the community still perceives that the 
federal government has something to offer. This is surprising considering the scale 
of the programme and the hostilities and indifference of some state governments It 
represents the survival of the popular elements in Mexican politics.
The importance of local politics must not be underestimated. Even if a 
programme has full political support, it is still difficult to overcome the obstacles 
created by traditional political actors At the community level local politics are 
more independent o f national politics than is usually thought. This affects feasibility
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of decentralising government programmes in Mexico. Greater decentralisation 
depends on the states’ willingness to observe the guidelines of federal initiatives. 
This depends on the evolution of the federal/state relationship and also on the 
ability and willingness of state and municipal governments to perform according to 
the rules.
Politically the research also stressed that the presidency in Mexico still 
exerts the most important influence in policy making and implementation. Despite 
this, analysis of implementation also showed that bureaucratic actors at the federal, 
state and municipal level have significant room for political manoeuvre, an element 
that has not received the necessary attention in studies of Mexico. Implementation 
studies are useful in bringing to the surface the means by which bureaucratic actors 
as well as local political interests can obstruct policy implementation. This is so 
because federal political interests may not be coincident with local ones. It is 
during the implementation process that local interests emerge, frequently erecting 
insuperable obstacles to the implementation of a federal policy. Federal initiatives 
are still empty talk for many regions in the country where patronage and bossism 
still prevail. These disparities between federal intentions and local ones, also reflect 
the extent to which the intra-elite struggles of the governing coalition in Mexico 
are affecting policy making and implementation. But precisely because of this 
multi-regional composition of the political elite, it was difficult to find a single and 
recurrent pattern in implementation. In some places the programme achieved better 
results because the implementation of the programme encountered favourable
\C o n c l u s i o n s ________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________
political conditions or allies. In others, like Chiapas, the programme threatened the 
balance of power and was therefore blocked In Campeche results were mixed 
While in some municipalities the programme performed well (Hopelchén), in others 
(Campeche and Isla del Carmen) its performance was less effective. In sum, 
because the implementation process is a political one, the success o f Solidarity 
largely depended on the extent to which it threatened the balance o f  power in a 
given situation. Where resistance was significant, presidential power, availability of 
resources and incentives, and community participation were essential in 
overcoming such resistance.
Future research in the field of policy implementation should focus on the 
role of local coalitions in the success or failure of policies Equally important 
would be to carry out further research about the role of incentives in improving the 
implementation process, particularly in the rent-seeking bureaucratic context of 
Mexican politics. What these incentives might be and how they can be applied to 
motivate and trigger action is important in the implementation of policies in general 
but anti-poverty programmes in particular
Finally, the experiences o f PIDER, COPLAMAR and now PRONASOL 
also require more research on institutional changes that have aimed to include 
community participation in the implementation of public policies. Related to this, is 
the study of the way in which community attitudes have been shaped by those 
institutional efforts and whether they have increased the political capacity of the 
community.
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